Nov 20, 2014

Will Whites Regain Political Control of Their Lands (and thus Their Destinies)?

via American Renaissance

White Americans are “scheduled” to become a minority around about 2042, although they will continue to be the majority of voters for a few years longer. This trend is usually greeted with pessimism and hand-wringing by race realists, but at some point it will almost certainly create a surge of racially conscious white political power.

Already there are signs that whites are starting to think, feel, and vote like a minority–placing their identity and group interests first–and this trend to vote identity over policies will only increase.

In the 2012 presidential election, the vote in several Southern states reflected what can only be incipient white racial consciousness. Mr. Romney won no less than 89 percent of the white vote in Mississippi, 84 percent in Alabama and Louisiana, and more than 70 percent in Georgia and South Carolina. In the country as a whole, only 35 percent of white men voted for Mr. Obama (42 percent of white women voted for him), in an election that saw a decline in white turnout compared to 2008.

The recent midterm elections continued this trend, with white men voting Republican two to one. The midterms also had a low turnout, but that cuts both ways: A higher turnout might only increase the white vote for what is the default white party.

Increased identitarianism and increased apathy, while appearing to be opposites, are actually two sides of the same coin and part of the pattern that arises as a political system that is based on differences of political and economic ideas transitions into an ethnopolitical system.

As demographic changes make race increasingly salient, increasing numbers of voters feel apathy for parties like the two main parties in America that do not overtly express a racial identity. At the same time, voters with ethnic and racial affinities try to project that identity onto parties that are not expressly identitarian.

Apathy is clearly driving the lower-than-normal white vote in recent elections. As for the projection of identity onto non-identitarian parties, this has been going on for decades, with Jews, Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians voting Democratic and Southern whites voting Republican, regardless of conflicting economic or social issues.

At some point, however, the identitarian voting patterns will express themselves more consistently, at first in a coded way but then with a tendency towards increasing explicitness. American politics are still largely at the coded stage–with an extra layer of denial serving only to confirm this–but the trend is unmistakable. As this trend develops, we can expect to see less apathy, and the political expression of increasingly clear racial interests.

The implicit indentarianism of the Republican Party already means that whites must be much more motivated by ideology or party platform to vote Democrat rather than Republican. For Democrats, the same can be said for Jews and Asians, whose economic interests would be best served by the Republican Party but who vote Democrat instead.

In the future, the degree of political motivation required for whites to vote Democrat will only increase, so that only the most radical and committed left-wing whites will continue to vote Democrat.

Spoiler parties

Some will say that if whites become a minority, surely it doesn’t matter who they vote for, especially if a significant portion of them continue to vote with the non-white majority.

This view hinges on the idea that being a minority implies a united majority opposed to that minority, in a kind of zero-sum game. This is far from the case, but it is easy to see why Americans think this way, conditioned as they are to a two-party system.

Despite the dominance of the duopoly, America has an interesting history of third-party politics, including the efforts of the Libertarian Party in the recent elections, which, according to VDARE.com, may have cost the Republicans a senate seat:
Libertarian Robert Sarvis took 53,000 votes in the Old Dominion, far greater than Republican Ed Gillespie’s losing margin of 16,700. That’s a significant 2.5 percent. As the Washington Post’s Norman Leahy and Paul Goldman gloated, ‘2014 is apparently the first time in Virginia that a protest candidate decided the outcome of a major election.’
A better example is the presidential campaign of Al Gore. One reason often cited for his narrow failure to become president was the 2.74 percent of the vote that went to Ralph Nader’s Green Party, which took many more votes from the Democrats than from the Republicans. Similarly, how much of Bill Clinton’s success was due to the spoiler role that Ross Perot’s 19 percent and 8 percent of the vote played in the 1992 and 1996 elections?

In a two-party system, where the two main parties have a tendency to converge on a center by adjusting their policies to counteract each other, and where winning margins are typically narrow, a third or even fourth party’s spoiler effect has the potential to shift the results dramatically.

History shows that both Democrats and Republicans are vulnerable to this threat, but how will this vulnerability be impacted by demographic change? Consider the Libertarian Party’s effect on the Virginia mid-terms. The party appeals to a small, overwhelmingly white group of voters, but even to get a small percentage of whites to vote for it required that it have a well worked out economic and political theory and some kind of track record: The party has existed since the 1970s and has been scoring over a million votes at most presidential elections for over a decade.

Still, part of the Libertarian Party’s limited success stems from the apathy that whites feel towards the “main white party.” As whites diminish as a percentage and identitarian sentiments strengthen, the ground becomes even less fertile for parties like the Libertarians, who could see their support drawn off yet further by the eventual emergence of an explicitly white party.

It is obvious that the Democrats are inherently less unified than the Republicans, and more prone to defection. It would be easy to start a third party that appealed to parts of the Democratic Party’s coalition of races. Any such party would simply need to declare its advocacy of black or Hispanic interests in a context in which voting for it would produce perceived benefits, even if they were only emotional.

Let us imagine a Democratic administration forced to implement a policy of austerity in a metropolitan area with a majority black population, or having to enforce order over an issue of race and policing, as is now the case in Ferguson. Any reasonably organized and funded black party rising up to challenge the Democrats’ usual tack to the center would be able to shave off at least a few percentage points, and success would breed further success.

The biggest obstacle to this happening, however, is the inability or unwillingness of the members of the uneasy Democratic coalition to start their own parties. Jews or Asians could certainly do so, but would be unwilling. Blacks and Hispanics might be unable to create effective parties, though movements such as the Nation of Islam and La Raza suggest a willingness.

Something, somewhere has got to give. The more the anti-white coalition of the future hangs together, the more it will galvanize the identitarianism of the biggest and most powerful group–whites themselves–with their vast financial resources, especially as these come under attack from non-white politicians promoting redistribution of wealth under the banner of social justice. Under these conditions, it is unlikely that the Democratic coalition could hold together indefinitely. Jews, Asians, or white Hispanics would break ranks.

Power surge

Let us therefore imagine a projection of current trends: Reduction of whites to a minority and the ethno-politicization of the two-party system leads to an increasingly identitarian Republican Party and an increasingly fragile anti-white coalition based in the Democratic Party. Perhaps the best option for whites would then be to encourage and even covertly to fund identitarian third parties that could split the anti-white Democratic vote. Once non-whites start to vote outside their coalition the breakup would hopefully become irreversible.

If the Democratic Party splits into warring racial factions, the white minority–as the largest minority–would be in a position once again to gain an overwhelming majority of the power, despite being a minority. This is because, unlike most European nations, the American voting system is not proportional but instead favors whichever party can get its nose in front of its rivals.

Back in the 1990s, when Ross Perot was playing an important spoiler role, Clinton did not need a majority to win a landslide in the Electoral College. He did that with only 43 percent of the vote. Something similar is likely to happen either shortly before whites become a minority or shortly after. Such an outcome will of necessity involve much greater white racial consciousness. This window of opportunity for increased power for whites will remain open for only a few years. Whites will eventually be pushed aside demographically, so it will be vital for them to find a way of using their Indian Summer of power to ensure their survival.

This could be done either by changing the voting system, partitioning parts of the country, or by encouraging emigration of non-whites and immigration of whites from South Africa, Eastern Europe, and South America.

In the run-up to this scenario it will also be vital for whites to avoid two things: political fragmentation and proportional representation. At present, the Republican Party may look like a curse, but in the future, one big party in the face of splintered opposition could prove vital to a racially conscious white minority seizing control of its country again, even if only for the last time.

Race and Jews, Part 6

via Age of Treason

Listen Now

The jews have infiltrated, manipulated, exploited and outlived every nation, empire and civilization in Europe and the Middle East for millenia. The jewish problem is an old problem. The racial character and nature of the jews is not something Europeans only first noticed in the 15th century with the Purity of Blood Statutes in Spain. We’ve previously addressed what contemporary twits have to say. This time we’ll review some observations of jewish racial character – the personality traits characteristic of the collective – which date back more than two thousands years into the past.

Cicero, a Roman statesman during the 1st century BC, remarked:
The Jews belong to a dark and repulsive force. One knows how numerous this clique is, how they stick together and what power they exercise through their unions. They are a nation of rascals and deceivers.
Tacitus was a senator and a historian of the Roman Empire during the 1st century AD. In The Works of Tacitus, Volume 4, published in 1752, Thomas Gordon wrote:
Concerning the jews, he followed the tradition and accounts current amongst the Romans. He tells you what different relations there were, and neither adds any thing, nor misrepresents things maliciously. It was an obscure State; generally enslaved by some greater power; to the Assyrians, Egyptians, Grecians and then to the Romans, and condemned by all, as much as they themselves hated all. They had not common mercy or charity toward the Gentiles and uncircumcised; and being persuaded that the Almighty loved only themselves, they fancied that he abhorred, and therefore they abhorred, the whole human race besides : So that it was said by Tacitus too truly, “adversus omnes alios hostile odium.”
This is a well known phrase amongst scholars, and has appeared in many variations since. What Tacitus was saying was, “they hate and are hostile to all others”.

Notices of the Jews by the Classic Writers of Antiquity, published in 1870, John Gill notes that Tacitus had described the laws of the jews as “hostile to men, and calculated to inspire the jew with hatred and opposition to the rest of mankind”.

Strabo, a Greek geographer during the 1st century BC was another ancient observer who noticed the jews. I found Strabo’s wisdom embedded in a broader account provided by William Pierce in 1998, How It Fits Together:
The world’s 14 million Jews think and act like one big family — even though, like most families, they do a lot of arguing and squabbling among themselves. They go to different synagogues — Orthodox and Conservative and Reform — or to no synagogue at all. There are atheist Jews, and there are Jews who have converted to Christianity. There are capitalist Jews and communist Jews, homosexual Jews and heterosexual Jews. There are rich Jews and middle-class Jews and even a few poor Jews, but despite this apparent diversity they do a better job of cooperating with each other and looking out for their common interests than any other ethnic group in the world.
Why is this? Why are Jews more racially conscious than anyone else? Why are they so much more ready to collaborate with each other than members of other groups? Part of the reason is in their religion. It is an ethnocentric religion, a racist religion. Whereas Christianity and Islam, for example, are universalist religions, religions for anyone who chooses to believe in them, Judaism is not. Judaism is a religion only for the Chosen People, only for the circumcised sons of Abraham. Jews are defined in terms of their bloodline, not in terms of their faith, which is why non-religious Jews like Freud or Trotsky or even Marx, the father of atheistic communism, are considered just as much Jews as the most pious synagogue-goer, with sidelocks and yarmulke. The non-religious Jews don’t believe the hocus-pocus in their Torah, or Old Testament, but they nevertheless are steeped in the folklore and traditions of Judaism. They are as familiar as their religious cousins are with the claims that Jews are a Chosen People, destined to own all of the world’s wealth and be waited on hand and foot by non-Jews. And they are familiar with the tales of persecution, from the time of the pharaohs until the time of Hitler: with the tradition of being universally hated by all the other peoples of the world — which is why they believe they are justified in avenging themselves on non-Jews whenever they have the opportunity.
This tendency of the Jews to stick together, always to favor their fellow Jews over non-Jews, and to work for the interests of their tribe instead of just for their individual interests is a fact: a very enviable fact. It is the primary reason for their extraordinary level of wealth and power through the ages.
You know, there are clubby little groups of White men who cooperate with each other to advance their interests. But those interests are personal and individual, not racial or even tribal. And virtually all of the really influential groups of this sort — the Council on Foreign Relations, for example, or groups of very rich and powerful men, corporate bosses or bankers, are in fact heavily larded with Jews. They’re not racial groups at all, even if they don’t have any Blacks or Chinamen in them. They’re simply special-interest groups, whereas the 14 million Jews of the world form a huge, self-conscious racial-interest group. They really are unique in this regard.
I wish that our people had the same degree of racial consciousness the Jews do. The Jews understand the power of togetherness. Most of our people don’t. And this is largely the reason why we’re in the mess we’re in today.
The second thing for us to understand about the Jews is their very unusual mode of existence, living nearly everywhere as a small minority among other peoples. If one looks at their history in the Biblical period, they were at most times a people on the move, living as strangers and aliens among other peoples, getting kicked out of one place after another, always on terms of enmity with the Gentile host population. Only for a little over 400 years, from approximately the time of King David until the Babylonian conquest, did they really have a national existence in the ordinary sense of the word, with geographical borders.
When the Babylonians dispersed the Jews throughout the Middle Eastern and the Mediterranean world in the middle of the sixth century BC, the Jews adapted amazingly well to being a minority everywhere and a majority nowhere. Five hundred years later, in the first century BC, the Greek writer Strabo commented: “The Jews have penetrated every country, so that it is difficult to find any place in the world where their tribe has not entered and become dominant.” Note those words: “There is no place where they have not become dominant.” The great geographer and historian Strabo was not the only scholar of the ancient world to make that observation about the Jews. The Jews became dominant by accumulating a substantial portion of the wealth of every country that they infiltrated. And they accumulated their wealth by collaborating with each other and preying on the host population. Their collaboration was based on their racial consciousness, on their conviction that they were a distinct and unique people, superior to the people among whom they lived and deserving of whatever they could take away from their hosts. The Jews in Rome did not think of themselves as Romans who happened to believe in Judaism, but as Jews who happened to live in Rome. And the same for every other country where they lived.
With the sort of attitude and behavior the Jews had they were bound to be hated by everyone — and they reciprocated. The Jews regarded the hatred they had for their hosts as justified, just as they considered deceiving and exploiting their hosts to be justified; but their hosts’ hatred of the Jews they regarded as “bigotry” and “persecution.” Their history is a chronicle of one “persecution” after another, right down to modern times. During the Middle Ages they were kicked en masse out of every country in Europe, repeatedly. They pretend today that this supposed “persecution” was the result of religious bigotry on the part of their hosts, but in fact it was simply self-defense on the part of their hosts, the same sort of reaction to their presence that the Egyptians and the Greeks and the Romans and everyone else in pre-Christian times had had. And it was this barrier of hatred between the Jews and the rest of the world which made it possible for them to maintain their identity and their sense of racial self-consciousness.
We return again to Eric Goldstein’s book, The Price of Whiteness: Jews, Race, and American Identity. We left off last time in CHAPTER 4: “WHAT ARE WE?”: JEWISHNESS BETWEEN RACE AND RELIGION, page 110. Goldstein describes the private communications between jewish leaders in America. In 1909 these leaders feared that race scientists were close to declaring the jews a non-White race, and so they conspired to:
enlist the help of an anthropologist in order to get “a very strongly worded declaration as to the practical identity of the white race,” one that would presumably leave no doubt as to the whiteness of Jews.
During the first two decades of the twentieth century, Columbia University Processor Franz Boas was the best known anthropologist of Jewish origin in the United States. Boas shared the concern of the Jewish communal elite about racial nativism, but his preference to identify as a German American rather than as a Jew prevented him from engaging too directly in Jewish defense efforts during these years. Instead, Boas worked to discredit the centrality of race in evaluating human capabilities, arguing that differences between groups–including those between blacks and whites–were heavily influenced by environmental factors. Because these ideas contradicted the overwhelming consensus about the importance of racial differences in the United States, however, they offered little to Jewish leaders hoping to win acceptance for their group in white America. As a scholar who was well integrated into the non-Jewish world, Boas could freely advance such oppositional theories. But for Jews struggling to overcome their uncertain racial status, it was much harder to build their case for inclusion on ideas that undermined the basic assumptions of the larger society. To soothe white Americans’ doubts about the “Jewish race,” they would have to affirm the basic distinction between black and white.
The scientist who took up this challenge was Maurice Fishberg, one of the leading scholars of Jewish physical anthropology at the turn of the century, and the only American to devote himself significantly to such research.
I’ve examined Franz Boas in some detail previously. What Boas and his disciples did was adopt the mantle and authority as objective scientists while replacing research with outright fraud and just-so stories about culture.

Fishberg laid out his line of argument in a book titled, The Jews: A Study of Race and Environment, published in 1911. The jews did not see it as good for the jews. Page 114:
In denying any far-reaching racial distinctiveness and identifying Jews with other American whites, Fishberg had provided a scientific basis for the claims of Jewish leaders. Unlike other Jewish spokesmen, however, he pursued his conclusions with a rigid scientific consistency that was unable to make room for any lingering attachment to the notion of a Jewish race. In fact, because he had made the argument for the temporary, artificial nature of Jewish difference so rigorously, he discounted not only the Jewish racial distinctiveness but almost every form of Jewish particularity.
By taking the denial of Jewish racial difference to its logical conclusion, Fishberg failed at satisfying the contradictory needs of American Jews, most of whom ultimately wanted to be accepted in white America without giving up their own distinctive racial identity. This failure was apparent in the almost universal condemnation the book received in Jewish circles.
Fishberg argued that the jews were not a “race, creed or nation” but simply a “social phenomenon”. Page 115:
Horace Wolf, a Reform rabbi in Chicago, scoffed at Fishberg’s argument that the term “Jewish race” was a scientific misnomer. “What do we care that the laboratory masters have dubbed us in error,” he asked, “so long as our lives reflect our implicit belief in the continued existence of the Jewish people?”
If Jews found that race was an increasing liability and threatened to lump them with nonwhites, they also found themselves unable to break the emotional commitment they had to a racial self-understanding. The result was a constant stuggle with these two powerful impulses for inclusion and distinctiveness, one that led many acculturated Jews to assert their status as a religious group in public while privately clinging to a much broader racial understanding of Jewishness. In 1910, addressing the question “What Are We?” for a Jewish reading audience, historian Max Margolis summed up the collective frustration of American Jews by concluding that the Jews were “a great anomaly which cannot be classified according to accepted rules of definition.” In finding satisfactory terms for Jewish self-definition, complained another Jewish writer the same year, “we succeed to about the same extent as the man who sets out to square the circle or to prove that twice two are five.”
These “two powerful impulses for inclusion and distinctiveness” are exactly what parasitism needs to succeed. The parasite must infiltrate, manipulate and exploit its host, while being mindful enough not to attack or destroy itself.

The jews see themselves as a racially related group. They always have and always will. The euphemism they use for race today is “peoplehood”.

When the reality of race was something everyone acknowledged the jews openly talked about themselves in those terms. But as scientists began to understand the deep, biological nature of race, thus threatening to expose the jews, the jews came up with a two-pronged plan to meet the challenge. Both prongs involved co-opting race science (infiltrating and manipulating it) to make their seemingly contradictory case for inclusion and distinctiveness.

In the end the jews settled on Boas’ path – hijacking and derailing race science – first to minimize the significance of race, and eventually to banish any understanding of race as rooted, relatively immutably, in biology.

The Forgotten Class

via Radix Journal

Blue-collar Whites are the forgotten class of America. Hated by Democrats and ignored by Republicans, their interests are of no concern to the major parties as they continue to fall over themselves in the pursuit of America’s rising tide of color.

Their jobs are gone or threatened, their benefits are cut, their neighborhoods overrun, and their way of life destroyed. There’s hardly any issue pushed by either the GOP or Democrats that in any way would benefit the lives of working-class Whites. And it’s not like they are lacking in issues. Charles Murray’s Coming Apart centered on the decline of the White working class and how it is now beset by a plethora of issues including depression (economic and mental), single parent households, and skyrocketing substance abuse. But their problems prompt no outcries or calls for immediate solutions from our political and media elite. That’s why large swaths of the working class stay home on Election Day.

But that’s also why there are now new calls for the Democrats to reclaim their heritages as the party of Workingman, regardless of color. The Democrats, recovering from a brutal election, are looking for ways to win back blue collar votes to their side. Are they calling for a halt to immigration and eliminating affirmative action? Yeah, right. Instead, the authors behind a piece outlining an appeal to the workingman just want to emphasize a quaint “middle-out” economic approach that manages to benefit all of the various elements of the Left (“minorities, unmarried and working women, Millennials and more secular voters, and educated whites living in more urbanized states”) while appealing to those Whites they can no longer count on. Sounds like pure fantasy, but it’s no worse than what Republicans propose.

The “middle-out” proposal simply calls for further empowering technocrats and the managerial elite to handle our economy and “invest” more in the so-called “middle-class.” Thus, magically, we’d get an economy that works for everyone! That’s a tall order when there’s no call to cut subsidies for the urban poor and you’re giving more power to a managerial state that already has unprecedented authority over society. It’s not just Wall Street that doesn’t care about laboring rubes, it’s also the managerial elite that doesn’t give a shit about their economic prospects. Why you should we give them even more power and expect different results? This is just another milquetoast, bloodless idea that sounds good only on paper—but will never transfer results into reality. You cannot have an economy that works for everybody when you live in a Balkanized, multiracial, continental strip mall. The interests of non-Whites and Urban Elves trump that of Whites in flyover country, according to the technocrats bolstered by this plan.

There’s also the plan’s whimsical notion that the working class is coming to love diversity and is now down with cosmopolitanism. This assumption bases itself on a poll that asked two vague, probably misrepresented questions on diversity to working folk. However, later on in the article the authors admit the Democrat Party needs to step away from racial politics (it is indeed entitled “Beyond Identity Politics”) that alienate Whites and favor non-Whites. This is also sounds like the working-class might, in fact, have a problem with diversity. It also fails to address why these people stopped voting Democrat in the first place.

Luckily, a professional Black journalist was able to shoot down this notion that the working-class will be won over by the Democrats with economic tomfoolery—with the simple assertion that they see it as the party for Black people—that also (correctly) ascertains why they became Republican voters. After the party sided with the race rioters in the 60s and pushed busing and integration into White ethnic neighborhoods, their old demographic began to look elsewhere to voice their political concerns. The Dems became the party of color and that’s why the working-class left—not because the party moderated its economic agenda.

But it is true to a lesser extent that the Democrat embrace of cultural progressivism and economic moderation has ruined their appeal for the people who would rather have cultural conservatism and economic progressivism. They would rather have the party to be populistic than technocratic. And this was the Democrat calling card ever since the days of Andrew Jackson. They lost it when they became the party of the Colored Man and backed busing and forced integration—measures that hurt lower-income Whites for the benefit of Blacks and the progressive delusions of upper-class White liberals. The party’s previous appeal to working men knew no geographic divide as they equally won over the White ethnics of the North and the Scots-Irish of the South. This was not because the Democrats were the “White People’s Party” of its day though—it was due to the party having the image of fighting for the common man against the wealthy and powerful. For Southern Whites, the powerful were represented by the North and the various elites that wanted them to integrate and enfranchise Blacks. For Northern Whites, the powerful were the factory owners that kept them at low wages and in poor housing.

The heroes of the party all fought against the forces of power that were hated by the common man. Jackson fought the National Bank. William Jennings Bryant fought the robber barons. George Wallace fought the federal government’s intrusion into segregation. The populism of the party always attracted Middle American Whites…until they abandon populism in favor of managerialism. Wallace was the last major populist in the party before his demographic fled to the Republicans. Democrats replaced their concern for the White workingman with an ideology more fit for Urban Elf centers rather than ethnic neighborhoods. However, it’s still an ideology that benefits non-Whites of all stripes with steadfast cheerleading for welfare, affirmative action, and mass immigration.

But the White exodus to the Republican Party hasn’t made the GOP into the party of the common man. The Republican economic policy is still designed to benefit the wealthy and they still demand cuts to well-liked government programs, such as Medicare, that benefit Whites across the board. They also support mass immigration for cheap labor and attack 47% of Americans as “takers.” The GOP’s slide towards libertarianism—an ideology that emphatically rejects the culture and economic interests of working-class Whites—only means the Grand Old Party isn’t about to embrace genuine populism anytime soon. The Republican Party has won over the lower-income Whites through its transformation into the generic White People’s Party—a party that on the surface appears to fight for the interests of White America but in reality only fights for Israel and the 1%. They are able to convince healthy-minded Whites to vote for them through macho rhetoric and figureheads that present a breath of fresh air from the low T White males associated with the Democrat Party. Working-class Whites respect men that who hew to traditional notions of masculinity and the GOP have mastered this appearance since Ronald Reagan. They’d rather vote for a man than a pansy—even if his policies resemble Reagan’s.

So they are a class without a party, staying at home in a time of chaotic elections where they could prove the decisive vote—if they just showed up.

In the last 50 years, only two figures have managed to tap into this class and make them politically active: Wallace and Pat Buchanan. Both combined economic populism with cultural conservatism that appealed to the sensibilities and desires of America’s forgotten demographic. They fought against the elite and were hated back by the elite for their respective attacks. Mocked by the media and labeled fascists, they rallied around them enthusiastic supporters who had had enough of changing racial demographics and threatening cultural intrusions to vote and support their political campaigns. They both appealed to the descendants of yeoman farmers in the South and the descendants of 19th century immigrants in the North. They both had the potential to create mass movements that could’ve changed this country—but they each failed to do that and their successes faded away after their campaigns ceased.

While there is much to admire in Wallace and Buchanan, we should not succumb to the temptation to strictly follow in their footsteps. Both spent immeasurable amounts of their time campaigning trying to demonstrate they were not White Nationalists. Wallace truly wasn’t a fighter for White interests and only adopted the issue of segregation after losing his first Alabama’s governor’s race to a stronger opponent. The man who wrote his famous “Segregation Forever” speech later denounced him as a phony and ran against Wallace for governor in 1970. Buchanan never built a faction within the conservative movement and has a long habit of endorsing Republican tickets—no matter how awful they are. Buchanan is the perfect representation of the cognitive dissonance of the working-class that continues to vote Team Red in spite of the party doing a piss poor job of representing their interests. How the GOP is able to maintain their lead on this demographic is its ability to delude White backlash into impotent rage against “big government.”

The working-class backlash was transformed by Republicans into a purely economic agenda that employed racial dog whistling to keep this class voting for them. None of their social issues were resolved and their economic status worsened. In any case, Whites—whether white-collar or blue-collar—will continue to vote Republican unless the party meets an untimely end. At the same time, that doesn’t mean Whites will be happy with their choice. The authors of “Beyond Identity Politics” were right to claim that this demographic is taken for granted by the elephants.

The Forgotten Class will stay forgotten and other population groups will be pursued. They have no interest groups on their side and the demographic picture paints a grim future for their prospects. Courting them is only a short-term idea for the Left who sees them as a necessity for the upcoming Presidential election in 2016. After that, they will be discarded and used as favored targets to bash everything considered backward in the country.

This also makes them the demographic most likely to listen to our ideas. Everyone else has already given up on them and moved on to other groups. They have no place in this country anymore—and that may make many of them try to forge a homeland of their own. If we want to succeed in the long-run, we will have to win over this class and tailor our message to appeal to their concerns. They are now the Forgotten Class, that’s why we need to remember them.

As their alienation continues to increase, their desire for a new outlook will only grow. Let’s make ours the one they choose.

Chagas Disease Comes to America; Has Infected 300,000 Americans

via American Freedom Party

Despite the current Ebola panic, there is another disease posing a threat to American’s health. Chagas disease, also known as the “kissing bug” disease, has made its way into the United States and has already infected thousands, but health officials and doctors do not view the disease as potentially endemic.

The disease, prevalent in Mexico and Latin America, has begun to spread in the United States with around 300,000 people currently infected per Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates, according to Fox News Latino.

According to the CDC, Chagas disease is caused by the Trypanosoma cruzi parasite, which is carried by insects and it is transmitted via their feces. Around 8 million people in Latin America are infected with the disease, which is mostly prevalent in poor rural areas. Triatomine bugs, known as “kissing bugs,” can transmit the disease when they suck on the blood of people and defecate on the wound or near it.

People can also be infected through blood transfusion from an infected person, congenital transmission (from mother to child during pregnancy), organ transplants and consumption of uncooked food contaminated with the parasite.

Early symptoms include fever, body aches, swelling of the eyelids and at the bite site. Following this stage, most people become asymptomatic, but around 30 percent develop heart or intestinal problems. 

The [chagas] disease, prevalent in Mexico and Latin America, has begun to spread in the United States with around 300,000 people currently infected per Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates, according to Fox News Latino.

Those without symptoms can still transmit the disease.

According to Click 2 Houston, research conducted by Melissa Garcia at the Baylor College of Medicine on blood donations found that in Texas one out of 6,500 potentially has the disease.

“I think we are likely under-diagnosing and mismanaging a lot of Houstonians and a lot of Texas residents with this disease. So it really is imperative that we start screening people that are at high risk,” she said. “If you don’t get treatment, it can progress and it can be fatal.”
 
However, Fox News Latino reports the disease is not labeled as endemic, prompting many doctors to not consider it when diagnosing patients.

Facts, Values, and Dark Beer

via The Archdruid Report

Over the last eight and a half years, since I first began writing essays on The Archdruid Report, I’ve fielded a great many questions about what motivates this blog’s project. Some of those questions have been abusive, and some of them have been clueless; some of them have been thoughtful enough to deserve an answer, either in the comments or as a blog post in its own right. Last week brought one of that last category. It came from one of my European readers, Ervino Cus, and it read as follows:
“All considered (the amount of weapons—personal and of MD—around today; the population numbers; the environmental pollution; the level of lawlessness we are about to face; the difficulty to have a secure form of life in the coming years; etc.) plus the ‘low’ technical level of possible development of the future societies (I mean: no more space flight? no more scientific discovery about the ultimate structure of the Universe? no genetic engineering to modify the human genome?) the question I ask to myself is: why bother?
“Seriously: why one should wish to plan for his/her long term survival in the future that await us? Why, when all goes belly up, don't join the first warlord band available and go off with a bang, pillaging and raping till one drops dead?
“If the possibilities for a new stable civilization are very low, and it's very probable that such a civilization, even if created, will NEVER be able to reach even the technical level of today, not to mention to surpass it, why one should want to try to survive some more years in a situation that becomes every day less bright, without ANY possibilities to get better in his/her lifetime, and with, as the best objective, only some low-tech rural/feudal state waaay along the way?
“Dunno you, but for me the idea that this is the last stop for the technological civilization, that things as a syncrothron or a manned space flight are doomed and never to repeat, and that the max at which we, as a species and as individuals, can aspire from now on is to have a good harvest and to ‘enjoy’ the same level of knowledge of the structure of the Universe of our flock of sheeps, doesen't makes for a good enough incentive to want to live more, or to give a darn if anybody other lives on.
“Apologies if my word could seem blunt (and for my far than good English: I'm Italian), but, as Dante said:
“Considerate la vostra semenza:
fatti non foste a viver come bruti,
ma per seguir virtute e canoscenza.”
 (Inferno - Canto XXVI - vv. 112-120)
“If our future is not this (and unfortunately I too agree with you that at this point the things seems irreversibles) I, for one, don't see any reason to be anymore compelled by any moral imperative... :-(
“PS: Yes, I know, I pose some absolutes: that a high-tech/scientific civilization is the only kind of civilization that enpowers us to gain any form of ‘real’ knowledge of the Universe, that this knowledge is a ‘plus’ and that a life made only of ‘birth-reproduction-death’ is a life of no more ‘meaning’ than the one of an a plant.
“Cheers, Ervino.”
It’s a common enough question, though rarely expressed as clearly or as starkly as this. As it happens, there’s an answer to it, or rather an entire family of answers, but the best way there is to start by considering the presuppositions behind it.  Those aren’t adequately summarized by Ervino’s list of ‘absolutes’—the latter are simply restatements of his basic argument.
What Ervino is suggesting, rather, presupposes that scientific and technological progress are the only reasons for human existence. Lacking those—lacking space travel, cyclotrons, ‘real’ knowledge about the universe, and the rest—our existence is a waste of time and we might as well just lay down and die or, as he suggests, run riot in anarchic excess until death makes the whole thing moot. What’s more, only the promise of a better future gives any justification for moral behavior—consider his comment about not feeling compelled by any moral imperative if no better future is in sight.
Those of my readers who recall the discussion of progress as a surrogate religion in last year’s posts here will find this sort of thinking very familiar, because the values being imputed to space travel, cyclotrons et al. are precisely those that used to be assigned to more blatantly theological concepts such as God and eternal life. Still, I want to pose a more basic question: is this claim—that the meaning and purpose of human existence and the justification of morality can only be found in scientific and technological progress—based on evidence? Are there, for example, double-blinded, controlled studies by qualified experts that confirm this claim?
Of course not. Ervino’s claim is a value judgment, not a statement of fact.  The distinction between facts and values was mentioned in last week’s post, but probably needs to be sketched out here as well; to summarize a complex issue somewhat too simply, facts are the things that depend on the properties of perceived objects rather than perceiving subjects. Imagine, dear reader, that you and I were sitting in the same living room, and I got a bottle of beer out of the fridge and passed it around.  Provided that everyone present had normally functioning senses and no reason to prevaricate, we’d be able to agree on certain facts about the bottle: its size, shape, color, weight, temperature, and so on. Those are facts.
Now let’s suppose I got two glasses, poured half the beer into each glass, handed one to you and took the other for myself. Let’s further suppose that the beer is an imperial stout, and you can’t stand dark beer. I take a sip and say, “Oh, man, that’s good.” You take a sip, make a face, and say, “Ick. That’s awful.” If I were to say, “No, that’s not true—it’s delicious,” I’d be talking nonsense of a very specific kind: the nonsense that pops up reliably whenever someone tries to treat a value as though it’s a fact.
“Delicious” is a value judgment, and like every value judgment, it depends on the properties of perceiving subjects rather than perceived objects. That’s true of all values without exception, including those considerably more important than those involved in assessing the taste of beer. To say “this is good” or “this is bad” is to invite the question “according to whose values?”—which is to say, every value implies a valuer, just as every judgment implies a judge.
Now of course it’s remarkably common these days for people to insist that their values are objective truths, and values that differ from theirs objective falsehoods. That’s a very appealing sort of nonsense, but it’s still nonsense. Consider the claim often made by such people that if values are subjective, that would make all values, no matter how repugnant, equal to one another. Equal in what sense? Why, equal in value—and of course there the entire claim falls to pieces, because “equal in value” invites the question already noted, “according to whose values?” If a given set of values is repugnant to you, then pointing out that someone else thinks differently about those values doesn’t make them less repugnant to you.  All it means is that if you want to talk other people into sharing those values, you have to offer good reasons, and not simply insist at the top of your lungs that you’re right and they’re wrong.
To say that values depend on the properties of perceiving subjects rather than perceived objects does not mean that values are wholly arbitrary, after all. It’s possible to compare different values to one another, and to decide that one set of values is better than another. In point of fact, people do this all the time, just as they compare different claims of fact to one another and decide that one is more accurate than another. The scientific method itself is simply a relatively rigorous way to handle this latter task: if fact X is true, then fact Y would also be true; is it? In the same way, though contemporary industrial culture tends to pay far too little attention to this, there’s an ethical method that works along the same lines: if value X is good, then value Y would also be good; is it?
Again, we do this sort of thing all the time. Consider, for example, why it is that most people nowadays reject the racist claim that some arbitrarily defined assortment of ethnicities—say, “the white race”—is superior to all others, and ought to have rights and privileges that are denied to everyone else. One reason why such claims are rejected is that they conflict with other values, such as fairness and justice, that most people consider to be important; another is that the history of racial intolerance shows that people who hold the values associated with racism are much more likely than others to engage in activities, such as herding their neighbors into concentration camps, which most people find morally repugnant. That’s the ethical method in practice.
With all this in mind, let’s go back to Ervino’s claims. He proposes that in all the extraordinary richness of human life, out of all its potentials for love, learning, reflection, and delight, the only thing that can count as a source of meaning is the accumulation of “‘real’ knowledge of the Universe,” defined more precisely as the specific kind of quantitative knowledge about the behavior of matter and energy that the physical sciences of the world’s industrial societies currently pursue. That’s his value judgment on human life. Of course he has the right to make that judgment; he would be equally within his rights to insist that the point of life is to see how many orgasms he can rack up over the course of his existence; and it’s by no means obvious why one of these ambitions is any more absurd than the other.
Curiosity, after all, is a biological drive, one that human beings share in a high degree with most other primates. Sexual desire is another such drive, rather more widely shared among living things. Grant that the fulfillment of some such drive can be seen as the purpose of life, why not another? For that matter, why not more than one, or some combination of biological drives and the many other incentives that are capable of motivating human beings?
For quite a few centuries now, though, it’s been fashionable for thinkers in the Western world to finesse such issues, and insist that some biological drives are “noble” while others are “base,” “animal,” or what have you. Here again, we have value judgments masquerading as statements of fact, with a hearty dollop of class prejudice mixed in—for “base,” “animal,” etc., you could as well put “peasant,” which is of course the literal opposite of “noble.” That’s the sort of thinking that appears in the bit of Dante that Ervino included in his comment. His English is better than my Italian, and I’m not enough of a poet to translate anything but the raw meaning of Dante’s verse, but this is roughly what the verses say:
“Consider your lineage;
You were not born to live as animals,
But to seek virtue and knowledge.”
It’s a very conventional sentiment. The remarkable thing about this passage, though, is that Dante was not proposing the sentiment as a model for others to follow. Rather, this least conventional of poets put those words in the mouth of Ulysses, who appears in this passage of the Inferno as a damned soul frying in the eighth circle of Hell. Dante has it that after the events of Homer’s poem, Ulysses was so deeply in love with endless voyaging that he put to sea again, and these are the words with which he urged his second crew to sail beyond all known seas—a voyage which took them straight to a miserable death, and sent Ulysses himself tumbling down to eternal damnation.
This intensely equivocal frame story is typical of Dante, who delineated as well as any poet ever has the many ways that greatness turns into hubris, that useful Greek concept best translated as the overweening pride of the doomed. The project of scientific and technological progress is at least as vulnerable to that fate as any of the acts that earned the damned their places in Dante’s poem. That project might fail irrevocably if industrial society comes crashing down and no future society will ever be able to pursue the same narrowly defined objectives that ours has valued. In that case—at least in the parochial sense just sketched out—progress is over. Still, there’s at least one more way the same project would come to a screeching and permanent halt: if it succeeds.
Let’s imagine, for instance, that the fantasies of our scientific cornucopians are right and the march of progress continues on its way, unhindered by resource shortages or destabilized biospheres. Let’s also imagine that right now, some brilliant young physicist in Mumbai is working out the details of the long-awaited Unified Field Theory. It sees print next year; there are furious debates; the next decade goes into experimental tests of the theory, and proves that it’s correct. The relationship of all four basic forces of the cosmos—the strong force, the weak force, electromagnetism, and gravity—is explained clearly once and for all. With that in place, the rest of physical science falls into place step by step over the next century or so, and humanity learns the answers to all the questions that science can pose.
It’s only in the imagination of true believers in the Singularity, please note, that everything becomes possible once that happens. Many of the greatest achievements of science can be summed up in the words “you can’t do that;” the discovery of the laws of thermodynamics closed the door once and for all on perpetual motion, just as the theory of relativity put a full stop to the hope of limitless velocity. (“186,282 miles per second: it’s not just a good idea, it’s the law.”) Once the sciences finish their work, the technologists will have to scramble to catch up with them, and so for a while, at least, there will be no shortage of novel toys to amuse those who like such things; but sooner or later, all of what Ervino calls “‘real’ knowledge about the Universe” will have been learnt; at some point after that, every viable technology will have been refined to the highest degree of efficiency that physical law allows.
What then? The project of scientific and technological progress will be over. No one will ever again be able to discover a brand new, previously unimagined truth about the universe, in any but the most trivial sense—“this star’s mass is 1.000000000000000000006978 greater than this other star,” or the like—and variations in technology will be reduced to shifts in what’s fashionable at any given time. If the ongoing quest for replicable quantifiable knowledge about the physical properties of nature is the only thing that makes human life worth living, everyone alive at that point arguably ought to fly their hovercars at top speed into the nearest concrete abutment and end it all.
One way or another, that is, the project of scientific and technological progress is self-terminating. If this suggests to you, dear reader, that treating it as the be-all and end-all of human existence may not be the smartest choice, well, yes, that’s what it suggests to me as well. Does that make it worthless? Of course not. It should hardly be necessary to point out that “the only thing important in life” and “not important at all” aren’t the only two options available in discussions of this kind.
I’d like to suggest, along these lines, that human life sorts itself out most straightforwardly into an assortment of separate spheres, each of which deals with certain aspects of the extraordinary range of possibilities open to each of us. The sciences comprise one of those spheres, with each individual science a subsphere within it; the arts are a separate sphere, similarly subdivided; politics, religion, and sexuality are among the other spheres. None of these spheres contains more than a fraction of the whole rich landscape of human existence. Which of them is the most important? That’s a value judgment, and thus can only be made by an individual, from his or her own irreducibly individual point of view.
We’ve begun to realize—well, at least some of us have—that authority in one of these spheres isn’t transferable. When a religious leader, let’s say, makes pronouncements about science, those have no more authority than they would if they came from any other more or less clueless layperson, and a scientist who makes pronouncements about religion is subject to exactly the same rule. The same distinction applies with equal force between any two spheres, and as often as not between subspheres of a single sphere as well:  plenty of scientists make fools of themselves, for example, when they try to lay down the law about sciences they haven’t studied.
Claiming that one such sphere is the only thing that makes human life worthwhile is an error of the same kind. If Ervino feels that scientific and technological progress is the only thing that makes his own personal life worth living, that’s his call, and presumably he has reasons for it. If he tries to say that that’s true for me, he’s wrong—there are plenty of things that make my life worth living—and if he’s trying to make the same claim for every human being who will ever live, that strikes me as a profoundly impoverished view of the richness of human possibility. Insisting that scientific and technological progress are the only acts of human beings that differentiate their existence from that of a plant isn’t much better. Dante’s Divina Commedia, to cite the obvious example, is neither a scientific paper nor a technological invention; does that mean that it belongs in the same category as the noise made by hogs grunting in the mud?
Dante Alighieri lived in a troubled age in which scientific and technological progress were nearly absent and warfare, injustice, famine, pestilence, and the collapse of widely held beliefs about the world were matters of common experience. From that arguably unpromising raw material, he brewed one of the great achievements of human culture. It may well be that the next few centuries will be far from optimal for scientific and technological progress; it may well be that the most important thing that can be done by people who value science and technology is to figure out what can be preserved through the difficult times ahead, and do their best to see that these things reach the waiting hands of the future. If life hands you a dark age, one might say, it’s probably not a good time to brew lite beer, but there are plenty of other things you can still brew, bottle and drink.
As for me—well, all things considered, I find that being alive beats the stuffing out of the alternative, and that’s true even though I live in a troubled age in which scientific and technological progress show every sign of grinding to a halt in the near future, and in which warfare, injustice, famine, pestilence, and the collapse of widely held beliefs are matters of common experience. The notion that life has to justify itself to me seems, if I may be frank, faintly silly, and so does the comparable claim that I have to justify my existence to it, or to anyone else. Here I am; I did not make the world; quite the contrary, the world made me, and put me in the irreducibly personal situation in which I find myself. Given that I’m here, where and when I happen to be, there are any number of things that I can choose to do, or not do; and it so happens that one of the things I choose to do is to prepare, and help others prepare, for the long decline of industrial civilization and the coming of the dark age that will follow it.
And with that, dear reader, I return you to your regularly scheduled discussion of decline and fall on The Archdruid Report.

Whatever Happened to Our Old Friend?

via Alternative Right

No man is a prophet in his own land. On this, Sir Oswald Mosley's birthday, here is a short piece of fiction that attests to this fact.

Here in the bars, bazaars, and dens of iniquity that make up the ex-pat Far East, you run into your fair share of cads, chancers, and 'rum' fellows – the sort of chaps whose eccentricities and slight quirks go unnoticed amid the teeming masses of Asia. The broad-minded and perpetually distracted Oriental, it seems, has a nasty habit of lumping all White men in together and glossing over the subtle codes and hierarchies by which we define ourselves.

It was no surprise, therefore, when on a recent trip to Singapore, I ran into an old European acquaintance, whom, I had been reliably informed, had died and been buried a long time ago back in his native Europe, a place where he had never really fitted in, leading, on occasion, to unfortunate excesses of behaviour that saw him blackballed from most of polite society.

As he pressed me for news from home over cocktails at the Raffles, I could see that he had done extremely well for himself out here, and seemed far, far younger than he had any right to be.

The bartender and waiters were clearly in awe of him; while, from across the room, came the deferential glances of the city’s movers and shakers, and the realization that I myself could not be a complete nobody to be in such exalted company.

“It’s really all down to my old chum, Lee Kuan Yew,” he told me warmed by his fifth daiquiri. “Without Harry’s help, god knows what I’d be doing.”

After I had checked into my hotel – definitely not the Raffles on my budget, but somewhere cheap and cheerful with geckos on the wall and Russia Today on the satellite TV – I wondered how he had managed to pull off such a remarkable recovery. Back in the old country he had been reviled, but these people clearly loved and venerated him.

I thought no more of this impenetrable conundrum and spent the next day visiting the sights – Sentosa Island and Changi Prison Museum, with its dioramas of Japanese atrocities. Towards evening, after the usual short, intense tropical downpour, I made my way to the famous Merlion Statue, the symbol of this rootless city state, created by the British as a convenient coaling station and anti-pirate base for their worldwide web of trade. And there he was again!

He was standing next to a gaggle of Western tourists, dressed unbelievably in his trademark black under the still broiling sun, but looking as cool as ever. With my right arm upraised I hailed him from the distance. He turned to look at me as if disturbed from a reverie, then quickly resumed his trademark look of smug strength that always reminded me of a bank manager who had just turned down a loan.

“I often come down here at this time of the day,” he said in a slightly breathy voice. “I seem to be strangely effected by the sight of the sun departing west.”

There was something uncanny about his appearance. While I was drenched in sweat from my touristy exertions, there wasn’t a single bead upon his pale skin. The only sign of the tremendous heat was the glistening sheen of the melted wax in his neatly groomed moustache. Inevitably we resumed our conversation of the night before. I asked him point blankly why he had made so good out here.

“Well, as you know, the movement with which I am associated grew out of the class conflict of the early twentieth century; an antidote to both Communism and the excesses of global capitalism, and a movement at whose heart lay the idea of perpetuating the harmonious interaction of the various classes in society,” he said, starting to relentlessly roll one wordy phrase after another, as if speaking to a large hall of people who had foregone a night at the cinema in order to listen to him.

“Well, I’m sad to say that we were all barking up the wrong tree,” he continued without a pause. “The class conflict, about which so many of us got excited in those far-off, heady days, was a mere mirage, an insane illusion, a tragic misreading of the wider situation. Class, it seems, was not the ultimate factor and only seemed to be so because the preceding political state had been the highest development of ethnically-based national centralization. By positing our whole existence as an antidote to imaginary or temporary class conflict, those of us in our movement historically limited our relevance.”

Since he was speaking voluminously, the tourists, who had been taking pictures with the Merlion, now backed away and started looking askance.

“But why here, in Singapore?” I asked, keen to dampen the ardour of his tirade with the occasional question.

“I said that class conflict, as a historical phenomenon, has been grossly exaggerated, but this does not mean that we live in an inherently peaceful world,” he resumed at slightly reduced volume. “There is still plenty of conflict in the world, but class conflict is the exception; not the rule. The real seed of conflict is race! Hence I am here. Singapore is not riven by potential class conflict – everybody here is just keen to make money to the best of their differing abilities. No! The real danger in a place of this nature, with Chinese, Malays, Indians, and Arabs, all living cheek by jowl, is racial conflict. That’s where our movement, with its ethos of suppressing group conflicts, really comes into its own! Our fellow Westerners are always sniffy about the strict censorship here, the lack of pornography, the draconian anti-litter laws, the birching, et cetra, as if they were referring to the quaint conservatism of a childishly backward Asian state. They don’t realize that this is their own future. Each of these measures reflects the central goal of avoiding mass, brutal, and bloody race riots. Just imagine a Malay reading a pornographic magazine featuring a Chinese girl on a train, or an Arab spitting out chewing gum in front of a Hindu temple, and you will understand why Singapore has to be the way it is; and the rest of the world, too, as each country gradually becomes more and more ethnically diverse and more crowded. Singapore is a rather upmarket version of how the rest of the world will ultimately become, and it will be a world ruled by the spirit of Fa…”

“Sir Oswald, sir,” a voice cut in. We both turned to see a couple of smartly dressed men backed up by two other, bigger, less smartly dressed men. On the lapels of their suits they all wore badges showing a red streak of lightning bisecting a blue circle that looked vaguely familiar.

“Sorry to interrupt, sir,” the smartest dressed man said, “but their Excellencies require your advice on a most important national question and have sent the limousine.”

“Duty calls!” my old acquaintance said, then turned and walked towards the waiting limousine, followed by the four attendants. Alas, that was the last I saw of him.

Cohesive Societies Check State Power: A Nationalist Critique of 'The Origins of Political Order'

via Counter-Currents

Francis Fukuyama
The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution
New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012

There’s so much meat in Francis Fukuyama’s The Origins of Political Order that someone could teach a college class on it, and someone should. It’s an expansive study of different political systems that attempts to develop a general theory of political development, and explain why different societies have formed different kinds of states — or none at all. The author also offers some explanations for why state-building efforts in the developing world have produced mixed results.

Fukuyama intended The Origins of Political Order to build on his mentor Samuel Huntington’s Political Order in Changing Societies, but it would be just as comfortable on a shelf beside Spengler’s Decline of the West or something like Toynbee’s A Study of History. It’s engagingly written and lacks the kind of obsessive moralizing or contemporary political obsessions that would make it tedious. Fukuyama does have the academic’s habit of giving us more than we need — probably to ward off academic critics. The Origins of Political Order has also been recently followed by second volume, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy.

While clearly an advocate of modern liberal democracies — or what people call modern liberal democracies — Fukuyama is no chauvinist in this regard and does not present political development as a linear, inevitable path to the revelation of modern, liberal democracy. Rather, he sees modern political systems as having three main features — state formation, rule of law, and accountability — that may or may not be present in many reasonably successful political orders. He argues repeatedly that while China formed the first true state, the Chinese have never had true rule of law or downward accountability.

Fukuyama begins by looking at pre-state societies and addressing what he calls the “Hobbesian fallacy” — something I also touched on in The Way of Men. Humans have always lived in groups. We were not “primordially individualistic” creatures who evolved alone in a brutish world and then entered into society as the result of rational calculation at some later date — trading freedom for safety. We’ve always been social animals, and our pre-human ancestors were, too. Yet this idea of primordial individualism “underpins the understanding of rights contained in the American Declaration of Independence and thus of the democratic political community that springs from it.” To truly understand human political behavior, it’s important to correct mistaken notions about human nature and how the most basic political orders form.

The most basic human society, according to Fukuyama, is the “band.” A band society is a small collection of nuclear families, typically exogamous and patrilocal, meaning that, as with chimpanzees, females tend to marry outside the band and males tend to remain with their fathers, brothers, and cousins. This band — or perhaps, “gang” — is the default social order for humans, and the exogamous arrangement with women increases genetic diversity, encourages intergroup contact and trade, and even allows groups of men to resolve intergroup conflicts by simply trading women.

Band-level societies are also fairly egalitarian, and do a lot of sharing. Fukuyama adds that, “many of the moral rules in this type of society are not directed at individuals who steal each other’s property but rather against those who refuse to share food or other necessities.”

Leadership in this kind of society is not inherited — it is earned both through a combination of demonstrating strength, earning trust, and building a coalition of supporters. You can strong-arm a small group for a while, but sooner or later, someone’s gonna cut you down. A betrayal of trust or a stronger contender can elevate a new “alpha,” or “big man,” so decision-making in a band-level society tends to be consensus-based.

The natural tendency to return to band-level thinking is the basis for the phenomenon Fukuyama calls “patrimonialism,” defined as the preference for one’s kin or “friends.” The human tendency toward patrimonialism is fundamental to Fukuyama’s theory of political order, because he pits it against the kinds of systems that are purely meritocratic or impersonal, as modern states say they attempt to be. In a patrimonial society, “we” are more equal than “them,” and this results in the accumulation of wealth and power into fewer hands, as well as all sorts of favoritism and unearned privileges. In a modern state that is functioning more or less as it’s supposed to, everyone has to play by the same rules.

The majority of The Origins of Political Order is devoted to exploring the complicated ways in which elements of modern states developed to check patrimonialism, and how those checks can decay as circumstances change. As I mentioned, he covers a lot of ground — too much to cover here — so I’ll simply recommend the book and focus on a relevant point.

Fukuyama doesn’t say it in so many words, but modern, socially constructed identity groups seem able to replace kin-based groups in terms of inspiring this kind of favoritism. A member of the “party” or “union” or “community” is preferred over a pure outsider. Ideology has many features of religion, and religion is one of the factors that Fukuyama believes separates the tribal society from the band-level society. Religion and ideology create a broader understanding of family — of who is “us” and who is “them.”

In the final pages of The Origins of Political Order, Fukuyama concludes that the doctrine of universal recognition makes liberal democracies attractive because it is a throwback to the shared participation and shared decision-making common to early tribal and band-level societies. “Once the principle of equal respect or dignity is articulated,” he writes, “it is hard to prevent human beings from demanding it for themselves.”

However, he follows this evident truth by stating that, “successful liberal democracy requires both a state that is strong, unified, and able to enforce laws on its own territory, and a society that is strong and cohesive and able to impose accountability on the state.” This also seems reasonably true, but the idea of a “cohesive” society conflicts with the “diversity is strength” mantras of First World governments, global corporations, and globalist organizations like the United Nations. The cohesive societies with shared backgrounds, religious beliefs, and values that created liberal democracies have in recent history been consistently undermined by attempts by elites to import and integrate foreign groups and ideologies into their states — Muslims in Europe being a particularly corrosive example.

The promise of “intratribal” egalitarianism to everyone everywhere, and anyone anywhere, has in practice created opportunities for the development of what Fukuyama would have to characterize as the kinds of interest groups that engage in zero-sum rent-seeking.

In America, the triumph of this doctrine of absolute inclusiveness has created a social environment in which identity groups actually end up vilifying any kind of overall cohesiveness, homogeneity or social order. Instead of promoting a cohesive society that mobilizes to check the power of the state, Americans have broken themselves out into racial and sexual identity groups — including the 51% minority group known as “women” — that are increasingly focused on using power to secure rents, privileges, “affirmative actions,” hard quotas, soft quotas, special protections, and impunities from both the state and private businesses. And while — unlike in Europe — freedoms of speech and press remain more or less intact in the US, these racial and sexual identity groups are successfully using social media, traditional media, predatory legal challenges, and economic leverage (by harassing companies who hire even the most benign, milquetoast dissenters and questioners) to silence any discussion or criticism of their ideas or collective behaviors.

These social actors, along with the trade unions, business groups, student organizations, nongovernmental organizations and religious organizations that Fukuyama identifies, have created an increasingly stagnant, inflexible system that is failing to respond efficiently or effectively to new challenges. While he sees much to like about liberal democracy, he admits that, “If the institution fails to adapt, the society will face crisis or collapse, and may be forced to adopt another one. This is no less true of a liberal democracy than of a nondemocratic political system.”

Fukuyama doesn’t directly address the problem of social fragmentation in his conclusion to The Origins of Political Order, but it if a cohesive, mobilized society is required to impose accountability on the state, then it seems to follow that a fragmented society of rent and privilege-seeking special interest groups will be unable to impose that accountability effectively — and Americans will be left with a powerful, authoritarian bureaucracy accountable only to interest groups and the wealthy stakeholders who fund them.

Every so often I see this smug little infographic about the superiority of public education in Nordic countries, and the failings of the American system. In the early chapters of The Origins of Political Order, Fukuyama calls the problem of modern state-building “getting to Denmark,” because, “for people in developed countries, ‘Denmark’ is a mythical place that is known to have good political and economic institutions: it is stable, democratic, peaceful, prosperous, inclusive, and has extremely low levels of political corruption.”

In addition to the unique factors Fukuyama identifies that made the development of European states possible, it also seems likely that the relative size and homogenous composition of these nations contributed to their mythical perfection. Denmark is less than one quarter of the size of the state of Oregon where I live, and Fukuyama points out early in the book that even the American Founding Fathers were aware that classical republicanism “did not scale well.” The democratic ideals of early Greece and Rome were developed by homogenous societies. In the case of Rome, expansion and growth eventually gave way to Caesarism, and the Greek city-states were eventually conquered by monarchies.

Part of the magic of Denmark is that it is small, and it was created by the Danes, for the Danes. Danish magic may only last as long as those things remain true, and there is clearly trouble in Denmark. Over half of the convicted rapists in Denmark are immigrants from Iran, Iraq, Turkey, or Somalia. Many Danes are concerned that their culture is being subverted by Muslim influence. Danish birth rates are so low (1.7) that the government recently sponsored a “Do it for Denmark” ad campaign. Denmark without Danish culture and the Danish people will not be the Denmark that everyone else in the West is “trying to get to,” and it seems likely that their political order will decay.

Anti-Whites Admit: 'Boosting our economy' Is a Farce to Promote White Genocide

via White GeNOcide Project

For decades now, all of the anti-White political parties have used the standard White genocide justification that mass non-White immigration and assimilation into ALL and ONLY White countries is a good thing because it “boosts the economy.”

While this claim is nebulous at best, it doesn’t really matter if it’s true. The “economy” line is just an excuse to flood EVERY traditionally White country from Ireland to Iceland with an endless supply of non-White immigration to “change the face” of those countries and “diversify” them with “multiculturalism.”

However, time and time again the anti-Whites slip up and show their real intentions. The “economy” line is just a barefaced lie and this recent article by the anti-White “Socialist Worker” in the UK proves the point. They said:

Socialist Worker supports unlimited immigration even if there was no financial benefit to the British economy.”oint out to them that all this talk of a “diverse” and “vibrant” future in traditionally White countries is just code for WHITE GENOCIDE.

“Diversity” means chasing down the LAST White person.

Say NO to White geNOcide.

Bad News Propaganda: And then some Good News

via The Occidental Observer

Bad news is dangerous to one’s health, and even worse for one’s politics. Our Jewish elites spin propaganda that minimizes damage to their own in-group cohesion while simultaneously pumping out a steady stream of pessimistic demographic “news” to the White majority in the United States.

Demographic prediction is particularly useful for propaganda.  It is either an elixir of hope that energizes a base population into effective action, or a poison that kills hope and drains life and motivation from individuals.

Our elites deploy demographic bad news to persuade Whites that the contest for power is over: to lay down our arms, remain silent and acquiesce to their removal from the professions, from leading intuitions: from remunerative jobs and from national culture.  Increasingly Whites are told through a myriad of channels: obey or pay the consequences.

Never mind that the Ashkenazi birthrate is well below replacement, or that only the Orthodox among Jews have a high birthrate — indeed that the Jewish Orthodox appear to sport a significantly lower IQ and are not likely to sustain Jewish elite dominance. The frenzy of concern about Jewish demographic decline (and the angst over Orthodox dominance) suddenly ceased in Jewish publications across the board in the early 2000s. It would appear that bad news about Jewish demographic decline is Bad for the Jews.

Meanwhile many Whites in the United States have absorbed the toxic pessimism of demographic decline so intricately constructed by our elites.  It is easy to understand why.  First, the “news” we get is pre-selected, pre-digested, and vomited up daily for our consumption in news sites, movies, newspapers and blared from speakers in grocery stores, gas stations and coffee shops.  Second, many White nationalists use demographic data to shock our fellow Whites into action, by pointing out the litany of atrocities committed against us on a daily basis.  Who among us are not shocked at the blasphemy of aliens overrunning our sacred temples, deforming out institutions of higher learning, and degrading our national symbols?  Obviously we must speak out.

But predicting the imminent demise of our people in order to “wake up” our base is a mistake.

While we must always hold a realistic assessment of our situation, we must not internalize and further the object of this propaganda. Our elites serve up bad demographic news to engender despair.  To internalize this despair means White nationalists lose followers and even well-wishers.  The world loves a winner. Our people will give up if we convince ourselves that we will lose.  Our people will speak up and fight only if there is hope.

This point is effectively made by a brilliant social scientist, Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann, who wrote in 1984 what is now a sociological classic, The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion — Our Social Skin. [1]  Friend and confidant of a succession of German Chancellors, including Helmut Kohl, Noelle-Neumann headed the  Allensbach Institute, a prestigious polling organization in Germany.  She demonstrated that humans are primarily motivated by fear of isolation.  Neither Neitzschean will to power, Hegelian search for recognition (thymos) nor a simplistic Marxian lust for material gain account for most human behavior.  Rather, given our evolutionary past, a very high priority for humans was to seek group inclusion and conformity to public opinion.  If they did not fit in they were evicted.   In a hunter-gather society eviction usually resulted in death.  To read the social cues; intuit the prevailing mood; and then join the crowd is the modus operandi of the vast majority of humans, including Whites.  She quotes John Locke to remind us that there is not
one of ten thousand who is stiff and insensible enough to bear up under the constant dislike and condemnation of his own club.
Noelle-Neumann demonstrates that elections are primarily won by parties that convince the general population that they are going to win. This makes nonsense, of course, of polling: people give answers they intuit are expected.  Further, polls are used primarily as propaganda tools by our elite to sway public opinion — hence, perhaps, the general under-prediction of the recent Republican tsunami in the Congressional elections.  Objectively, they measure very little.  “Fringe groups” “extremists” “controversial” are all terms that have no meaning other than the talking points that frame the official propaganda of the elite.

Fear of isolation also makes nonsense of democracy.  Political parties gain the majority of votes required to win by convincing the masses that their side is going to win.  Identifying losers by mass media and isolating dissent as a fringe element has proven a very successful strategy for keeping majority Whites from having effective representation in the halls of power.

But the Spiral of Silence also lays out a strategy for dissent.  If those outside of power project certainty and loudly proclaim confidence in their future, the average men and women will begin to hedge their bets.  They will compromise their adopted opinions and attempt to balance their views with that of the dissenters.  Some will even begin to break off and join the dissenting movement, particularly if the movement provides a welcoming network that operates as a new sub-elite, and offers inclusion in a satisfying milieu — even if opposed to the majority.  The key is to remember that people rarely form independent opinions. They get their cues from mass media unless they are involved in a dissenting sub-group that overrides these cues.

Noelle-Neumann reminds us that the vertical mass media has replaced a horizontal public opinion.  It delivers a brutal top-down narrative that tends to override the subtle intuition and clues that humans at one time utilized to understand dominant opinion.  Mass media hijacks normal human community interaction, and crushes its new image onto the group.  Her earlier writing in National Socialist newspapers, which she never repudiated, makes clear that she believes that Jewish media masters have formed public opinion in the West for many decades.

Now the real demographic story.

The Black Total Fertility Rate (TFR) has been undergoing a slow, steady collapse.  The Hispanic TFR is collapsing as well. The Black birthrate is very approximately even with the White birthrate and the Hispanic birth rate has fallen to mere replacement level.
You are not supposed to know that.

The data are buried in the National Vital Statistics Reports published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. [2]  These data constitute the only authoritative and trustworthy data on births and TFR in the United States.

The final report for 2013 is not available, but the final reports for 2012 and earlier are easily accessible online. Let’s look at the data.  For convenience I compare 2007 to 2012, though the reports go back much further, and confirm the general trends found in this most recent data. The figures are for the Total Fertility Rate. Keep in mind that 2.1-2.2 births per woman are required for maintenance of a stable population — though in the Black community the replacement figure would be higher due to higher death rates.

2007 to 2012 Total Fertility Rate
                                                        2007                  2012
Non-Hispanic White         1.868                 1.765       Fell  5.51%
Non-Hispanic Black           2.133                 1.898      Fell 11.02%
American Indian                1.866                 1.350      Fell 27.65%
  and Alaskan Native
Asian and Pacific                2.038%            1.769       Fell 13.2%
  Islanders
Hispanic                               2.995                 2.189      Fell 26.9%

As you can see Blacks are decreasing at twice the rate of Whites. Hispanics are decreasing at five times the rate of Whites.  Asians are decreasing almost three times the rate of Whites, and Native Americans are decreasing five times the rate of Whites.

Hispanics are now just at replacement level and Blacks are below replacement, just barely above Whites. Asians are also approximately the same as Whites, and Native Americans are disappearing from the landscape.

The CDC has done its best not to highlight these demographic changes and to give the impression that 2012 reflects a state of affairs much like 2011 and earlier.  Under the “highlights” of the 2012 report it reads,
Births declined 1% for non-Hispanic White and Hispanic women and were essentially unchanged for non-Hispanic Black women from 2011–2012.
Thats one way of looking at it.

Here is another.  The population of Whites has been stable and will very slowly decrease because our TFR fell earlier than other groups.  Thus maintaining a stable figure for births is significant.  Black and Hispanic populations have been surging, and have a higher percentage of their population in childbearing years. Yet Hispanic births, despite the surge in population declined in absolute terms by 1%, and Blacks births have stayed essentiality the same, again, despite the increase in total Black population and the increase in child bearing age cohort.

In a word, Hispanics and Blacks have a falling TFR because the increased numbers and young average age has not resulted in the expected parallel increase in births.  Both groups are blowing off their chance for long term demographic increase by having fewer children per women.

There is more to consider.  The fastest declines are a decline of births out of wedlock, and most declines in the future will be in — to use a CDC term — “Non-marriage Rates.”  Now compare the racial differences for this factor, in the percentage of births in this category.

Non-marriage Rates [3]
White 2012  32%
Black 2012 62.6%
Hispanic 2012 72.6%

Enter Obamacare.  This new insurance program, though anathema to most Americans, and especially White Americans, provides free birth control to all women. Very few Americans are left uninsured and without access to birth control.  White women seem to have little trouble accessing birth control, and they also seem to have the foresight to make conscious decisions about using it.  Free birth control has not done, nor will do much, to lower the White birthrate further.  But Blacks and Hispanics are a different matter.

One recent study in the New England Journal of Medicine sheds light on what we can expect to happen.  In “Provision of no-cost, Long-acting Contraception and Teenage Pregnancy” participants in St. Louis were provided with contraception at no cost and administered for 2 to 3 years. [4]   Of 1,404 teenage girls and women, aged 14–19, 72% deliberately chose intrauterine or implant devises, 28% other methods.

In this study, among Whites, it showed a drop from 37.8 pregnancies per (per 1,000 teens) to 26.9.  That is a 28.8% decrease. If applied across the board to out-of-wedlock births among Whites, it would drop the White out-of-wedlock births from 32% to 9.2% of births.

Among Blacks, it showed a drop from 99.5 pregnancies (per 1,000 teens) to 31.8. That is a 68% decrease. If applied across the board to out-of-wedlock births among Blacks, it would drop the Black out of wedlock births from 62.6% to 42.5% of births.

Among Hispanics, if using the same percentage decrease for Blacks, and if applied across the board to out-of-wedlock births, it would drop the out of wedlock births  among Hispanics from 72.6% to 49.3%.

There is every reason to believe that the free long-term birth control offered by Obamacare and required also for all private insurance providers will have a disproportionately large impact on Hispanic and Black TFR in the future.  Obamacare, dysfunctional as it is, may very well provide the coup-de-grace to higher  minority birthrates, and add further downward pressure on Black and Hispanic birthrate to levels below that of Whites.  Precision is impossible in this guesswork. But there is every reason to be optimistic.

Now some major caveats. Applying these figures from the St. Louis study to whole populations is simply not tenable — it would not work like that for any number of reasons.  Out of wedlock births for 14–19-year-old girls does not represent the same conditions of out-of-wedlock births for racial populations a whole.  Further, these girls were counseled on birth control, and received $10 for every visit every six months after initial counseling. So this study cannot seriously predict a drop of White out-of-wedlock births to merely 9.2% of White births, nor Black to 42.5%, nor Hispanics (who were not categorized in this study) to 49.3%.  But even granted all the methodological problems involved in extrapolating these results to whole racial groups,  we can conclude with some certainty that free birth control will drop out-of-wedlock births, and that this will not only add to the downward pressure on TFR on all groups but will disproportionately affect Blacks and Hispanics.

There are further caveats with all these data, including the CDC figures.   The CDC counts Indians from the Subcontinent and people from the Middle East as “White.” This would not change the big picture however,  since Indians  are known to have a  birth-rate lower than Whites and more  in line with Native Americans.  Arabs have had a higher birthrate in the past but recent figures are hard to get, and the birthrate for this group has been falling.  Muslims in France and Germany have a TFR of 2.2 and are such a small proportion that they are unlikely to push up the TFR figures of Whites more than a tiny fraction in the 2012 figures.

Of course there is still plenty of bad news to go around.  There are millions pouring over our borders from Latin America, and increasingly from Africa, and the Obama Administration is doing its best to facilitate the invasion.  The data count the race of the baby by the race of the mother, and there are White mothers with Black fathers, and of course, some Black births by White fathers (though small)  and Asian births with White fathers, and so on.

But the Black, Asian and Hispanic communities are now rapidly aging, with heavy downward pressure on their birthrate. Our hostile elites have not found it to be in their interest to discuss this.  To do so is dangerous. Non-Whites might complain of “racism” and blame them elite for their demise, as White nationalists have done.  Demographic news that discourages minorities from envisioning an inevitable takeover of the country would discourage them. It might even create in Native Americans, Blacks and other components of traditional America, a sense of betrayal — that they are being invaded, flooded, and overwhelmed. Analysis of the CDC data, and other studies like the St. Louis study published in the New England Journal of Medicine, would wreak havoc on the anti-White propaganda and the steady stream of bad news meant for White ears only.

Any way you cut it, however, there is good demographic news out there. Whites in the United States cannot be described as finished.  We are surviving the onslaught, and our numbers are steady while other racial groups are in collapse — only to be helped along by Obamacare and poised to fall below our own TFR in the near future.

Guaranteed? By no means. Likely? Yes. To use a favorite propaganda phrase of our elite media, Whites will have the highest birth rate in the country “if present trends continue.”

So let’s not internalize the dominant narrative of demographic bad news. There is good news out there, and we have a lot to live and fight for. Despair is not justified.  Given the numbers as they currently stand, and given the future trends, despair is not only unjustified. It is absurd.

Endnotes

  1. Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann, The Spiral of Silence: Public opinion–our Social Skin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
  2. ‘Births: Final Data for 2007′ National Vital Statistics Reports (NVSS); Vol. 58, No. 24;
‘Births: Final Data for 2008′ National Vital Statistics Reports (NVSS); Vol. 59, No. 1;
‘Births: Final Data for 2009′ National Vital Statistics Reports (NVSS; Vol. 60, No. 1; ‘Births: Final Data for 2010′ National Vital Statistics Reports (NVSS); Vol. 61, No. 1. ‘Births: Final Data for 2011′ National Vital Statistics Reports (NVSS) Vol. 62, No. 1 ‘Births: Final Data for 2012’ National Vital Statistics Reports (NVSS); Vol. 62, No.9.
  1. ‘Recent Declines in Non-marital Childbearing in the United States’ National Center for Health Prevention Data Brief, no. 162. Note these figures have been rounded off.
  2. Gina M. Secura, et. al. ‘Provision of No-Cost, Long Acting Contraception and Teenage Pregnancy’ New England Journal of Medicine, 371 (2014): 1316-23.