Jul 24, 2015

Uncle Bob Wants YOU!

via BUGS

My name is Bob Whitaker and I am running for President on the American Freedom Party ticket.

I have been in active politics for over sixty years.

I worked on Capitol Hill and was a presidential appointee.

Every election year you hear people say that if you vote for a third party you “throw away your vote.”

Meanwhile, out in the real world, the only people who DON’T throw away their vote are those who either do not vote or who vote for a third party.

I am telling you this as a political professional.

The American electorate is divided into three titanic groups.  There are the Democrats, the Republicans, and the non-voters. The biggest group by far is the non-voters.

Political professionals always have that mountain of non-votes in the back of their minds.

There is one indication of where that mountain of non-voters might go if they came to the polls, and that is the tiny parties that refuse to go along with the Democrats or the Republicans.

The Prohibition Party never got as high as one percent of the vote, but Prohibition became law.

The Free Soil Party twelve years before the Civil War never got one percent of the vote, but their platform became the Republican Party and dominated America for generations.

Every political pro knows the lesson of the 1932 election.   In 1932 President Herbert Hoover ran for reelection, and he got more votes than anyone before him had ever gotten.

But Hoover wasn’t just defeated, he was crushed.   The non-voters of 1928 blamed Hoover for the Depression and they came out in their millions and threw him out of office.

The American Freedom Party needs all the usual things.  We want your vote, your money would be welcome, but what I am asking for right now is You.

We need candidates for office.

But most of all we need you to get out there and tell our rulers that we the people are sick of things as they are and we are here to tell them so.

Predestination and Predilection

via Gornahoor
Our will is truly free only in union with that of God and that God acts on earth only through our free will freely united with his. ~ Valentin Tomberg
Every incarnated human being is the product of two shaping forces: heredity and the creative force of self-realization of the eternal individuality. ~ Valentin Tomberg
Any discussion of the mystery of birth would be incomplete without an understanding of predestination and predilection as understood in the Medieval Germanic-Roman religion, which is also known as the Catholic religion. To summarize the earlier post:
  • Each person comes into the world with a set of qualities (his karmic inheritance).
  • Beyond those innate qualities, his life’s path is to actualize the possibilities open to him (his dharma path).
  • He enters the world process at a time, place, and relationships suitable for him.
Nevertheless, the story is incomplete. Ultimately, beyond such terrestrial concerns, the goal is salvation and liberation. Hence, there is a supernatural destiny beyond our ordinary life. For some reason, the doctrines of predestination and predilection are seldom mentioned today despite their enormous importance. They may be hard to understand, or even distasteful to the secular mind, so it is helpful to meditate on them. For what follows, I am relying mostly on the book Predestination by Fr Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange.


This is the Principle of Predilection:
One would not be better than another unless one were loved more by God.
Predilection and predestination are clearly radically anti-egalitarian, as that principle makes clear.

St Thomas Aquinas justifies this principle:
Since God’s love is the cause of goodness in things, no one thing would be better than another if God did not will greater good for one than for another … and the reason why some things are better than others is that God wills them a greater good. Hence it follows that He loves more the better things.
Hence good things are not better because of some accident or injustice, but precisely because God loves them more. And the most perfect good is theosis, or becoming God-like. Fr Garrigou-Lagrange explains:
Every agent acts for an end and the purpose of the action of the supreme agent is to manifest His goodness by reproducing a likeness of Himself which is a more or less perfect participation of His nature.
Predilection is both a philosophical truth, known to reason, as well as a revealed truth. As a philosophical truth, it is obvious that it is true. Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange explains:
This principle is true in every order. It is true of plants, of animals, of human beings, of angels, of things in which there is less of perfection or of goodness. It is also true of every man who, from whatever point of view, is better than another …
As a revealed, predilection is related to the gratuitous gift of grace from God which makes us pleasing. Thus, predilection, or what we consider the “good life”, may have one meaning in the natural realm, but in the supernatural, it may be completely different; the beatitudes are examples of supernatural predilection. This goodness comes from the grace of God, and makes us pleasing in his sight.

There is no injustice in this, for justice means to treat unlike things differently. Nevertheless, pride must be avoided since it is God who makes one man superior to another (Thomas Aquinas).


Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparedness on God’s part to bestow the favors by which all those are saved who are to be saved … God already knew, when He predestined, what He must do to bring His elect infallibly to eternal life. ~ St. Augustine

The doctrine of predestination follows from predilection. St Thomas defines it this way:
The plan of the direction of a rational creature towards the end, i.e., life eternal; for to destine is to direct or send.
Therefore, predestination is the plan in God’s mind of directing a particular man to the ultimate and supernatural end. This plan, from all eternity, determines the efficacious means that will lead a man to his final end.

For God, intention precedes execution, or ends before means. Hence, according to this doctrine, God will also provide the means, circumstances, and situations required to achieve the ultimate end for the elect, or predestined. This is exactly what Guenon was getting at with the notion of “compossible”. The conditions of birth need to be consistent with, and provide the necessary opportunities, to achieve salvation or liberation. A sign of being predestined is to be born into the Medieval Germanic-Roman tradition, or otherwise to have the opportunity to embrace it freely. Nevertheless, some would spurn God’s love and reject it.

Antecedent and Consequent Will

To fully grasp these doctrines, it is necessary to be clear about the difference between the antecedent and consequent will of God. What God wills antecedently may or may not take place. On the other hand, the consequent will if efficacious.

Now the antecedent will of God is for all to achieve salvation, but not all are predestined. The antecedent will is more like the Hermetic notion of Providence. To deny the antecedent will would make God responsible for “wars, concentration camps, and physical and psychical epidemics” as Tomberg points out. This view of God’s omnipotence is not uncommon and is based on presumption.

The consequent will involves the alliance of the divine will and the human will. This is not pure passivity, as Fr Garrigou-Lagrange makes clear:
The wills of men are more in God’s power than their own.
We can’t go into all the details right now, but God affects the will through graces and virtues.

Postscript on Incarnation

Tomberg’s understanding of incarnation is in general agreement with Evola’s. Tomberg writes (in Letter XX):
The individuality descends consciously and of his own free will to birth, into an environment where he is wanted and awaited.
Those are rarer cases however. For most, the incarnation is dominated more by the horizontal than the vertical.

The consequences of Tomberg’s insight have been mentioned in other contexts. Some are “born from above”, even if their memory of it is quite dim. The second birth is a remembrance of that. Many, if not most, people today, have a self-understanding of being a product of biological forces and cultural influences. They lack that true will that Tomberg mentions.
The united will constitutes the indestructible and immortal kernel of the body … its active principle, its formative will-energy, survives death.
The notion of being “adopted sons [or children] of God” is trivialized today. It leads to a spiritual infantalization, a pure passivity, the presumption that God loves you just the way you are, without any demands. As we have seen, God does not love everyone to the same degree. His real children are those who have taken on his nature. That’s what being a son means: to inherit the nature of the father, or, speaking colloquially, being a “chip off the old block.”

Nevertheless, unlike certain reformation heresies, the Germanic-Roman religion does not accept that some people are condemned at birth. God does not demand the impossible, so it is incorrect to claim that a man may be born with certain proclivities that compel him to deviate from the cosmic law. Even worse is to believe that such compulsions are therefore good and defensible.

Murderous Equality

via Alternative Right

The Khmer Rouge brought bone-deep
equality to the citizens of Cambodia
“Equality” is one of the hoariest cliches and most pernicious slogans of modern times. Said to derive from a supposedly common-sense notion of fairness, the mad clamor underway to equalize the human race in fact has no basis whatsoever in justice or reality, human or otherwise.

Indeed, the idea of equality is almost inevitably deeply debasing to a culture; pushing for greater “equality” does nothing to make the dumb smart, the ugly beautiful, or the poor rich; instead, it only makes nearly everything—be it fashion, the arts, language, commerce, or general human interaction— duller, less pleasant, less orderly, less desirable, and infinitely more tacky, tawdry, and loathsome.

More crucially, the ramming of equality down our collective gullet requires the construction of a hateful bureaucracy to monitor, control, and altogether enslave the very people it supposedly wishes to uplift and empower. The imposition of equality, that is, requires the self-appointment of a vanguard elite who arrogate to themselves the task of being the equalizers. Thus the attempt to construct a society of “equals” invariably leads to perpetual exercise of tyranny.

But how did we get to the point where this obviously insane concept came to be enshrined as an ideal? And why, after the untold carnage, horror, and heartbreak it has caused, do we still view equality as a thing worth pursuing, worth sacrificing for, a patriotic duty even? 

The term “equality,” of course, isn’t exactly new; it first sprung up as a vogue among the Western intellectual elite over two centuries ago. It in large part inspired two major political upheavals, one in America and the other in France. Upon deciding to be unencumbered states, representatives of the thirteen former English colonies in the New World signed the Declaration of Independence, which holds it to be “self-evident” that “all men are created equal”; meanwhile, those guillotine-happy men of Gaul made “egalite” one of their watchwords of revolution.

"All men are created equal?...Say WHAT, TJ?"

Far be it from me to mock and deride America’s founding fathers—they were in many ways an impressive lot. Still, their collective signing on to the concept of mankind’s equality was an astoundingly stupid gesture, which has ushered in all kinds of ideological mischief. Whatever Thomas Jefferson’s reason for including the phrase in the Declaration of Independence, this ill-defined assertion of men’s equality is vexingly vague. “All men are equal,” how exactly? Equal under the law? Equal in the eyes of God? Equal, as in “deserving the same level of income as everyone else”? TJ doesn’t say. And the matter is complicated, since—as has often been pointed out in our selectively iconoclastic age—this supposed believer in the self-evidence of human equality was also an owner of slaves.

The French revolutionaries, for their part, weren’t content merely to cozy up to abstractions. Their tireless quest was to make society much more equal by bringing the mighty low: specifically, to cut the “one percent” of their time down to size by rendering them a whole head shorter. Thousands perished in this orchestrated reign of terror, whose main aim was to promote and promulgate equality.

Once the Bolsheviks seized power in 20th-century Russia, joined later by the Maoist regime in China and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, the stakes were magnified. Now millions, and tens of millions, would be put to death for the singular crime of not being properly “equal” with their fellow men. Across the world, the quest for equality has led to carnage unequalled by any previous era in history.

One would have thought, by now, that demagogic demands to “level the playing field,” as the sinister euphemism goes, would be utterly rejected as gauche and tasteless, given the moldering mound of corpses whose pitiful and poignant stink reminds us that equalitarian rhetoric seems inextricably tied with state-sanctioned mass murder. We live in a time, after all, when any criticism of Jews is treated, in respectable circles, with extreme reflexive suspicion, if not outright hostility. Because of the bloody Shoah of recent history, one who calls Jews to task for anything in any manner or context is punished with banishment from polite society and the imputation of being complicit in genocide; such a one might as well wear a scarlet swastika sewn across his chest, like a post-modern day Hester Prynne.

But of course, not all of history’s victims are held to be equal in stature; as George Orwell famously observed, some are indeed much “more equal” than others. Thus it seems to make no difference how many tens of millions have been beheaded by the guillotine, executed in the killing fields, or sent to Siberia to starve, all for the offense of seeming to be more prosperous or of a higher social strata than the average citizen, and thus rousing the ire of a murderous revolutionary regime demanding that the high be brought low (or, as the Hutus in Rwanda broadcast their genocidal designs prior to indulging in a luridly nightmarish three weeks of unfathomably promiscuous slaughter, that the “tall trees” be cut down)… No, it seems clear that no matter how many have been ground into dust under the tyranny of enforced “equalization,” demands to make things more “equal” will continue to be not only tolerated, but approved. Those who agitate for equality are still viewed as righteous crusaders for justice, rather than properly judged as shrieking nuisances spitefully waging a campaign of terror against tradition, logic, and reality.

It was, I suppose, only a matter of time before the relentless clamoring for “gay marriage”—that is, the demand that a millennia-old institution to be suddenly redefined based on a decade-old whim of the ruling class—got reframed as a matter of “equality.” The fact that a man and a woman can get married but not two men or two women, means that things aren’t “equal” on the marriage front (so it is asserted); therefore the law must be changed to accommodate those who feel left out (or at least those among the “left out” whose cause is favored by the hive-mind of the Zeitgeist-upholders; polygamists, having as they do the flavor and complexion of ultra-conservative patriarchy, are TSOL in the new dispensation, while incestuous couples are just seen as icky and are reflexively dismissed, though in truth no legitimate reason exists to reject either innovation under the new rules, given that everyone involved is a consenting adult).

Again, one would have thought, given the equality-brigade’s altogether crummy human-rights track record throughout recent history, that those stridently demanding what is now called “marriage equality” would be looked at askance for employing such rhetoric. Indeed, if the merest whiff of sanity prevailed among the fetid fumes of our brain-dead Zeitgeist and its uncritical adherents who man our opinion-shaping institutions, then the invocation of “equality” would set off the same warning bells that “hate” now does among the highly-placed and powerful and their eager lapdogs and water-carriers. In such a world, an outfit called “equality-watch” would be keeping a wary eye on equality-agitators.

An emblem of murder, hate, and horror
As it stands, the SPLC’s “hate watch” has conniptions whenever any skinhead with an iron cross tattoo on his neck appears to sneer threateningly at an illegal immigrant, and it completely flips its lid anytime a small group of clean-cut, suit-and-tied white activists want to hold a weekend seminar in a medium-sized hotel ballroom somewhere in the United States. But far-greater malefactions are excused, or even defended, if left-leaning equalitarians commit them. (A semi-famous Hollywood actress can even wish catastrophic death upon a group of convention-goers who don’t meet her definition of “enlightened,” and nobody important seems to care, since even if her words were imprudent at least she’s on the side of the angels.

Again, as we see, the legacy of genocide, terror, and tyranny that the push for equality has engendered makes absolutely no difference; equality will remain perversely sacrosanct among our cultural betters; it will continue to be trumpeted as a good in itself, an end unquestionably worthy of fulfillment, and its conspicuous historical dark side will be downplayed, if not completely ignored. In Europe and North America, the wish to impose “equality” now carries a more and more pronounced anti-white subtext; its advocates tend to be deracinated white liberals (or SWPLs, as they are now called) who have imbibed poisonous cultural Marxism like mother’s milk, and who flatter themselves as being the vanguard of the ongoing societal revolution, ridiculously romanticizing the cultures of urban blacks, barrio Latinos, and other ethnic minorities, while viewing their conservative Middle American racial brethren with an unhinged, embittered hostility worthy of an Ellen Barkin Twitter hissy-fit.

But the truth is a mighty ally, and those of us who know better than to believe what we’re told should never hesitate to point out that our would-be vanguard are naught but a bunch of smug, self-serving, and generally ignorant brainwashed clowns. And it is a grim irony not untinged with Shadenfreude that, should a real, brutal, balls-to-the-wall, no-bullshit revolution ever actually gain momentum, these useful idiots will no doubt be the first to face the firing squad.

For 100 Years, the ADL Has Worked to Pervert Justice in the Murder of Little Mary Phagan

via Carolyn Yeager

Abraham Foxman (top) was paid
handsomely by the ADL to protect and defend
Jew criminals and perverts like Leo Frank (below)

On July 20, 2015, Abe Foxman ended his "50 years of service” to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), twenty-eight of them spent as National Director. The league itself was founded in October 1913 (the exact day cannot be found) as a direct reaction to the guilty verdict delivered on Leo M. Frank in Atlanta, Georgia two months earlier, on August 25, 1913.

Though it's played down now, the fact that a prominent Jew was exposed as a pervert rapist-murderer, and that the entire nation had followed the sensational trial testimony, horrified the Jewish establishment. Leo Frank was President of the Atlanta chapter of B'nai B'rith*, and was the son-in-law of the wealthy Jewish Selig family of that city. And now this privileged Jew, one of their own, was scheduled to BE HANGED for the murder of a 13-year old Christian girl who worked at the National Pencil Factory of which he was supervisor. 

This could not be allowed to continue.

Therefore, the "Anti-Defamation League" was created by the Independent Order of B'nai B'rith as an activist arm of the New York City-based organization, charged with the following mission:
To stop, by appeals to reason and conscience and, if necessary, by appeals to law, the defamation of the Jewish people.”
The League doesn't distinguish between the truth or falsehood of what is being said about Jews, because, to it, Jews are always innocent.

Mary Phagan autopsy photo shows the gouge in her neck from the cord that was wrapped around her neck to strangle her

Shortly after Frank was convicted by the jury, a nationwide campaign to exonerate him was inaugurated by Jewish interests. Adolph Ochs, Jewish publisher of The New York Times, was the most active; he teamed with A.D. Lasker, an "advertising genius" to carry out a number of publicity campaigns. Another New York newspaper The Sun published the headline "Jews Fight to Save Leo Frank." That was exactly accurate. 

The entire argument used by the Jews, then and now, consists of the magical charge of “anti-Semitism**” which works in every case. In the case of Leo Frank, they insist it poisoned the minds of the Southern population against him. In this way they avoid the subject of the evidence.

Frank's high priced lawyers appealed the case for two years, up to the U.S. Supreme Court, and no fault or error in the trial proceedings, and no anti-Semitism, was unearthed. But Jews don't rely on only one plan of action. On the eve of the day Frank was scheduled to hang, outgoing Georgia Gov. John Slaton commuted his sentence to life in prison, in spite of the fact that it was a conflict-of-interest. Slaton was a law partner in the same firm as Frank's lead counsel, Jew Luther Z. Rosser. Thus, Slaton commuted the sentence of a man being represented by his own law firm! 

But in commuting Frank's death sentence, Slaton admitted he found “no error of law” in the trial, that the evidence submitted was sufficient to sustain the guilty verdict, and that any charge of racial prejudice was "unfair" … but he still thought there was an element of doubt felt by many. This “doubt” however, was not felt by the newly elected incoming governor, Nathaniel Harris, who supported Frank's conviction and execution. Nor was it shared by the public, which was outraged by the move. A mob gathered at Slaton's home, and he and his wife felt the need to move out of Georgia immediately after the new governor was sworn in.

This was not anti-Semitism. This was a judgment of the people against taking too lightly the life of 13-year-old working girl . Prominent men of the community organized themselves into the “Knights of Mary Phagan,” openly planning to kidnap Frank from prison. Populist politician Tom Watson wrote in his magazine, “Lynch law is a good sign; it shows that a sense of justice lives among the people.”

As you know, the kidnapping took place and Leo Frank was lynched on the morning of August 17, 1915 outside of the town of Marietta where Mary Phagan had lived with her mother, stepfather and siblings. And it is said that still today ...

It’s the only known lynching of a Jew in American history. 

From that time to present day, the ADL and the rest of the U.S. Jewish establishment has sustained the single-minded intention to reverse the findings of that trial, to exonerate Leo Frank fully, to have the state of Georgia proclaim him to be an innocent man who was another Jewish victim of anti-Semitism in America.

The lynching of Leo Frank by the committee of 28 responsible citizens.

As you may know, the ADL's secret of success is that they never give up, and they take every opportunity to make progress toward their goal, no matter how small or seemingly unimportant. 

In 1982, the ADL of B'nai B'rith, the American Jewish Committee, Atlanta Jewish Federation and numerous other Jewish organizations used some "new information" to push for a Posthumous Pardon and Exoneration for Leo M. Frank for the murder of Mary Ann Phagan. The petition was denied on December 22, 1983. [enlarge letter]

In 2003, on the 90th anniversary of the Anti-Defamation League's founding, a monument dedicated by the ADL was placed near the inside entrance of the Mount Carmel Cemetery in Queens, NY where Leo Frank is buried.. It reads:
Leo Frank: The trial of Leo Frank in 1913 was motivated by the rampant antisemitism of the time. The founding of the Anti-Defamation League that same year was motivated by a passion to eradicate such injustice and bigotry. Despite his innocence, Frank was abducted from jail in 1915 and lynched. ADL remembers the victim Leo Frank and rededicates itself to ensuring there will be no more victims of injustice and intolerance.

Though it is a lie, the charge of “rampant antisemitism” is what the ADL is determined to associate with any Jewish wrongdoing across the breadth of this land, and to make it “the unquestioned truth” of the matter. The ADL is on the move to make the Jewish narrative on EVERYTHING the only narrative that exists This is what they mean when they say they want to “Stop the defamation of the Jewish people.” It means that any accusation against a Jew is defamation, and will not be allowed to stand.

In 2008, a Leo Frank Lynching Site historical marker was put up near the site of the 1915 lynching in Marietta. The lynching marker read:
Near this location on August 17, 1915, Leo M. Frank, the Jewish superintendent of the National Pencil Company in Atlanta, was lynched for the murder of thirteen-year-old Mary Phagan, a factory employee. A highly controversial trial fueled by societal tensions and anti-Semitism resulted in a guilty verdict in 1913. After Governor John M. Slaton commuted his sentence from death to life in prison, Frank was kidnapped from the state prison in Milledgeville and taken to Phagan's hometown of Marietta where he was hanged before a local crowd. Without addressing guilt or innocence, and in recognition of the state's failure to either protect Frank or bring his killers to justice***, he was granted a posthumous pardon in 1986.
Erected by the Georgia Historical Society, the Jewish American Society for Historic Preservation, and Temple Kol Emeth.

Because of roadway renovation, the marker had to be temporarily taken down, but now a new historical marker has been put up on the property of the Atlanta History Center, whose executive vice president is a man named Michael Rose. The new marker was put up on June 17; it honors Gov. John M. Slaton's commutation of Leo Frank's sentence. Another of the three organizations sponsoring this marker is the Jewish American Society for Historic Preservation. So two out of three, at least, are Jewish. The writing on this Slaton marker includes these words:

Concerned by the sensationalized atmosphere and circumstantial evidence that led to the notorious 1913 conviction of Jewish businessman Leo Frank in the murder of teenager Mary Phagan, Slaton granted Frank clemency in June 1915. Slaton’s commutation of Frank’s death sentence drew national attention but hostile local backlash resulted in Frank’s lynching in August 1915, and the end of Slaton’s political career 

What could be more dismissive of 13-year-old Mary Phagan than to call her a teenager? There were no “teenagers” in 1913 [the term was invented later] but there were many girls from modest families who, from the age of 12 on, left school and worked full time in factories and mills for something like ten cents an hour. In any case, a teenager can be any age from 13 to 19! This is a good example of how Jews will sacrifice even Gentile children on the alter of protecting guilty, criminal Jews.

National Pencil Company at 37-41 South Forsyth Street, Atlanta

Another of the tribe who worked to erect the 2008 marker at the lynching site is Rabbi Steve Lebow of Temple Kol Emeth in East Cobb (pictured at right). Lebow says he’s trying to get the lynching marker out of storage for a centennial event planned for next month.

Rabbi Lebow is very active in the cause of Leo Frank, and says of the pardon, “That's not enough.” He wants Frank to be declared innocent and will ask the Georgia General Assembly, Cobb County and the city of Marietta to exonerate Frank. 

This Lebow is a real character. 

His specialty is officiating at Jewish and interfaith weddings. I'm sorry if this article devolves into comedy - it's not my fault. Laughing
Rabbi Lebow in one of his typical "touchy-feely" pictures taken with a Jewish bride whose wedding he officiated.

Rabbi Lebow is also circulating a petition on the Internet but there is no groundswell of support. From reading it, I conjecture that he is not too well educated. He doesn't write well and he doesn't know the facts about the trial either. He falsely states:
Frank was subsequently convicted on false testimony, given on the stand by many suspect to be the real murderer, Jim Conley. 
Frank's trial, from beginning to end, was a legal farce. Witnesses were coerced to say they had seen Leo Frank with the girl that day. Then many of those witnesses later recanted their story. The forensic evidence had been "cooked". The jury was instructed that the girl's hair and blood had been found next to Frank's office. [Instructed by whom?]
Convinced that the entire trial had been a sham, Governor Slaton mounted an independent investigation of the crime. Slaton's conclusion was inescapable; Frank had been falsely accused and then wrongly convicted. [No, Slaton said he read over the entire trial transcript and found no errors and no reason to disagree with the verdict. The opposite of what Lebow states!]

This is the type of “reasoning” and “facts” that we get from the Leo Frank defenders, all the way up to the ADL and Abe Foxman. They have no valid arguments; they rely on victimology and the old complaint of anti-Semitism … and on downright lies. 

More to come:  Next month, on Monday, August 17, we will mark the 100th anniversary of the lynching of Leo Frank by a committee of 28 respectable, responsible men from the community. The list includes a former Georgia governor, Joseph Mackey Brown; former mayor of Marietta and later president of the Georgia Senate, Eugene Herbert Clay; the Mayor of Marietta at the time, E. P. Dobbs; lawyer and banker, part of the Marietta delegation at Governor Slaton's clemency hearing, Moultrie McKinney Sessions; several current and former Cobb County sheriffs, and other professional men. 

This was not a rag-tag band of ne'r-do-wells, and that's why they were not prosecuted. It was Gov. Slaton who had to leave the state because he took the law into his own hands in order to please or placate the Jews. How much was he paid?


*B'nai B'rith – an international fraternal order of Jews founded in 1843 in New York City. It states that it is committed to the security and continuity of the Jewish people and the State of Israel. It is affiliated with the World Jewish Congress. The Anti-Defamation League (ADL), Hillel and BBYO (originally B'nai B'rith Youth Organization) were all launched by B'nai B'rith.

**Anti-Semitism – A term invented by Jews to be used as a defense whenever a Jew is accused of criminal or otherwise harmful behavior toward Gentiles.

***He had been sentenced to die at the hands of the State; the Governor intervened without legal grounds, so how could they be called 'killers?'

What’s Wrong with Distributism: A Response

via The Distributist Review

Recently, in the Intercollegiate Review online, Mr. David Deavel published two articles, the first entitled “What’s Right with Distributism,” and the second, “What’s Wrong with Distributism.”

As an editor of The Distributist Review and indeed, one of the distributists whom Dr. Deavel mentions, I am replying to him here, not as an official reply on behalf of the Review, but simply as a private response of someone who has perhaps been as involved as any other in the contemporary revival of Distributism.

Dr. Deavel’s first article is a sort of praise of distributism, or at least of some aspects of it, and he instances four areas of agreement with distributists. First, “distributists are right to emphasize the place of morality and ethics in economics and our working lives,” next, distributists “object to the concentration of power that is so endemic in modern Western economies,” thirdly, distributists “are right that a wider distribution of wealth is essential to a healthier society,” and finally, “distributists believe, and rightly, that too much of the modern welfare state hinders the moral and social development of the human person.”

It is in his second article, however, that Dr. Deavel gives his fuller—and critical—assessment of Distributism. He begins the substance of this article by claiming that “Distributists tend to deny that economics is a real mode of knowledge in any sense. They scoff at the notion that there might be predictive laws of economic behavior, such as supply and demand.” Now while I do not necessarily blame Deavel for making statements such as “distributists tend to say this or that,” nevertheless this kind of statement can be misleading unless he provides references to a particular distributist writer, since it gives the impression that such an opinion is widely held among distributists. Speaking for myself, I have explicitly and more than once acknowledged the existence of economic laws and specifically the laws of supply and demand. I have only pointed out that such laws necessarily function within a particular cultural and legal matrix. This can easily be seen simply by observing differences in the way capitalism operates in the United States as compared with how it operates in Japan, Germany or Italy. Supply and demand are indeed constant factors in economic life, but they are not absolute factors which operate independently from everything else, nor are they necessarily always the most important factor in any given economic outcome. In addition to the legal and cultural context, the exercise of power is a fact of economic life which at times is of greater importance than the principle of supply and demand. It was not supply and demand that rewarded inefficient corporate CEOs with big bonuses and pensions while their companies were descending into bankruptcy, but the CEOs’ ability to control appointments to the compensation committees of their boards of directors. The CEOs were able to take advantage of legal and corporate rules to appoint the very people who awarded them huge bonuses and pensions. Indeed, Dr. Deavel’s frequent mention of crony capitalism indicates that he is aware that power can and often does play a role in determining economic outcomes. But if this is so, it calls into question Deavel’s criticism of distributists for our skepticism of the textbook presentation of how economies actually function. These texts present the economy as for the most part a mechanism working automatically, so that if a particular input is made, we can predict and expect a particular output. On the basis of such an understanding of economics one would predict that incompetent CEOs would be fired. Instead in many instances they were rewarded. Dr. Deavel would probably acknowledge this, but argue that this is because of the widespread cronyism in our economy, and that if only we had a truly free market, or something approximating it, we would not have these distortions of the supposedly infallible mechanical laws of economics. But in the last forty years the U.S. economy has become more, not less of a free market, and cronyism has flourished in such an atmosphere. This is only to be expected, for a free market, by its absence of regulation and oversight, allows and facilitates the very concentration of economic power that in the end gives rise to crony capitalism and other abuses.

Next Dr. Deavel propounds a thesis much beloved by certain free-market proponents, especially supporters of Austrian economics. This thesis is that the essentials of the free-market position were contained in the writings of a group of 16th and 17th-century Spanish scholastic theologians. “Distributists also tend to dismiss free market arguments as products of the secular Enlightenment, unaware that they were in fact developed not just by Christians, but by priests.” Well, I am not unaware of this claim, but it is true that I do not accept it. In support of his view Deavel mentions a work by Alejandro Chafuen, Faith and Liberty: the Economic Thought of the Late Scholastics, which is a reissue or revision of an earlier title by Chafuen, Christians for Freedom: Late-Scholastic Economics (Ignatius Press, 1986) with an introduction by Michael Novak. This earlier book I have myself read, and while obviously there is no room for a review of that work here, I can make a brief comment on it. The book is curious in that one can see a progressive difference in the statements made about free markets by Novak, Chafuen and by the scholastic writers themselves. In the first place, Novak, who apparently had not read widely in the scholastic authors under discussion, tends to view them as uncritical supporters of the free market. Chafuen, who had read them, is a bit more tempered in his claims. Then lastly the authors themselves. Here, since Chafuen provides numerous extended quotations, one can see even less of a free-market attitude. But even if it were the case that these writers held the proto-libertarian ideas sometimes attributed to them, they would still be merely a group of private theologians, whose opinions count for nothing whenever they are opposed to the papal social magisterium. (For a good discussion of the claims made about the Spanish late scholastics, see Peter Chojnowski’s article, “Corporation Christendom: the True School of Salamanca.”)

Then Dr. Deavel takes up the papal social encyclicals. Here he is on even shakier ground. First of all when he says that distributists “tend to treat papal encyclicals as if every word in them were infallible”—again, what distributist said that? I have pointed out that papal social teaching needs to be regarded just like every other instance of the ordinary magisterium. Sometimes the ordinary magisterium is ordinary and universal, and when it is, then its teaching is as binding as that of the extraordinary magisterium, as the First Vatican Council taught. So on certain points where a series of popes have taught the same thing over and over, such as the just wage, the insufficiency of free competition as the ruling principle of an economy, the institution of private property and its limitations—on such matters one can discern that the magisterium is both ordinary and universal, and thus infallible. But any reader of these encyclicals can see that the many statements in them fall into different categories, ranging from infallible statements to simple suggestions.

However, Dr. Deavel attempts to do more than point out that not everything in these documents is infallible. Sadly, he pretty much attempts to explain them away. For example, he quotes Leo XIII, “If I were to pronounce on any single matter of a prevailing economic problem I should be interfering with the freedom of men to work out their own affairs,” and then Pius XI to the effect that “economics and moral science each employs its own principles in its own sphere” and that in “matters of technique” the Church has nothing to teach. One would never suspect from Deavel’s selective quotations that both Leo and Pius taught that employers were obliged in justice to pay a living wage whenever possible, that Pius denied that free competition was a correct principle to direct an economy, and indeed that the very passage from Pius XI which Deavel quotes is part of a justification for why it is “Our right and Our duty to deal authoritatively with social and economic problems” (Quadragesimo Anno §41). It is true that the Pontiff limits that authority to questions “that have a bearing on moral conduct.” But this limitation of his teaching authority to the moral realm does not mean what many American apologists for the free market seem to think that it means or should mean or would like it to mean. For in this same encyclical Pius denounces the classical liberal idea of the state and teaches that “the civil power is more than the mere guardian of law and order” (§25), sanctions state limitations on property ownership (§49), asserts that “the wage paid to the workingman should be sufficient for the support of himself and his family” (§71), teaches that “the proper ordering of economic affairs cannot be left to the free play of rugged competition” (§88), an idea which he says originated “as from a polluted spring,” and remarks that the economic ideas of the more moderate socialists “often strikingly approach the just demands of Christian social reformers” (§113). Nor are Deavel’s quotations from Centesimus Annus to the point either, for all the key tenets of Catholic social doctrine were repeated and reaffirmed by John Paul II in that often misunderstood and sometimes dishonestly quoted encyclical. Although space prevents me from offering an extended treatment of any of the encyclicals here, on Centesimus, I refer interested readers to this article of mine which discusses it at length and the false claims often made about it: What Does Centesimus Annus Really Teach?

Dr. Deavel next asserts that “Distributist confusions go beyond the Church and extend into their ideas about the state. Complain as they will of the evils of crony capitalism…distributist solutions in fact amount to crony capitalism on a massive, societal scale. What else were medieval guilds but a system by which certain producers used the government to restrict their competition?” Well, indeed, what were the guilds, those institutions whose demise Leo XIII lamented or whose revival Pius XI and Pius XII so strongly advocated? Were they really such nefarious entities as Deavel believes? In fact the guilds did not represent crony capitalism at all, though of course they could and sometimes did develop abuses, just as every other institution peopled by fallen human beings, including the Church, can and does. Crony capitalism is the manipulation of capitalism engaged in for one’s own enrichment or the enrichment of one’s friends. The regulations that the guilds imposed were designed to provide a steady supply of goods and services to the public at a fair price, and at the same time allow each workmen enough business so that he could provide decently for himself and his family. The constant free-market catchword is competition, regardless of how many businesses fail and how much economic or social turmoil results. The medievals understood that economic activity is meant to serve our larger social life, and that as a result its goals are logically subordinate to the overall goals of humanity, including, above all, our attainment of eternal life. To those who long for the “creative destruction” of capitalism such an arrangement no doubt seems quaint, even old-fashioned, but anyone who realizes that our use of external goods in this world is meant to serve our cultural, intellectual, family and spiritual life, not supplant or distort it, will recognize in the medieval situation, as did Pius XI, “a social order which, though by no means perfect in every respect, corresponded nevertheless in a certain measure to right reason according to the needs and conditions of the times” (Quadragesimo Anno §97).

Deavel’s indictment of guilds is part of his larger attack on what he calls the distributists’ “secret lust for big government.” Very correctly he argues that distributism is not libertarian. Indeed, were it so, I would not be a distributist. I do not hesitate to say that political authority is something natural and good, as Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas held, and that the state has a proper role in economic activity, as the papal encyclicals teach. But this does not mean that distributists desire an oppressive, centralizing state. Deavel attempts to paint distributists as statists by bringing up extraneous matters, such as Belloc’s and Chesterton’s qualified and temporary support for Mussolini. Since anyone is free to call himself a distributist, I cannot vouch for the views of every single one, but the central distributist movement as represented by The Distributist Review has no interest in fascist economic theory, whatever anyone in the very different historical situation of the 1920s may have thought or said. Distributism as an economic concept stands or falls on what the leading distributist thinkers of both past and present said about it, not about other matters with no relevance to today.

Next, in the section entitled, Are You a Price Slave?, Deavel asserts a number of varying things which revolve around the fact that the economy necessarily involves the cooperation of many different persons. Of course this is true, and Deavel knows that distributists know this too. In his first article he had mentioned the Spanish Basque Mondragon cooperatives and the cooperatives of the Emilia Romagna region of Italy, both of which are rightly seen by distributists as an example of successful Distributisism in the context of an industrialized economy. One can hardly claim that capitalism alone depends upon cooperation. Distributist use of the term “wage slave” is meant to highlight the fact that such employees are economically entirely dependent upon their employers, and if they lose their jobs, have nothing to fall back upon. Capitalism can hardly claim a monopoly on economic cooperation, for some type of cooperation is necessary in any economy, no matter how organized. In fact, with Distributism, such cooperation is more likely to be unforced than either in capitalism or any kind of totalitarian economy.

Lastly, Deavel suggests that, in fact, many of the good things distributists advocate are “already available in a free market system. You are free to shop only at small businesses, and get your produce straight from family farms… If enough people make those choices, that will help support an ample, thriving sector of independent farms and businesses….” This is true as far as it goes—we can and should choose to patronize such establishments whenever possible. So is Dr. Deavel therefore right that distributists should simply limit their goal to persuading people to frequent farmers markets and small shops, all within the context of free-market capitalism? I do not think so. In the first place, the economic and even political power of corporations is so vast in comparison with the local producers he mentions that any fundamental change in the economy is very unlikely. In fact, should small businesses and farmers ever become so numerous that they threaten the corporate dominance of the economy, one can be certain that corporations will take effective steps to limit or destroy such local producers and suppliers.

More fundamentally, though, those who recognize that economic activity is an integral part of the social order cannot be content with the arrangement that Deavel suggests. Just as any person of good will ought to be disturbed by indications of family pathology in society, no matter how well his own family is doing, so one can hardly look at the economy as someone else’s problem, so long as one has ready access to farmers markets and boutique shops. Just as the health of families is an important factor in our general social or cultural health, so is it with the economy. The economy is more than merely about exchange of goods or services; its operations affect how we live, affect the livelihood of individuals and families, and contribute toward the shaping of our culture. Even those who attempt to limit their buying to small shops and farmers markets are affected by the corporate-controlled economy. How could it be otherwise? We are parts of a whole and the social order necessarily has an effect on everyone and on our common culture. The economy ought to be everyone’s concern, but everyone’s concern as a moral matter, as an important part of our concern for the common good. To quote from Pius XI once more, the economy is supposed to be built on moral principles so that “particular economic aims, whether of society as a body or of individuals, will be intimately linked with the universal teleological order, and as a consequence we shall be led by progressive stages to the final end of all, God Himself, our highest and lasting good” (Quadragesimo Anno §43). Dr. Deavel’s suggestion is of a piece with his free-market orientation, an orientation which at bottom prescinds from a recognition that there is a common good, a shared concern that demands the attention and care of every citizen – just as it affects the moral and even physical health of every citizen.

As far as one can judge based on his biographical note, Dr. Deavel is a sincere Catholic dedicated to serving the Church. Part of the education of future priests has been entrusted to him, and I am sure he takes this weighty responsibility seriously. Therefore, it is especially saddening to see his failure to see the forest in his preoccupation with the trees. The glaring fact is that the free-market capitalist economy, as a real historical thing existing in the world, has been the engine of a society whose ideals are at odds with those of Christian society. Instead of looking around to see if there might be some Catholic theologian somewhere whose teachings might have some sort of kinship with free-market ideologues, instead of parsing the papal social encyclicals so as to restrict as much as possible their teaching authority, I would hope that Dr. Deavel would simply open his eyes and look—at both the past and the present. Catholic societies were not those that embraced the ideals championed by Enlightenment economists, and in the 19th century Catholic thinkers were among the first who turned to the medieval thinkers, especially St. Thomas, not in order to justify the laissez-faire of their liberal contemporaries, but to find an alternative to their free-market doctrines in Catholic tradition. We cannot compartmentalize our minds so that, while seeking to uphold the Church’s teaching on most points, as no doubt Dr. Deavel does, at the same time accommodate ourselves to a doctrine, to an entire system of social life, that is fundamentally at odds with Catholic teaching and tradition. One can only hope that deeper reflection on the part of Dr. Deavel will produce a change of mind—indeed, a change of heart—so that he will realize that Catholic teaching and tradition extend not merely to how an individual lives, but to how whole societies and whole civilizations live, and that he will recognize in the statements of popes, even when they do not exercise their infallible authority, the authentic mind of the Church on social questions, and see in their vision of a Christian society the genuine Apostolic tradition. The fragmented society which has been bequeathed to us by the Liberalism of the 18th and 19th centuries can hardly commend itself to any Catholic who thinks long and much on the social expression of the Faith, and I appeal to Mr. Deavel to allow his Catholic sensibilities to permeate all of his thinking, and to make his own the words and sentiments of the sovereign pontiffs as they expound the law and teachings of Jesus Christ for the social order.

The Anti-Civilization: There Is Nothing at the Heart of the West

via Radix

In his famous book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996), Samuel P. Huntington put forward the thesis, popular with large sections of the “Right,” that the post-Cold-War world would be shaped by its major civilizations and their interactions.

For some, it was the gently coded recognition of race that appealed; for others, it was the stigmatization of Islam as a rather unpleasant civilization that rang true; whatever the case, the book became, for better or worse, a landmark of political science. This makes it an ideal starting point for considering the topic of civilizations in general and the problematic nature of the West in particular.

Clash is well written in that it deploys supportive data for its theories in the correct amounts and at reassuring intervals, but there is also an extremely misshapen feel to Huntington’s thesis that stems from the following factors:
  1. Overemphasis on religion
  2. Questionable demarcation of civilizational boundaries
  3. Superficial definition of civilization
  4. Cowardice regarding race
  5. Confusion about the true nature of the West


The map showing the “World of Civilizations” in Huntington’s book presents nine civilizations, namely Western, Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic (Chinese), Hindu (Indian), Orthodox (largely Russian), Buddhist, and Japanese.

Huntington’s scheme relies heavily on religion as a defining factor. This is especially noticeable in his Buddhist “civilization,” which includes such disparate countries and climate zones as Thailand, Tibet, and Mongolia—three countries that have little in common except for the fact that they are Buddhist. Given their relative unimportance, it would perhaps have been more elegant to have simply included them as peripheral regions of Sinic civilization.

Religion is also the unacknowledged basis for his Western civilization, which throws together Catholic and Protestant countries, while strangely excluding heavily Europeanized parts of South America and Africa. Given the widespread lack of faith in most of the West, this seems odd. Religion also allows him to divide Russia and its satellites from the West—with Greece thrown in as a kind of going away present. Another major problem is India. Just as American maps of the world have two Indias, one on each side, so Huntington seems to think there are two, allocating the whole country to both the Islamic and Hindu civilizations.

Huntington makes a strong case for the inherent aggressiveness of Islamic civilization, based on the number of intra-civilizational and inter-civilizational conflicts. This is something that has given the book neoconservative appeal, but there are other obvious explanations for this aggression, like Islam’s comparative lack of political unity and the fact that it borders more civilizations than other civilizations.

One of the weaknesses of Huntington’s book is that he is never clear about what a civilization actually is. His best definition comes on page 43, but is sketchy and subjective:
A civilization is the broadest cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity. . . . A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. . . .
Civilizations are the biggest “ we” within which we feel culturally at home as distinguished from all the other “thems” out there.
The key point in this definition is that a civilization is something that people “feel” comfortable belonging to. Rather than just being a member of the same civilization that your parents were part of, it is now far more important how you “feel” about it.

This effectively turns “civilization” into an expression of late 20th-century consumerism. Your civilization could almost be something you pick off the shelf, like a pack of soap powder. Needless to say, following this principle in practice would cause havoc with Huntington’s civilizational map.

The reason Huntington favors religion as the civilizational “sorting hat” is that it loosely reflects race and therefore gives his thesis a quality readers can empathize with, but also allows him to avoid mentioning the dreaded R-word itself—quite literally, as the book’s index has no mention of “race” or its equivalents! The idea of distinct zonal civilizations, however, is implicitly racial because such civilizations can only emerge through a degree of sustained demographic stability. Left-wing critics of Huntington realize this and have concentrated their attacks on this point.

To talk about Western civilization as Huntington does is to slyly evoke the idea of Western European man. Western civilization is how the phrase “White race” is whispered in the modern, politically correct era. Huntington must have known this—and that implicit racialism would likely make his book provocative and successful—but he also knew that he could not make race explicit. As a successful academic and part of the establishment, he had to maintain deniability. His slyness was his cowardice.

The Uniqueness of the West

But enough about quibbles! The book’s main weakness lies at its very heart, in the idea that the West is just another civilization, and an old one at that, dating from around the time of Charlemagne, according to Huntington.

Huntington often admits that the West is unique among civilizations, but he fails to proceed to the next logical step, i.e. considering whether the West is in fact something entirely different:
The West obviously differs from all other civilizations that have ever existed in that it has had an overwhelming impact on all other civilizations that have existed since 1500. It also inaugurated the process of modernization and industrialization that have become worldwide, and as a result societies in all other civilizations have been attempting to catch up with the West in wealth and modernity. Do these characters of the West, however, mean that its evolution and dynamics as a civilization are fundamentally different from the patterns that have prevailed in all other civilizations? The evidence of history and the judgments of the scholars of the comparative history of civilizations suggest otherwise. The development of the West to date has not deviated significantly from the evolutionary patterns common to civilizations throughout history.
When he says that the West differs from all other civilizations, he appears to mean in terms of its power, technology, and early industrialization. He is therefore only describing effects rather than providing causes. This approach allows the power of the West to chime with the implicit Whiteness evoked by his civilizational categories, giving his readers a quiet, sweaty-palmed moment of racial smugness. It becomes more and more apparent that the book is subliminal, low-key, middle-brow White Pride porn. But mental masturbation is just mental masturbation, an action by the impotent to feel potent. It does not help us to understand civilization or the problem posed by the West.

If the West is different from all other civilizations, then that is clearly important, but Huntington shows little inclination to explore this question, even though it cries out for deeper analysis. But just how are we to approach this? Standard academic procedure would be to select your preferred theory first and then sift through a welter of micro-data until you found facts and figures that confirmed your pre-selected view.

Rather than following this disingenuous course, I will refer to macro empirical points of comparison that will establish the uniqueness of the West in an easily observed and objective way. My three areas of comparison are:

  1. Civilizational Morphology
  2. Civilizational Consistency
  3. Civilizational Behavior

Civilizational Morphology

Like countries, civilizations have definite shapes. Although their borders may be less precise, they tend to occupy specific parts of the globe. Using this as an empirical standard, we can see that all civilizations except the West have a reasonably compact form.

The West by contrast has a divided and disparate form: the core is in Europe, the largest piece is thousands of miles further West, and there are other pieces scattered all around the globe in such far flung places as Australia, New Zealand, and, according to Huntington’s map, even French Guyana.

This patchy pattern would be even more apparent if the more European parts of South America and Africa were included in the West. But then, that would have raised the issue of race in too explicit a manner for Huntington’s liking.

Interestingly, disparate morphology is something that can also be detected in the Medieval West, and in the main civilization that preceded the West, namely the Roman Empire.

With Western enclaves in Palestine, parts of Greece, the remoter regions of the Baltic, and even Greenland, as well as an alien civilization occupying much of the Iberian Peninsula, the Medieval West was also an oddly shaped civilization. The same could be said for the Roman Empire, whose main problem throughout its history was cumbersome, over-extended borders—for example, Dacia. In strict morphological terms, The West and its predecessors have always lacked the compactness common to almost all other civilizations. Imperial overstretch has always been with us.

Civilizational Consistency

Another major empirical point of difference between the West and all other civilizations is in civilizational consistency over time. The essence of a civilization should not radically alter over the centuries. A consistent core of features, customs, and qualities will normally be retained. China today is still recognizably the same civilization as China of the Ming or Han period. Similar points could be made regarding Islamic and Hindu civilizations, and even the intensely modernized Japanese civilization.

The West, by contrast, shows marked inconsistencies. The values and characteristics of today are unrecognizable from those of 100 years ago, which are themselves markedly different from those of 500 years ago or 1000 years ago, when Christ was being peddled to the Danes as some kind of warrior god. In short, the West is flux.

Civilizational Behavior

Due to people’s limitations in geography and history, this is the most obvious difference between the West and the rest. There are things that normal civilizations do that the West simply doesn’t do and vice versa. We can break some of this down into the following categories: 1. Demography 2. Technology 3. Conflict 4. Propaganda


Perhaps the most noticeable thing that the West doesn’t do these days is defend itself demographically. The vast majority of civilizations, even in their dotages, attempt to prevent the demographic displacement of their peoples. the West, by contrast, is supposed to be the mightiest civilization, yet it freely allows and even assists widespread intrusion and colonization of its territories by outsiders.

Interestingly, the closest any other civilization has come to this is Islamic civilization, which has important macro-historical similarities with Christianity. This also encouraged large flows of people into its civilization in the form of slaves from the South and mercenaries from the North, accounting for some of the interesting genetic mixes to be found in the “Arab” countries, but even in this case, there was a clear attempt to keep the incomers subordinated, although in the case of the Seljuk and Mameluke “slave mercenaries” this clearly backfired.

The West by contrast offers its invaders free medical care, housing, welfare, and a host of other benefits, including a half share in the Presidency of the United States. Also, the more different the invaders are, the more it seems to welcome and assist them. While Eastern Europeans are expected to work as the price of admission into Western Europe, Somalians, Afghans, and Congolese merely have to show up. This effectively gives a green light for various forms of race replacement and the radical alteration of the demographic character of the civilization.

Considering all previously existing civilizations, these patterns of behavior are simply an aberration. Some try to pass this off as an effect of modernity, but even civilizations that are as modern and economically developed as the West, like Japanese civilization and parts of the Sinic civilization, refuse to behave like this.


Another behavior pattern of the West is equally unique and baffling. While all civilizations try jealously to guard their business, military, and technological advantages, the West goes out of its way to facilitate massive transfers of technology and manufacturing capability.

The Chinese famously carefully guarded their economic secrets, banning the export of silk worms and tea plants so that these had to be smuggled out of the country; while the secrets of porcelain production were so carefully guarded that they had to be independently reinvented by the potters of Meissen.


All civilizations will enter into conflict with other civilizations for a range of understandable, if not always commendable, reasons. Sometimes these conflicts have played a vital role in human progress. The West, however, is unique for the pointlessness of its conflicts. This is especially true today, where we are being treated to TV images of squaddies doing the rounds in Afghan villages, while non-profit organizations try to translate The Female Eunuch into Farsi.

Again, there is a temptation to see this as some kind of side effect of modernity, but it is also possible to find Medieval and Classical examples that bear a surprising resemblance, most notably in the Crusades and Roman attempts to subjugate economically unimportant wildernesses, such as Germania and Caledonia. Before this, there were also the heroic but essentially pointless campaigns of Alexander the Great in Central Asia.


Normal civilizations have identity. Those who belong to them know, without thinking or conscious statement, exactly who they are. They exude what they are rather than proclaim it. the West, by contrast, is always trying to publicize and propagandize what it is, repeatedly affirming and broadcasting its values, as if not quite sure of them. The reason for this is quite simple. The values of the West are, for the most part, meaningless universalisms and negatives that can only exist in a state of constant affirmation.

The Values of the West

Before I precisely explain the negativity of these values, it is useful to establish context by examining how the characteristics of Western civilization have changed. Huntington’s definition of the characteristics is a bit of a grab bag along the lines of “what those other guys said,” but the format of the middle-brow academic book forces him to bullet point his confusion. He lists the following as the defining characteristics of the West before it modernized: 1. The Classical legacy 2. Catholicism and Protestantism 3. European languages 4. Separation of spiritual and temporal authority 5. Social pluralism (also described as the existence of “diverse autonomous groups”) 6. Representative bodies (by which he means multi-polar parliaments, such as the French Estates or the British Houses of Lords and Commons) 7. Individualism
It is noticeable that rather than defining the West as it exists today, he is forced to rewind by 200 or 300 years, and even then, he admits that many of the elements listed above were not exclusive to the West. But this is the closest that he comes to defining Western Civilization, so we should be grateful for that at least.

An examination of these seven characteristics of the West immediately drives home the major empirical point about the civilizational inconsistency of the West. What Huntington is describing is demonstrably not the West in which we live. The past in this case is not so much another country as another civilization.

Viewed from the present, this list starts to fall apart and mutate in front of our eyes. Points 1 (Classical Legacy), 2 (Catholicism and Protestantism), 4 (Separation of spiritual and temporal authority), and 6 (Representative bodies) have clearly not dated well. Also, even in an earlier historical era, 4 effectively counteracted and minimized the influence of 2, which is very much the case today, where religion is largely relegated to a personal issue of less social importance than one’s hairstyle.

If we attempt to maintain the principle of civilizational consistency by staying as close to Huntington’s list as possible, we still have to make significant changes to update it for our own times.

We would have to discard Points 1 and 4 entirely. The Classical legacy is now confined to the extremely unfashionable end of academia, while the separation of spiritual and temporal authority only makes sense in a society that has a strong spiritual authority, which is clearly not the case with the West. Of the five remaining Points, 2, 3, 5, and 6 would have to be radically redefined.

Catholicism and Protestantism would shrink to become “minor identitarian role for Christianity (optional);” European languages would have to be altered to reflect the increasing linguistic diversity of the West, perhaps substituting the term “Tower of Babel;” the “diverse autonomous groups” of the social pluralism category could be replaced with “diverse racial and sexual identity groups”; and Representative bodies could be altered to “Pooled electorate with detached professional political class.” The two defunct characteristics could be replaced by two new characteristics. As the Classical legacy was mainly enshrined in our universities, this gap could be filled with “Cultural Marxism and Political Correctness,” which holds sway there now; while the element of denial implicit in the old separation of spiritual and temporal authority could be served by replacing it with anti-nationalism, which might also be termed “White guilt.” This would give us the following heavily revised Huntingtonian list of characteristics to define the West as we now know it:
  1. Cultural Marxism and political correctness
  2. Minor identitarian role for Christianity (optional)
  3. Tower of Babel
  4. White Guilt
  5. Social pluralism (diverse racial and sexual identity groups)
  6. Pooled electorate and detached professional political class
  7. Individualism

Civilization is Positive

While this is amusing, trying to stick with Huntington’s categories is obviously akin to taking the long way round. When people talk about “Western values” today, they invariably mean things like “freedom,” “choice,” “individualism,” “equality,” “human rights,” etc. These are lovely words and, indeed, words that most of us instinctively agree on. But the reason we love these words is because of their negativity and vacuity.

“Negative” is a loaded word, so I am forced here to “unload” it. By negative I don’t mean bad, bleak, or depressing, but negative in the almost mathematical sense of something missing—a gap, a space, that which is unfilled and unformed, a void.

This is why we like these words. It is their very vacuity that draws us in. When we hear these terms we instantly think of our own freedom, our own choice, and our own individual natures. In other words, we take a hollow word and fill it with ourselves. “Freedom” in itself is meaningless. It only becomes meaningful when we imagine how we would use it. This explains the power and popularity of such rhetoric. But when the principle is extended throughout a whole society or civilization, then problems are sure to arise.

While we crave our freedom, we may object to that of others. The heterosexual may scorn the openly homosexual (and vice versa), the indigenous may resent the assertive incomer (and vice versa), so that “freedom,” “choice,” “individualism,” and the rest of them have to be enforced from above, creating a tendency towards totalitarianism that goes hand in hand with the apparently affirmative individualism of these negative values.

True civilization, by its very nature, is collective and positive, and as a result does not require the statist imposition of “values.” It seeks to create a degree of similarity and sympathy between people through shared culture, history, morality, and habits. This can only be done through “positive” values.

But, once again, “positive” is a loaded word, so I will have to “unload” that, too. By positive I don’t mean good, fine, or dandy, but positive in the almost mathematical sense of something that is there, something clear and substantial, a decided idea, a belief, a definite opinion, not a mental vacuum.

One of the functions of civilization is to shape its people, to give them a collective set of precepts, a way of looking at the world, and an identity. The West, by contrast, is based on the negation of this civilizational idea. Any residue of this, such as Christian notions that homosexuality is wrong or sentimentality about national identity, are attacked by the establishment and the controlled culture of the “Anti-civilization.”

By destroying the collective and corrective principles of civilization, the West that we see today threatens its own unity and is therefore forced to rely on totalitarian substitutes. The morality of the West becomes the enforcement of the anti-morality: gay rights, the mass murder of fetuses, a culture of divorce and one-parent families, the privileges of the immigrant over the rights of the indigenous, the enforced equivalence of all forms of dysfunction with normalcy; while its identitarianism becomes a negative one of not belonging to the despised groups, the “racists,” “neo-Nazis,” and “haters,” who crave a positive civilizational identity.

The “Natural Civilization”

But where did something as unique and frightening as the Anti-civilization come from? It is not simply the product of a few decades of Leftist agitation, nor is it down to a cadre of sneaky Ashkenazi. The roots of the problem predate the influence of those two often interrelated groups by at least two millennia.

The rootless Anti-civilization has deep roots that pass through and play their part in much that could be counted as civilization. But in order to diagnose disease, you first need to define health. In order to do this, we need a working idea of a “natural civilization.”

Luckily I happen to live in a reasonable approximation to one. Of the nine civilizations that Huntington includes in his book, the smallest is Japan, my home for the last several years. So, what characteristics would we associate with the “natural civilization”? Simple deductive reasoning suggests the following:
  1. Geographical identity
  2. Cultural continuity
  3. Demographic continuity
  4. Centricity (symbolic, cultural, or religious centers and heartlands)
  5. Local rootedness
  6. Modulated openness
(These characteristics are related to the macro-empirical points used to establish the uniqueness of the West, namely, morphology, consistency, and behavior.)

Japanese civilization is strong in all six of the above characteristics. Being an archipelago, it has a clear geographical identity and it has existed continuously for thousands of years. This has allowed it to develop a high degree of centricity, through cultural and religious centers like Kyoto and Ise, and local rootedness, with people feeling deeply attached to their hometowns and the graves of ancestors.

A possible drawback with the first four factors is civilizational parochialism, which can be impoverishing in terms of technology and other ideas. However, Japan has always been open to other cultures and civilizations, mainly the Sinic and Western civilizations, and it has been able to enrich its civilization without destroying it or seeing it replaced.

Left to themselves, most civilizations have a tendency to develop along similar lines, although clearly each would do so in its own way, at its own level, and relative to its environment and the qualities of its people. A similar pattern can be seen in the Sinic and Hindu civilizations, as well as several that are no longer with us, such as the Andean and Meso-American.

Gestation of the Anti-Civilization

With the idea of the “natural civilization” to guide us, we can now detect anomalies in the development of the Anti-civilization of the West that will help us understand its aberrant nature. There are three main historical stages in the creation of the Anti-civilization, each of which was also partly a reaction to its predecessor: 1. Romanization 2. Christianization 3. Liberalization What is known as the “Alternative Right” includes several tendencies, including neo-paganism and neo-Christianity. The latter see the evils of the modern West as springing from secularization, while the former see Christianity as the root of the problem. Both groups clearly perceive part of the bigger picture.


While the growth of Sinic civilization was broadly based on a large ethnic Han population, the growth of the Roman Empire at roughly the same time was not. This was the result of differential demographic and geographic factors, with the Romans starting from a smaller population base and expanding across a more disjointed land mass.

Unlike the main population centers of Europe and the Mediterranean, which are divided into peninsulas and islands, or by the sea or the Alps, the centre of Chinese population is united by the surrounding mountains, desert, and sea. This favored geographical identity, demographic and cultural continuity, centricity, and local rootedness. Roman civilization, by contrast, became more de-centered as it grew, developing, via conquest, military occupation, demilitarization of the conquered, and an uprooted slave population. Power moved increasingly to the periphery, as that was where the army was located.

As the Roman Empire weakened politically, economically, and militarily, its natural geographical and ethnic disunity reasserted itself. Parts of the Empire reverted to older ethnic cultures—Greeks and Berbers, for example—but in much of the empire, a demographic void had been created into which new peoples (mainly Germans and later in the East, Arabs) were drawn. Contrast this with the Sinic or Hindu civilizations. Even when the dynasties collapsed, demographic stability remained.


The processes of Romanization and Christianization overlap. (Islamification, which occurred in the eastern and southern part of the Roman Empire at a later date, is a related phenomenon that reflects similar forces.)
As a civilization struggling with its geographical ambiguity, demographic divisions, lack of rootedness, and fluctuating centricity, Roman civilization was drawn to Christianity because of its transcendent, reductionist and centralizing qualities. The emperors saw it as a means of tightening their grip on society as the Empire built around that society waned. In other words, it served as a substitute for the organic unity that the Empire lacked.

With the Empire sliding further into chaos, Christianity then effectively became the shadow Empire. Unable to better the barbarian hordes in battle, the civilization retreated into its churches and monasteries and set about rebuilding its power through offering the barbarian rulers the same advantages that it offered the Emperors.

By making its power less ostensible, Christianity was also able to spread much further than Rome’s legions had. Along with the remnants of Roman civilization and the Germanic cultures of the dominant invaders, it also provided the basis for a new civilization, which Huntington calls Western. Given the problems of civilizational consistency, it would be more accurate to see this as a predecessor of the West, called Christian civilization, which lasted at least into the late 18th century.

Just as the characteristics of Roman civilization—militarism, imperialism, colonization, Romanization, and a rootless slave population—derived from the degree to which that civilization deviated from the conditions of the “natural civilization,” so, too, with Christian civilization, which also lacked geographic and demographic contiguity, centricity, and rootedness.

A vast disparate geographical area, containing a wide variety of people, was united by this civilization. As its power spread and tightened, its unnaturalness became increasingly manifest in the following symptoms: 1. Brainwashed rootless elite 2. Geographical incontinence 3. The repression of localism 4. Cultural schizophrenia 5. Outbreaks of mass hysteria The Church de-cultured and denatured its recruits, removing them from their original culture, and even from their roles as men and warriors or women and mothers. Christian civilization had no geographical sense of itself. This was manifest in its frequent missions and attempts at mass convert in distant lands, as well as the Crusades. In short, it was geographically incontinent.

Partly this was the result of its rootless and otherworldly nature. As a corollary of this, it also strongly repressed any traces of localism, destroying local gods and traditions or subsuming them into its own pantheon of saints and calendar of festivals. The fact that it could not subjugate directly as the Romans had done, also meant that Christian civilization developed into a schizophrenic culture, with religious and secular sides. The secular side tended to develop in the direction of the “natural civilization,” leading to the creation of the German Reich, while the religious side tended to oppose this.

The unnaturalness of these various arrangements led to constant strains as well as an element of paranoia resulting in increasing hysteria that was reflected in purges of heretics, crusades, inquisitions, Antipopes, and finally schisms and sectarianism. The fanaticism expressed in these acts is testament to the unnaturalness of this civilization.

While the modern West can be defined by its “negative” values, Christian civilization was defined by an excess of “positive” values, imperatives designed to shape and control every aspect of life, from diet, dress, and belief to art, music, and architecture. This was all part of its unnatural attempt to impose an order and unity that was not naturally there.

Islamic civilization, in the southern and eastern Mediterranean, Persia, and Central Asia, represents a similar drive to impose artificial civilizational unity on an unwieldy and diverse area.


Civilizations that approximate more to the conditions of the “natural civilization,” such as the Hindu, Sinic, and Japanese civilizations, seldom feel the need to be as imperative as either the Christian or Islamic civilizations. The process by which they shape their populations is less overt but more immersive.

Between the fall of the old Christian civilization, which can be linked for the sake of convenience to the date of the French Revolution, and the rise of the Anti-civilization of the West, which we can peg to the 1960s, there was an intermediate period of nearly 200 years, during which Christianity remained important, especially as a force for social cohesion, but was increasingly subordinated to a secular, materialist culture, economy, and ruling elite. It seems natural to refer to this intervening entity as secular Christian civilization.

From Positive to Negative

The exact processes by which Christian civilization led to secular Christian civilization, and then the modern West, are extremely complex, but a review of the main macro empirical factors correlated with the concept of a “natural civilization” suggest that the West and its predecessors—the Roman, Christian, and secular Christian civilizations— occupy a vector of civilizational instability that works against the conditions of the ideal “natural civilization.”

This instability, which is partly geographical in origin, generates civilizations with extreme characteristics that emerge as reactions to their predecessors, in a kind of wild zigzagging pattern: the overly aggressive militarism of the Romans is succeeded by the passive aggression and positivist morality of the Christians, which is then supplanted by the negative idealism and totalitarian tendencies of the modern West.

The latest stage of this process has created a civilization that can best be described as an Anti-civilization, as it is founded on what are essentially “negative” values rather than the “positive” ones that characterize all other and preceding civilizations.

There is a tendency on the Right to view the characteristics of the modern West as symptoms of long-term decline and to conclude, along with Huntington, that what we are witnessing is the Spenglerian sunset of an aged civilization. But the modern West as a distinct—and it is very distinct—entity is, at most, only a mere four decades old.

So, how will this new Anti-civilization of the West play out? As a new geopolitical mutation, is it inherently unstable and liable to collapse within decades (rather than centuries), or will it achieve a stable symbiosis with the global economy? Also, will its anti-values, with their strong subjective appeal, contaminate and corrode the other civilizations, creating a soulless and necessarily totalitarian global system? And what of the fate of those already living under its baleful influence, the largest part the White European race? Will they find a way to reject and overthrow the Anti-civilization from within? Or will they continue to unwittingly support it as it inexorably grinds them down into minority status? This raises one last question, is the Anti-civilization dependent for its existence on the dominance of this race, and with its fall, will it also see its own end?