Jan 12, 2015

Jonathan Chait and the End of Liberal Society in the West

via The Occidental Observer

The Charles Hebdo affair presents a difficult dilemma to liberals and the left in general. Typically, they have no problem with censorship of views they don’t like. They jump on board campaigns to fire college professors for publishing about race differences or White dispossession, and they shed no tears when some poor soul in the media gets fired for blurting out something about Jewish power in Hollywood. They would love for such people to go to prison.

But they want to think of themselves as principled and high-minded. So what to say about the murderous attempt to shut down Charlie Hebdo?
Here’s what Jonathan Chait says in New York magazine:
Let us stipulate for the sake of argument that Charlie Hebdo is crude and even racist. Freedom of expression is not a strong defense of crude, racist, or otherwise stupid expression. Indeed, one of the most common and least edifying defenses made by people who have proffered offensive opinions is that they have the right to free speech. The right of expression is not the issue when the objection centers on the content.
This last comment—that “the right of expression is not the issue when the objection centers on the content”— reflects Chait’s intellectual arrogance about the dogmas of liberalism — that for example,  there is no such thing as race, but if there is, genetic differences are irrelevant to average group differences in IQ or any other trait important for success in the contemporary world, etc. From his point of view, these dogmas are set in stone and massively supported by scientific data. So it’s perfectly legitimate to exclude people who dissent from these dogmas from having any voice in the mainstream media, and exert pressure to get them fired them from their jobs or put them in jail.

And Chait, as a prominent contributor to the elite media, is well aware that he is in a great position to do exactly that.

But that’s not what’s at issue here. Charlie Hebdo is obviously not attempting to be intellectually rigorous, and poking holes in its content would be child’s play. Their content is indefensible. So why tolerate Charlie Hebdo when you are unwilling to tolerate James Watson or Jason Richwine?

The approved answer is that we must stand up for Charlie Hebdo because they have been threatened with violence. Here Chait relies on Ross Douthat in the New York Times:
The kind of blasphemy that Charlie Hebdo engaged in had deadly consequences, as everyone knew it could … and that kind of blasphemy is precisely the kind that needs to be defended, because it’s the kind that clearly serves a free society’s greater good. If a large enough group of someones is willing to kill you for saying something, then it’s something that almost certainly needs to be said, because otherwise the violent have veto power over liberal civilization, and when that scenario obtains it isn’t really a liberal civilization any more. Again, liberalism doesn’t depend on everyone offending everyone else all the time, and it’s okay to prefer a society where offense for its own sake is limited rather than pervasive. But when offenses are policed by murder, that’s when we need more of them, not less, because the murderers cannot be allowed for a single moment to think that their strategy can succeed.
In this sense, many of the Western voices criticizing the editors of Hebdo have had things exactly backward: Whether it’s the Obama White House or Time Magazine in the past or the Financial Timesand (God help us) the Catholic League today, they’ve criticized the paper for provoking violence by being needlessly offensive and “inflammatory” (Jay Carney’s phrase), when the reality is that it’s precisely the violence that justifies the inflammatory content. In a different context, a context where the cartoons and other provocations only inspired angry press releases and furious blog comments, I might sympathize with the FT’s Tony Barber when he writes that publications like Hebdo “purport to strike a blow for freedom when they provoke Muslims, but are actually just being stupid.” (If all you have to fear is a religious group’s fax machine, what you’re doing might not be as truth-to-power-ish as you think.) But if publishing something might get you slaughtered and you publish it anyway, by definition you are striking a blow for freedom, and that’s precisely the context when you need your fellow citizens to set aside their squeamishness and rise to your defense.
Whereas far too often in the West today the situation is basically reversed: People will invoke free speech to justify just about any kind of offense or provocation or simple exploitation (“if we don’t go full-frontal seven times on ‘Game of Thrones’ tonight, man, the First Amendment dies”), and then scurry for cover as soon as there’s a whiff of actual danger, a hint that “bold” envelope-pushing might require actual bravery after all.
Jonathan Chait’s take away message from this manages to include the inference that Jews, having been supposedly been victims of laws against blasphemy during the Inquisition, naturally believe in “liberalism and liberty”:
Must all deliberate offense-giving, in any context, be celebrated, honored, praised? I think not. But in the presence of the gun — or, as in the darker chapters of my own faith’s history, the rack or the stake — both liberalism and liberty require that it be welcomed and defended.
The problem with this is that there is a very large area between fax machines and murder — like being fired from one’s job or going to prison for saying things liberals don’t like. These are very serious costs to contemplate before expressing one’s well-founded opinions, and when a society allows such costs, as pretty much every Western society does in one form or another, it is just as much an attempt to have “veto power over liberal civilization” as murder and threats of murder.

Liberal civilization disappeared in the West along with the increased power of the left. In the U.S., organizations like the ADL and the SPLC have lobbied for and supported thought crime legislation. And they have pressured governments and private companies to fire those with opinions they dislike. Throughout the West, it’s the same story, with a central role for Jewish activist organizations (e.g., Guillaume Durocher on France, Andrew Joyce on the UK, Brenton Sanderson on Australia; myself on the U.S. and Canada).

So imagine this paraphrase of Douthat’s central point:
The kind of blasphemy that Prof. James Watson and Jason Richwine (and many others) engaged in had the consequence that they were fired, as everyone knew it could … and that kind of blasphemy is precisely the kind that needs to be defended, because it’s the kind that clearly serves a free society’s greater good. If a large enough group of someones is willing to fire you for saying something, then it’s something that almost certainly needs to be said, because otherwise the censorious have veto power over liberal civilization, and when that scenario obtains it isn’t really a liberal civilization any more. Again, liberalism doesn’t depend on everyone offending everyone else all the time, and it’s okay to prefer a society where offense for its own sake is limited rather than pervasive. But when offenses are policed by devastating economic sanctions to one’s livelihood, that’s when we need more of them, not less, because the SPLC and the ADL cannot be allowed for a single moment to think that their strategy can succeed.
But don’t expect Chait — or Douthat or the rest of the mainstream media — to get on board with that. Remember, censorship on the basis of content is just fine unless someone wants to actually kill you for saying it. Anything short of murder is just fine—an ideology that certainly satisfies the interests of contemporary Western elites who control the media and are able to exert effective economic pressure on dissidents. As noted in Francis Carr Begbie’s article, there are very different mechanisms utilized by elites and non-elites for censoring public discourse.

But make no mistake. Liberal civilization in the West has been destroyed, and its destruction was carried out by the same people who now congratulate themselves for having reasoned, enlightened views on free speech.

The Catholic Church Is Like, Relevant, Brah!

via Theden

Ladies and gentlemen: What you see above is not a joke or a satire. This is part of an official ad campaign by the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn.

Apparently a great number of young adults are leaving the Catholic Church. It seems they no longer find it “relevant” to their lives. Apparently the Diocese of Brooklyn has judged that this is how they can make themselves a part of young people’s lives again.

The core vice of capitalism is that when the capitalist spirit dominates, everything is for sale. And when everything is for sale, everything is to be advertised. But sale and advertising alike are foreign to any sense of the sacred. “Thy money perish with thee,” said St Peter to Simon Magus, “because thou hast thought that thou couldest purchase the gift of God with money.”

Anything sacred is supposed to be eternal. But advertising plays on fads and trends. When religious rites are connected with this kind of an advertising campaign, maybe they will become “relevant” to young people’s lives, in the same way that countless fashion trends were “relevant” decades ago and induce groans and cringes when the people who wore them back then look at their own pictures today.

It’s sad that in our day and time even the Church doesn’t seem to understand the concept of sacredness or to be able to communicate it effectively. If our culture is to survive, we need to recapture the concept of having something that is, immovably, non-negotiably, not for sale. Ezra Pound said “the temple is holy because it is not for sale.” Dougie MacLean said of Scotland what I wish all the men of the West could say of their homelands: “Yes, sir, you may have paid good money for it, but, no, it’ll never belong to you.”

Men will die for the sacred. Men will live for the sacred. The power of a sacred thing, any sacred thing, to motivate men, to inspire them to fight, is unparalleled. Few, if any, will die for numbers in a bank account or little pieces of green paper. But men will die for a king. They will die for a god. They will die for a homeland. They will not die for “real estate.” They will not die for anything that is for sale.

If the courage of the martyrs is lacking in our generation, it is because the Faith is for sale.

My People, Right or Wrong

via Radix Journal

If the beginning of 2015 holds any premonitions, we should be in for another year of explosive rape accusations. The first major rape charge of this year goes for the crown, literally.

Prince Andrew, second son of Britain’s reigning Queen Elizabeth II, stands accused of participating in an international child sex ring where he reportedly raped an underage girl on multiple occasions. That girl, now an adult, is suing him and others for allegedly abusing her while she was a child. No surprise, but the specter of rape hanging around a man fifth-in-line for King of England is now huge news all over the world.

Like all of the defendants in these cases—whether they are royals or college lacrosse players—Prince Andrew is guilty until proven innocent and has already had his conviction in the public eye. Not a soul outside of Buckingham Palace is defending His Highness and the onslaught of ink already spilled has very well ruined his name for all time.

But there is one man accused with Andrew who’s receiving strong support and the media is allowing the public to hear his side. That’s retired Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz. Dershowitz, both Jewish and staunchly pro-Israel, has come out swinging against the charges against him and has threatened to sue the woman at the center of this controversy.

Par the course, Dershowitz brought up the trademark counter-charge of anti-Semitism against his foes. “The anti-Semites are crawling out from under their rocks, they are loving this. And the anti-Israel zealots are loving this,” Dershowitz told the friendly Jerusalem Post about the effects of this ordeal. And he’s not alone in his defense.

Popular American Rabbi Shmuley Boteach rushed to the lawyer’s defense and urged all Jews to do the same. Why is it so important for “all Jews” to stand up for Dershowitz against sex abuse charges? Because he is an ardent defender of Israel and the Jewish people. Rabbi Shmuley even discounts the matter of whether it the charges are true or false weigh in the matter. Instead, the absolute, primary reason Jewish leaders should come to the Harvard professor’s aid is because he is an important Jew. Shmuley doesn’t begin his op-ed addressing the charges, rather he begins with a long recitation of his record of defending Israel, claiming the Holocaust was the worst crime in man’s history, and how brilliant of a thinker he is. He only gets around to the charges in the fifth paragraph, and it is only a brief summation.

The Rabbi then switches gears and tries to shame the Jewish community with allusions to blood libels and the Dolchstosslegende, placing the accusations against Dershowitz in the same category. That’s quite the stretch, but Shmuley also believes Jews run away from scandal “like the plagues”, so don’t expect too much accuracy here.
What his whole argument boils down to is that this Jewish leader, who has spent his whole defending his people’s interests and homeland, deserves the support, solidarity, and voice of all Jewish people—regardless of whether he committed the crime or not—for that reason alone.

Compare Shmuley’s firebreathing essay with that of Buckingham Palace’s lukewarm defense of their own family member. Prince Andrew is a part of the living embodiment of the British nation and his sins tarnish that of his entire country. You would expect full-throated counter-attacks and hyperbolic apologetics for the Prince, from both the royal family and the British people. What is the word of one girl against a man who is of the same blood as the monarch? Alas, it is not so and I have yet to find anything remotely similar to the defenses for Dershowitz. It’s worth saying that Dershowitz is not the only public defender Israel has(not by a very long shot) and he is neither a leader of the state nor does his disgrace jeopardize the existence of the Jewish people. All he is a lawyer (albeit, a prominent one) with access to the media and a deep love for his people. Yet, he still receives far more support than that of a man who literally represents his country.

This a textbook example of what’s wrong with White people in comparison with that of others, particularly Jews. Nearly every group, except Whites, lives by the dictum “my people, right or wrong.” Older Whites might be familiar with and lived by the similar phrase “my country, right or wrong,” but the treatment of Prince Andrew proves that is a dying creed amongst our folk.

The reason Dershowitz is getting any support is not simply because he is Jewish and Jews rush to the aid of any of their people under attack. If that was true, you would be seeing more defenses of the man at the heart of this whole story, Jeffrey Epstein, who has powerful connections and immense wealth. But Jews don’t defend him because he is not as important to their people. Dershowitz, on the other hand, is synonymous with Jewish interests and defending Israel. Letting him become tarred as a child rapist would hurt those causes and undermine (to a degree) the ability Jews have to defend their homeland in American media. His shame is not only his to bear, but is borne by all Jews desiring a future for their identity.

Modern Whites haven’t woken up to this notion—even though every White person is taught to feel guilt for the crimes of their ancestors. European Identity in the minds of Whites is a completely negative concept. In our eyes, it’s “my people, always wrong.” Our universalism and hyperindividualism only further exacerbate this problem by not allowing us to see fellow Whites as our racial brethren. We see them only as fellow members of the non-existent “human race” and we evaluate their behavior only in regards to abstract values and beliefs. This doesn’t mean that every White would face the same treatment as Prince Andrew (his crucifixion is more due to rape culture hysteria). What it means is that we would not defend His Highness against these charges, in spite of the harm it would cause the country in allowing a man with royal blood to be labelled a pedophile. We care too much for the abstract “Truth” to stand up for ourselves. That’s what separates us from all the other races. We think of ourselves too much as isolated individuals rather than members of a larger community.

To counteract this, we need to become more ethnocentric. We need to stop caring for these values and “human rights” that deny our identity and allow others to exploit us. We need to stop having a solely negative identity and embrace the achievements of Europeans as the achievements of Europeans, not conceding them to “humanity.” We need to accept ourselves as one people, and no matter what our faults or supposed crimes, this is who we are—and there’s nothing wrong with loving your own kind.

Now, in fairness, “my people, right or wrong” does not entail that we defend White leaders who are, in fact, pedophiles. It also certainly doesn't mean we need to rush to the defense of Prince Andrew. Andrew is a part of a corrupt monarchy that has done a poor job of representing its country and looking after its preservation, unlike what Dershowitz has done for Israel. The only ones who should concern themselves with defending Andrew are those who wish for the well-being of the modern, multicultural British state. We're not in that category.

What it entails is that we at least give our support to those who represent us and champion our interests, like Rabbi Shmuley urges his people to do for Alan Dershowitz. Running away from them and letting the lions devour those who have given their all to Whites is downright shameful, and that’s the same logic that Shmuley uses to defend his Jewish brother.

We can complain all we want that this episode shows how dishonest and tribal Jews are when their own folks suffer attacks, but this is why they succeed. This is how Israel ensures its needed support, in spite of abusing those “human rights” and garnering the hatred of their neighbors. This is how they were able to create and maintain a homeland of their own. Instead of bemoaning this, we should understand it and take lessons from it. To build off the full phrase of the man behind “my country, right or wrong,” we’d keep right what is right about Whites and set what’s wrong with us right.

If we lived by this ethos, we’d have a homeland of our own.

Race Is a Social Construct?

via Western Spring

Black & WhiteThose who want to blend away all distinct peoples, and especially White people, often say that race doesn’t really exist and that it is just a social construct.  Of course, what they are really saying is:  jump in bed with people of different races because it doesn’t matter and we are all the same.

This is nonsense. It is also miscegenation.  It is also genocide. I call it bedroom genocide.  Feel free to use the term. Whites should not mate with non-Whites. Period. It is the death of us.

All humans are not the same. Your eyes tell you that. True science tells you that.  Evolution and natural selection tell you that. Statistics tell you that.  Even your nose and ears tell you that. Your senses feed information to your brain so you can survive, that’s the basic purpose of our senses.  And, you are to survive so you can make more like yourself.  To make more like yourself, you have to know who is like you and who isn’t so that you don’t turn into a baby factory for those unlike you and produce them instead of your own kind. The Blenders want to confuse you and blur the distinctions so you will commit your own genocide and turn your White family line into a non-White family line.  They want you to devolve back into the dark masses of humanity from which we Whites evolved not that may thousands of years ago.  They want to stop your evolution along a White line.  They want to destroy you and have you be assimilated and absorbed into the dark masses and cease to exist.  They want you and all Whites to go extinct.  They want you dead.

But there is something even more basic here that must be understood as to why the concept of  race is real and not just a social construct. And, it is this.  Every word ever uttered by any human is a made up word.  We make up words to distinguish between different things.  We humans need words to properly think about things.  We really can’t think about things correctly unless we have  words for them.

Humans, with our large brains and a higher consciousness  and discernment than so-called lower organisms look around us and we see differences in different things and we make up words so we can think about them and also so we can know what is dangerous and what isn’t, and for many other reasons.   Lower organisms might see a forest and think all the trees are the same.  Humans know there are differences, and we give the trees different names.  It is the same with everything else that humans encounter.  We have a higher level of discernment.  We see differences, we name the differences, we group like with like and we categorize things accordingly.  This is part of being intelligent.

It is the same with human types.  We have invented a word, “race,” which is used to categorize different humans into different logical groups.   Because we have invented the word “race” does not mean it is a social construct–that the thing itself is not real–because the word is a made up word (like all words).  To think that there aren’t different races of humans is akin to adopting  a position of such low consciousness that we must thereafter, to be consistent, not believe in breeds of dogs, or varieties of roses and return to a primitive sub-human ham handed state where we have, perhaps, a single word for, say, snakes.  And, in such a state of calling all snakes just snakes, we would fail to understand that snakes are not all the same and we would fail to understand that some snakes, such as dangerous rattlesnakes can kill us and others such as garter snakes can’t. A snake is not just a snake and a human is not just a human. There are different types of each.

white-prideFurthermore, saying that race doesn’t exist is the equivalent of saying Black humans, Yellow humans, Red humans, Brown humans and White humans don’t exist.  Now, we know they do exist because we can see them..  And, our eyes tell us they are different.  And, we also know that  the differences extend far beyond skin color, but skin color, even if there were no other differences, is enough to classify some as this race and some as this other race.

The king of the human senses is eyesight. We can reason to this conclusion by understanding that our eyesight is linked closely to our instincts to mate.  Trust your eyes.  If another human doesn’t look like you, they probably aren’t like you.  And, if they aren’t like you, they pose a danger to you either directly or indirectly in the sense that they possess genes that are unlike yours and if you mix your genes with theirs, you will produce non-White children and you will, in essence, kill off your Whiteness and set your family on a non-White trajectory.

Now, to go even further than this talk of races of humans, many of us say that race, as a term, does not go far enough and that the major races of humans (the colour coded ones) are actually different subspecies or even different species.

And, just a few last words.  Don’t let the Blenders convince you that skin colour is meaningless.  Don’t fall into that trap.  Skin colour is not like paint that is applied as an afterthought over identical model humans.  Skin colour is an essential part of humans and comes from within.  Whites are simply not White if they are not white.   (Upper case White means “non-Jewish white person of European descent.”  Lower case white means a colour.)

Keep Calm and Surf the Storm

via Alternative Right

The latest article over at Radix is a piece written by the passionate, brilliant Roman Bernard, a man whom I admire deeply. In it, he gives his impressions of the reaction – or rather, overreaction – of the western public and identitarian movement(s) in the wake of the terrorist attack upon the offices and employees of a left-wing French satirical magazine.

I can't say that I disagree entirely with his article. It is a mistake common (but not exclusive) to the western people to react in a manner that is perhaps disproportionate to attacks made upon them in a certain manner.

While we will happily tolerate in oblivious silence decades of slow-drip Cultural Marxism – an insidious social mechanism disseminated by the universities and the media & entertainment complexes that is as much an attack on our people as any bomb or mass shooting – we seem zealously willing and able to consider the previously unthinkable in the wake of a public attack upon one of our cultural institutions.

The time of the Cronulla Riots.
A good example of this was the inaptly named "Cronulla Riots" in the southern suburbs of my native city of Sydney. Locals had endured years of Muslim gangs from the western suburbs coming into the area, beating up locals and harassing young Australian women, but after a group of young volunteer lifeguards were attacked and beaten on Cronulla beach one summer weekend, the gloves suddenly came off. Via mass text messages, the Muslim gangs were "invited" to attend Cronulla the following weekend, where they would be warmly welcomed. Attendance by Muslims was virtually non-existent, and for those few foolhardy types who ventured to the seashore, their incautious action was not without unpleasant repercussions. The liberal media went hysterical, but Muslims learned to behave themselves in Cronulla, and that was that.

It was portrayed as an overreaction, but really, it was a late-coming, entirely reasonable reaction to a perceived common threat. Now, if calmer heads had prevailed and nothing whatever was done, the Muslim gangs would have decided that these Australians were doormats eager for more, and they would have supplied it to our detriment.

For all his (I'm certain) good intentions, this inaction seems to be what Roman is advising in this case. I do not agree with him, and this is why.

This morning, before the second Muslim attack which we are now learning was upon a French policewoman and a Paris city employee, I ran into an old friend of mine, a particularly bright young Japanese woman who was married to an Anglo-Australian.

Literary industry types, I knew they were both on the far left of the ideological spectrum. Much to my surprise, however, after just a few minutes of conversation, I was shocked to learn that this friend of mine who was until that day a staunch advocate of multiculturalism, was now expressing deep concern and even cautious rejection of the multicultural experiment.

I cannot emphasize enough what a polar shift this was for this couple. By carefully testing her thoughts via Socratic questioning, I led her to a turn in the conversation where I could start to – for the first time ever – begin to introduce some identitarian and "far-right" thought into her consciousness.

Perhaps I got a little overzealous, but at the end of the day, she went away with a piece of paper covered in urls for relevant websites (including this one, naturally) and the firm intention of buying copies of several books that I had recommended. To cement her conversion, I have set up a coffee date between myself, her and her husband for later this month, at which time I'll hit them with my inventory of Evola.

This would never have occurred had the Paris attack not taken place, and if I'd decided to remain quiet and "ride the tiger" in the purest sense. I could have resigned myself from the outset to the fact that Yukari is a leftist, she will always be a leftist, and that nothing I could do or say would change that.

I'm not advocating overreaction. Nobody should storm anything or attack anyone or blow anything up. Why? Because it would be totally counterproductive. It would give the Muslim "victims" and their allies in the slobbering, slavishly cowering western media an opening to push the White racist aggressor narrative.

But we must REACT! As in an ancient battle, when an army senses the hesitation and uncertainty of their adversaries, we must press home the advantage. And we must push HARD.

There is no overstepping when it comes to an intellectual surge. It is precisely this manner of suggesting the previously indigestible at the right moment that has allowed the leftist intelligentsia to shift the Overton window so far in their favour. So call for repatriation loudly. Attack the neocon enablers who have convinced us that multiculturalism is a pillar of western society when it's something no western country ever voted for. Question equality and egalitarianism everywhere, and, if it feels right, even call for a restoration of monarchies – especially in France, where the cultural vacuum is such that any hard drive would gain at least some traction.

Forget riding the tiger for a short time. This is the time to gain some lost ground. We need to surf the storm of western outrage, and start channeling it in productive directions.

Virtual Reality, Part 1

via Counter-Currents

Unreality and Catharsis

The death of Joshua “Leelah” Alcorn – a 17-year-old boy who committed suicide as a result of “gender identity disorder” – ought to provoke reflection about the Right’s attitude to sex and sexuality. Usefully, it also provides a definitive case study about the modern “Left’s” attitude and position on sex, biology, and individuality.

Above all, Joshua’s death, the surrounding circumstances, and his rather poignant and melodramatic suicide note are examples of a type of neurosis and societal calamity – failure at a complete civilizational level – that the Right has yet to address, do battle with, and resolve satisfactorily into a metaphysical doctrine.

From what we know of Joshua, he “understood what transgender meant” at 14 years old. No mean feat for a 14-year-old to have a thorough enough understanding of sexual and cultural mores that he understood the significance of invasive surgery and lifelong pretense. In his words, “after 10 years of confusion, I finally understood who I was.”

The idea that a 4-year-old would suffer from a neurotic mismatch between his biological sex and his sense of sexual identity seems utterly absurd. But bizarrely, it appears to carry some truth. New Scientist reports that “a 2010 study of 121 transgender people found that 38% realized they had gender variance by aged 5,” which coincides with Joshua’s experience.

Transgenderism in adults, gender dysmorphia, and the resultant “transitioning” is extremely outlandish, freakish even to majoritarian perspective – and yet upsettingly mundane, as clearly these individuals are troubled at a very profound level, and their struggle is typical of human flaws, failure, and neurosis. Often, I believe that peeling away the feigned shock of middle classes and the hysteria of misandrist agitators will reveal the boys posing in dresses are simply rebels without causes, and the transsexuals in red light districts are driven by catering for a niche market. The window dressing of civil rights agitation and sentimentality about being “trapped in a boy’s body” serve no real purpose apart from an indirect humiliation of those who adhere to gender norms when transposed into demands for public support. Gender dysmorphia is a private illness, and as such normally so are the coping mechanisms employed by those that suffer from it. It is only political actors that break transgenderism into popular consciousness – antifascist and egalitarian agents in the press, eager to reprint “Leelah’s” online profanity and demands to “fix society” – along with various charities, NGOs, and busybodies who want to keep themselves in subsidized work by prolonging the suffering of others.

It is important to delineate between homosexuality (an erotic attraction to biological sameness), transvestism (an avenue of erotic play), and transgenderism. The Transgenderism movement as a current social, biological, and governmental project (see the U.K’s National Health Services’ unwavering statement that “gender dysmorphia is not a mental illness”) is antithetical to authenticity. It contradicts sexual dimorphism, and by extension sexual orientation, at a basic level by elaborating a theory of “intersex” persons and “gender fluidity.” However, it uses this biological pretext in attempts to redefine gender as a function of appearance, social role, and self-image, and through this drive traditionally rooted gender ideals into obsolescence, displacing them instead with the idea that a persons’ gender is a subject of social consensus rather than biological fact. It is in many ways a logical and extreme end point of egalitarian mythos. Sexual determinism refutes enforced non-discrimination, and so in order to validate egalitarian thought, transgender persons must exist in both theory and practice to demonstrate that gender identity is a purely superficial phenomenon.

Through this, the leftist monomania of “rights” becomes the right of the differentiated, victimized, and oppressed “transgender” individual to narcissistically define himself however he likes in terms of gender (paradoxically supported by clinical studies). It demonstrates the mendacity of the Left in using biological proofs when convenient to bolster a radical individualist agenda at social cost, but ignoring them in all other areas, such as sexual determinism.

Transgenderism–in Leelah’s words, the ability to “live my life as a woman”–reduces to the idea of using any and all means as a wedge to force social compliance with personal fantasy. It is, to borrow Jonathan Bowden’s words on the S.C.U.M Manifesto, “the most extreme and delusional, counterfactual, and virtual reality piece of feminism that was ever created,” only transgenderism as a social exercise insists that feminism cannot exist because there is no such thing as a woman – Only the eventual “social construct” of the female gender, that any man can fill with appropriate makeup, “reassignment surgery,” and “gender rights.”

Transgenderism in its doctrine mainly calls upon the idea that human sexual dimorphism can be incomplete, stunted, or otherwise misdirected in the brain. In short, that those with gender-mismatch neurosis are “born that way.” This pretext is closely followed by a delusional dissociation between brain and body chemistry to allow for the ability to “become” the opposite sex. This initial premise of altered or differentiated brain development is reasonable and backed up by an expanding amount of clinical proof, if mainstream science journals and institutions are to be believed. It does not follow, though, that society should then maintain egalitarianism by adjusting its social customs, or even more dangerously, provide irreversible and drastic cosmetic surgery as “healthcare.” Those afflicted with the desire to “change sex” tend to view “transitioning” as the grand finale, the big year zero that will enable them to “live life” as the opposite sex. The fact that “gender reassignment’ surgery is ultimately cosmetic surgery is glossed over with special snowflakeism and anti-biological, marxoid rambling about “sex” and “gender” and “identity” being different, interchangeable tokens.

Transgenders as a general rule of thumb aren’t stupid or delusional – they don’t, for the most part, really believe they can rewrite gender. Most of them planning to “transition” fully acknowledge or are at least half-aware they are making a purely cosmetic transformation, of a biologically functioning body into a non-functional, doll-like simulacrum. What matters to them is social acceptance that they “are” the opposite sex. As I have been delicately told, “it’s my business what’s in my pants.” The self-mutilatory nature of the “gender re-assignment” is not a deterrent for them but seen as largely irrelevant, as their existing body holds little value to them due to their mis-identification with the opposite gender. Nonetheless, the surgery itself is longed for as a catharsis, alleviation of Weltschmerz, and means to social validation. Consequentially they discover that reality fails to live up to expectations, and find themselves pariahs outside of hugbox “safe space” environments of ideological conformists. It is this difficulty of maintaining ideological conformity – from preventing anyone raising an eyebrow, “misgendering,” or otherwise insinuating that they aren’t really a woman, that creates the intense psychological pressure behind transgender demands. Leelah’s petulant insistence that transgender people be “treated like humans, with valid feelings and human rights” are demands for an amorphous, fluid “personhood” that overlooks biological fact and enables them to experience the catharsis of “being” their preferred gender.

Obviously, this is an impossible crusade, and eventually when pitting themselves against a society that as a rule of thumb acknowledges the rudimentary facts of gender, it is the transgender individual who cracks and awakes to the full horror that they have encaged themselves in a fantasy. Post-surgery transgenders have an astonishing suicide rate according to all data collected, with a full 60% of “gender re-assigned or gender non-conforming” having attempted suicide if they had also been turned away by a doctor based on their gender identity. The same document references a study of over 6000 respondents, in which sample 41% reported ever having attempted suicide. However, the study also sensibly notes that respondents tend to conflate self-harming behavior with suicide attempts, and the lack of follow up or investigation into the status of these individuals could have inflated these percentages. Nonetheless even halving these numbers leaves transgender individuals with suicide risk orders of magnitude greater than the heteronormative majority.

The Independent, in its brief and fawning article about Leelah, states that “People can help to prevent similar tragedies by believing those who identify as transgender,” according to Mara Keisling, Executive Director of the National Centre of Transgender Equality, who conducted the study. Surely such massive failure in this approach should prompt a total re-evaluation of methodology in dealing with those afflicted with gender-based mental illness and/or neurological inconsistencies?

The Dispossessed Elite

via Radix Journal

Andrew Fraser is a legal scholar who has been forced to brave the slings and arrows of outrageous anti-White attitude in his position as Professor of Public Law at Macquarie University in Sydney. His book The WASP Question is a detailed presentation of his views on the self-destruction of the once-proud group of Anglo-Saxons who colonized vast areas after departing from their native England, but who are now very much threatened by loss of power and, even more disastrously, loss of identity. The book is an attempt to answer the question why WASPs (which he describes as “a subtly, perhaps deservedly derogatory acronym coined sometime in the late Fifties to denote White Anglo-Saxon Protestants”) have failed to protect their bio-cultural interests in the contemporary world.

This is, indeed, the fundamental question of our times—true not only of WASPs, but of all Whites, although it must be said that WASPs seem to embody this pathology to a greater extent than other White groups. Fraser’s answer is an intellectual tour de force, encompassing very wide swaths of history and pre-history, evolutionary thinking, the psychology of racial differences, and academic theology. Far from being a paean to his ethnic group, the book is nothing less than “an attack on my co-ethnics, mainly the American WASPs who for over two centuries now have waged a reckless, revolutionary, and relentless cultural war on the ethno-religious traditions which once inspired the Anglo-Saxon province of Christendom to greatness.”

At the heart of this project is an attempt to understand WASP uniqueness. As he notes early on, “European man alone bears the spirit of civic republicanism, a tradition still largely alien to other races and peoples.” Whereas WASPs eschew ethnic nepotism as a matter of enlightened principle, “there is no shortage of evidence that the Changs, the Gonzales, and the Singhs (not to mention the Goldmans with their well-known animus toward WASPs) still practice forms of ethnic nepotism strictly forbidden to Anglo-Protestants.”

Fraser’s search for unraveling this mystery begins with the Germanic origins of Anglo-Saxon society. Relying on recent population genetic data, Fraser suggests that beginning in the mid-5th century, the Angle, Saxon, and Jute invaders contributed beyond their numbers to the gene pool of what was to become England. Males from indigenous Britons were forced to migrate to the outer reaches of the island, but with high levels of intermarriage with native women. The result was that the population was distinct from the Germanic groups left behind on the continent.

Fraser points to “an institutionalized predisposition towards both local autonomy and individual liberty” as characteristic of Northern European peoples, based on monogamy, the nuclear family, paternal investment in children, and a relative de-emphasis on extended kinship groups, leading to the rise of non-kinship-based forms of reciprocity. These traits were adaptive when confronting difficult ecological conditions during the Ice Ages.

However, these tribal groups also had a strong sense of internal cohesion and in-group solidarity, and kinship ties were, indeed, of considerable importance, as indicated by the long history of blood feud and wergeld.

An important manifestation of non-kinship-based reciprocity was the Männerbund or comitatus—groups formed for military purposes and based on the reputation of leaders and the followers rather than on their kinship relatedness. Indeed, Fraser quotes James Russell (from The Germanization of Early Medieval Christianity1): “The intensity of the comitatus bond seems to exceed even that of kinship.”

Fraser makes the interesting point that “there were striking differences in the relative importance of lordship and kinship in Anglo-Saxon England,”
as compared with southern Denmark and northern Germany from which the Angles, the Jutes and the Saxons originated. In Friesland and Schleswig-Holstein, throughout the Middle Ages there was a preponderance of free peasant proprietors with few great territorial lords endowed with seigneurial privileges. In England, by contrast, the prevalence of lordship was much more marked.
Based on Berta Surees Phillipotts’ wonderfully titled Kindred and Clan in the Middle Ages and After: A Study in the Sociology of the Teutonic Races2, there is the suggestion that these differences were caused by the relative lack of strength of kinship groups in areas, like England, that became dominated by lords. According to this hypothesis, kinship relationships were compromised as Germanic groups left their native areas in southern Sweden, Denmark, and northern Germany.

Anglo-Saxon kings possessed “a sacral quality by virtue of their royal blood.” Kings combined religious and political functions, and their relationships with their subjects were ultimately based on reciprocity. And because kingship had religious overtones, “the ethnogenesis of the English people was very largely a religious phenomenon, proceeding in tandem with the success of Christian missionaries into the fold of the Church. By the 8th century the Angelcynn—people of the English race—had been formed from the mélange of Germanic tribes that had entered England.”

This shift to Christianity was accomplished without losing touch with Germanic folk religions. The Norman conquest had no fundamental effect on English institutions, since “Normandy itself had been conquered by sea-borne Teutonic invaders and, as a consequence, kindred groups had been weakened there just as they had been in England. Anglo-Saxon men may have been disinherited by their Norman overlords but ‘their daughters married Normans and taught their children the meaning of Englishness,’” quoting Phillpotts.

Despite the differences among different social groups of Englishmen, there was a common sense of being English based on “common blood nourished by a common faith.” Jews were regarded as outsiders precisely because they were not of common blood or common faith, so much so that the Magna Carta had clauses explicitly protecting English families from the Jews. Royal responsibility for the welfare of subjects meant that “English kings were compelled eventually to place definite limits on Jewish exploitation of their Christian subjects.” Jews were not merely outsiders, but tough economic competitors. When the Church sided with the people by petitioning the king to “protect his people against Jewish economic aggression,” the king expelled the Jews, but only after being assured that the revenue they provided to the king would be made up by revenue from the Church and the nobility.

The fact that the king tried first to convert the Jews indicates that European societies were not self-consciously based on blood ties. Attempts to convert Jews were a common phenomenon during the Middle Ages throughout Europe. The only important case where Jews actually converted was in Spain, but then the issue became the sincerity of the converts and their continued ethnic cohesion and cooperation, leading ultimately to the Inquisition.3 The desire of Europeans to assimilate with the Jews was always a one-way street.

In the absence of kinship ties, reputation was everything. Fraser spends quite a bit of time on oath-taking as a peculiarly English pre-occupation, so much so that “the commonplace spectacle of Third World immigrants reciting oaths of allegiance at naturalization ceremonies is calculated to warm the hearts of WASPs committed heart and soul to the constitutionalist creed of civic nationalism.” Oath-taking is a public affirmation that is fundamentally about one’s reputation. It is, of course, a bit of WASP egoism that they think that other peoples have a similar sense of public trustworthiness.
WASPs are trusting souls. For that very reason they can be exploited easily by those who promise one thing and do another. . . . Mass Third World immigration imposes enormous risks upon Anglo-Saxon societies grounded in unique patterns of trusting behavior that evolved over many centuries. If newcomers do not accept the burdens entailed by the civic culture of the host society—most notably the need to forswear one’s pre-existing racial, ethnic and religious allegiances—they are bound to reduce the benefits of good citizenship for the host Anglo-Saxon nation.
I couldn’t agree more. And all the evidence is that these groups will not forswear these allegiances, any more than Jews have forsworn their ethnic and religious allegiances despite centuries of living among Europeans.

The next great historical step for the Angelcynn was the step from a Germanized Christianity to a far more universalist form of Christianity as a result of the expansion of the power of the centralized Church during the 11th-13th centuries. This momentous process began with the papal reforms of Pope Gregory VII that had as their basic aim an increase in ecclesiastical power at the expense of the kings. The result was a Kirchenstaat—Church-state—that eventually compromised the Anglo-Saxon Christian cult of sacral kingship. But rather than a unitary society based on sacral kingship, there was a split between the realm of religion, dominated by the Church, and the secular realm, dominated by the kings. This development also weakened the already fragile ties of kinship, as the Church actively campaigned against endogamy by restricting marriage of relatives and developed a concept of marriage in which the individuals to be married, not relatives, had an absolute right to choose marriage partners.4

This development facilitated individualism, and especially among the English. Fraser is aware that the roots of Western individualism may be found in Classical Greece. But “by the thirteenth century, the English were already set apart from the rest of Christendom by their pronounced predisposition towards liberty, independence and individualism”— tendencies that, as he notes, are in stark contrast with the Chinese (and all other cultures of which I am aware).

Kings responded to the ecclesiastical power grab by setting up their own secular institutions of justice independent of the Church courts. Political authority became “disenchanted”—removed from any connection to the sacred; royal authority became “a function of the king’s temporal body politic; no longer was his natural body the medium through which an emanation of sacred Heil descended directly from the gods.”

Basic to the period was the concept of “double majesty” in which both the king and his leading men had power. This concept was based on the comitatus concept—what Ricardo Duchesne terms “aristocratic egalitarianism.”5 The king is first among equals. He had power, but his acts required the approval of the magnates and they could act to restrain him from rashness. As Fraser notes, the baronial class had power within this system, but the arrangement excluded the “vast majority of ordinary folk.” One result was that the great barons retained considerable power over local affairs, while the king tended to affairs that affected the kingdom as a whole.

The Tudor revolution eclipsed both the power of the nobility and the power of the Church. But the events unleashed by this upheaval resulted in an even more revolutionary and radical revolution in English political culture: the rise of the Puritans. The Puritan revolution represented a fundamental break in English history, and Fraser is deeply critical:
It was the Puritan refusal to recognize the established Church of England as the synergistic unity of society, politics and religion that finally sealed the fate of the ancient regime in England. Puritans rejected the past-oriented, this-worldly folk religion of their Germanic ancestors and embraced instead a future-oriented, salvation history of sin and redemption in which the “Godly” were radically estranged from conventional society. Separating themselves from their “lukewarm” neighbours, Puritans withdrew into select, independent and voluntary communities composed solely of equals. Their virtuous communities of the elect existed in a state of grace that knew no national boundaries.
The result was “a radically new social character” that resulted in the “embourgeoisement of English elites.” This New Order cut off the possibility of an Anglican commonwealth; it was focused on the accumulation of wealth for its own sake.

The radicalism of the Puritan Revolution was that it completely destroyed the old tripartite Indo-European order based on the classes of sovereignty, the military, and commoners. This revolution was far more radical than the revolution whereby Christianity destroyed the pagan gods of old Europe:
Christianity formally proscribed the old religions but it did not uproot the social ideals embodied in the pagan gods. Even after the Papal Revolution, tradition-directed English Christians preserved the Trinitarian cosmology that their Anglo-Saxon ancestors shared with the Celts, the Scandinavians and the Romans.
The Puritan spirit of capitalism not only turned that ancient worldview on its head: it also launched Anglo-Saxons into a novus ordo seclorum that brought religion down to earth in an economy enchanted by the cornucopian myths of modernist Mammonism…. Before we can hope to escape our self-imposed domination, we must understand how the Puritan Revolution flattened the foundational myths of the trifunctional social order characteristic of all Indo-European peoples.
In short, the Puritan Revolution meant the end of the Indo-European world and its Christian version: the Church (“those who prayed, oratores”), the king and aristocracy (“those who fought, bellatores”), and the commoners (“those who worked, laboratores”). It was thus the quintessential modern revolution, a fundamental break in the history of the West.

The revolution, although begun in England, was slow to reach its completion there, whereas in the United States, “as a consequence of the Civil War, the absolute hegemony of the leveling, acquisitive and utilitarian society pioneered by the Puritan Revolution was firmly entrenched.” The Civil War pitted “the Cavaliers of the Old South [who] recalled the highest ideals of European chivalry” against “the soulless materialism of Northern capitalism.”

The Puritans had won, but in Fraser’s analysis, their victory heralded the end of a highly adaptive social order in favor of a social order that eventually led to the eclipse of WASPs. The new order was far more egalitarian than the older order. Congregations elected their ministers, and they served at the pleasure of the people they served. Whereas war had been the province of the nobility, Cromwell’s New Model Army was based on citizen participation.

It was also profoundly spiritual and created enormous energy. Unfortunately, the spiritual capital of Puritanism “was squandered by their WASP descendants. The saintly secularism of the Puritan has degenerated into the nonchalant nihilism of the postmodernist.” “Possessive individualism” and “tasteful consumption” had come to define the highest expression of Anglo-Saxon character and culture. The governments of England and other Anglo-Saxon areas became dominated by financial interests.

When the intellectuals of the new order looked at the English past, they did not see a social order of liberty and reciprocity. Rather,
they insisted that “Old England had been steeped in slavery” and only after the Whigs had triumphed in the Glorious Revolution did the English begin to enjoy their present freedoms. ... “To bring the government of England back to its first principles is to bring the people back to absolute slavery.” In the dark days of the past, “the people had no share in the government; they were merely the villeins, vassals, or bondsmen of their lords, “a sort of cattle bought and sold with the land.” Those slavish ancestors had submitted, more or less willingly, to the yoke fastened on their necks by those who prayed and those who fought. Such a servile mentality, it is said, had no rightful claim to a voice in the political community of the modern English commonwealth.
Indeed, White slavery continued to exist in the New World as indentured servants were bought and sold—“a situation not unlike Negro slavery.”

This new social order requires endless economic expansion. If that fails to come to pass, there will indeed be a crisis, and it’s clear where Fraser’s sympathies lie:
One hopes that such a state of emergency will trigger the need to return to the long-forgotten original principles of the tripartite social order, however “atavistic” such needs may seem to the modern managerial mind. The day may yet come when ineffectual WASPs give way to a new generation of Anglo-Saxon leaders possessed of both the sovereign wisdom to revive the communitarian ethos of the ancient republics and the selfless nobility to defend unto death the bio-cultural interests of their people.
However, before discussing in detail his proposal for a return to a primeval Indo-European cultural paradigm, Fraser discusses the rise and fall of WASPs in the United States. His basic proposal is that WASPs are a superior group in terms of IQ and other traits necessary for success in the contemporary world. He accepts the idea that different races and ethnic groups are in competition for survival. This race realist perspective, explicitly based on sociobiology, is combined with the idea that WASP talents should be seen as a gift from God and that WASPs require an ethno-theology capable of serving their biological interests in survival and reproduction. Fraser fundamentally disagrees with the idea that the sacred and secular ought to inhabit two separate worlds. Rather, they should be joined by fostering an ethno-religious sense of peoplehood in which the biological imperatives of survival, reproduction and sense of being part of an ethnic group are embedded in religious belief—a rejection of what he sees as the deformity of Christian theology that occurred as a result of the Medieval papal reforms discussed above. Fraser therefore takes Frank Salter to task for developing a theory of ethnic interests based solely on “mature Enlightenment values”—on reason rather than theology.6

Fraser does not see the future as a reconquest of lands once controlled by WASPs, but rather as the creation of WASPs as a diaspora people capable of retaining their ethnic and religious ties in a “postmodern archipelago.”

The Jewish Diaspora based on strong ethno-centrism and in-group altruism and ethnic networking thus becomes the implicit model for a WASP future. As he notes, the original Puritans also had many of the traits that define successful groups—the willingness to suppress individual goals for the good of the group by enacting laws that, for example, prohibited excessive profits.

Part Two deals with America as an experiment in WASP culture, and in particular with “the pathogenesis of Anglo-Saxon Anglophobia.” For Fraser, the pathogenesis starts with a rejection of the religious basis of Anglo-Saxon peoplehood. The entire concept of America independent of Britain is anathema: The American Revolution “suppressed the spirit of ethnoreligious loyalty owed by all British colonists to the blood and faith of Old England.”

Freed of the hereditary aristocracy and the religion of England, during the Jacksonian era, “the few remaining conservative influences in religion, politics, and law” were swept aside. The result was an exultant radical individualism in which every individual was to have direct, unmediated access to God. This radical individualism distrusted all manifestations of corporate power, including chartered private corporations, and Fraser agrees, writing that “a perversion of Christian theology permitted the modern business corporation to establish itself as a secular parody of the ecclesia.”
From a biocultural perspective, the most important consequence of the managerial revolution in corporate governance was the recasting of Anglo-American social character into a novel form, one particularly susceptible to Anglo-Saxon Anglophobia.
The corporation eventually metastasized into a monster “incapable of preserving either the class boundaries of the bourgeoisie or the ethnic character of the Anglo-American nation as a whole.” In the hands of recent and contemporary Anglo-Saxons, the modern business corporation is analogous to the “proposition nation” concept: merely a concatenation of contracts, with no ethnic character, although Fraser is quick to note that corporations dominated by other groups do not lose their ethnic character.

The American Revolution is still “a work in progress.” There have been three transformations thus far: the Constitutional Republic dating from the American Revolution to the Civil War and based on political decentralization, liberty, and egalitarianism; the Bourgeois Republic resulting from the victory of the North in the Civil War and lasting until FDR, typified by the 14th Amendment and a large increase in federal power; and the Managerial/Therapeutic leviathan since that period, characterized by even greater concentration of power at the federal level, combined now with energetic attempts to change the attitudes of Americans in a liberal and eventually in an Anglophobic direction. None of these were explicitly Anglo-Saxon Protestant: even at the outset, “the Anglo-Saxon character of the Constitutional Republic was merely implicit” [emphasis in original]. The fourth, as yet unrealized, republic is slated to be the Transnational Republic where all traces of White domination have been erased and WASPs have become “a shrinking and despised minority.”

For Fraser, the leveling, egalitarian tendencies of the Constitutional Republic went much too far because they fundamentally opposed the aristocratic Indo-European tripartite model which resulted in a leisured aristocracy:
A natural social order dating from time out of mind had been leveled. The egalitarian sense that every free man must participate in labor now outlawed “invidious” social distinctions between those who worked, those who prayed, and those who fought. It also aggravated the growing split between the North and South. Both the celebration of work and the disparagement of idleness made “the South with its leisured aristocracy supported by slavery even more anomalous than it had been at the time of the Revolution.” Combined with the anti-institutional fervor of evangelical revivalism, the democratic ideology of free labor eventually lent its mass appeal to a multi-pronged crusade against Negro slavery. . . . The conquest and destruction of the Old South marked the second phase of the permanent American Revolution.
The triumph of the North in the Civil War meant that the U.S. was even further removed from its Indo-European roots than before. Congruent with his sympathies for the aristocratic culture of the South as far more compatible with traditional Indo-European social organization, Fraser is unapologetic about slavery: “Not only could a strong scriptural case be made in favor of slavery but a strict construction of the Constitution also favored the pro-slavery argument.”

The result of Lincoln’s victory was that limits on federal power “were swept aside by executive decree and military might.”
By crushing the southern states, Lincoln fatally weakened the federal principle; his arbitrary exercise of emergency powers laid the foundations for executive dictatorship whenever exceptional circumstances justify the suspension of constitutional liberties. The war was an exercise in constitutional duplicity; the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 was accomplished only by means of blatant fraud and military coercion. Nonetheless, once securely enshrined in the Constitution, the amendment provided both the Second [i.e., Bourgeois] Republic and the Third [i.e., Managerial/Therapeutic] Republic with their formal constitutional warrant. ... By the standard of the First (Federal) Republic, the Fourteenth Amendment was unconstitutional. But, despite some initial resistance, the legal priesthood of the Republic soon elevated the amendment to the status of sacred writ.
Following the Civil War, there were disagreements among elite Anglo-Saxon intellectuals on race and the ability to successfully absorb the former slaves. For the race realists, Fraser emphasizes William Graham Sumner, a social Darwinist, who thought that social class divisions and competition were part of the natural order of things. Writing in 1903, he noted that “the two races live more independently of each other now than they did” during the slave era. But during the same period, self-styled WASP “progressives,” like Supreme Court Justice John Harlan, “labored ceaselessly to promote the egalitarian myth of the color-blind constitution.”

This was also the period when immigrants from eastern and southern Europe were flooding the country, threatening to change its identity. For a time, at least, the forces of Anglo-Saxon ethnic defense, spearheaded by New England intellectuals like Madison Grant, Lothrop Stoddard, and Edward A. Ross in alliance with the South and West, won out, culminating in the short-lived victory of the immigration law of 1924.

Fraser sees the Managerial/Therapeutic Republic as flatly unconstitutional. The original constitution has been jettisoned to the point that it has no relationship to the actual structure and operation of the federal government. A new managerial class, first described by James Burnham, had come to power. The result is a “multiracialist managerial revolution” that is “an explicitly post-Christian civil religion; a free-floating Constitutionalism has displaced the implicitly Anglo-Saxon Protestantism of the first ‘white man’s country.’ Since the New Deal...the myth of the Constitution has been severed from its biocultural roots in Anglo-Saxon Christendom.” Anglo-Saxons have abdicated their leading role to a rainbow coalition of groups, including Jews, Blacks, and Catholics, feminists, and homosexuals.

In Part Three, Fraser concludes with his prescription for the future of Anglo-Saxons. While acknowledging the difficulty of the task, Fraser hopes that WASPs will rediscover themselves as an ethno-nation by rallying around a redefined British monarchy and the Christian tradition: Crown, Church, and Country. Following 18th-century political philosopher Henry St. John, Viscount of Bolingbroke, Fraser advocates a “Patriot King come to deliver them from evil, seizing victory from the jaws of defeat.” The king will be a living icon, inspiring but without real power. He envisions a diaspora where the Anglo-Saxons are given formal recognition as a group and are able to form their own autonomous institutions with “binding norms of in-group solidarity”—in effect governing themselves as traditional Jewish diaspora groups (i.e., Orthodox and Hasidic Jews) have always done. As with Jewish groups, the result would be a global network—a network that will be indispensable in what Fraser sees as a “New Dark Age” of global disorder about to engulf the world. This impending “Long Emergency” of “catastrophe and collapse” can only be negotiated by groups with strong ethnic and cultural ties and a willingness to engage in within-group altruism. In this new age, the Anglican Church will play a central role: “The next Protestant Reformation must recall the Anglican Church to its original mission to shepherd the Anglo-Saxon race into the Kingdom of God.”

Fraser has done an extraordinary job in charting the outline and key turning points in the history of the Anglo-Saxons, and the decline of the West more generally. I agree with Frank Salter, whose comments are reproduced on the cover, that Fraser provides “a fresh analysis of the ethno-religious foundations of the English people.... Agree or disagree with Andrew Fraser’s prescriptions, his combination of originality and scholarship deserves to find a place in literature dealing with ethnicity, nationalism, constitutional history, biosocial science, and advocacy for Anglo-Saxon ethnic identity and biocultural continuity. Be prepared to read, reread, and ponder.”
What follows are some of my own ponderings.



The non-unitary ethnic basis of Anglo-Saxons

I agree with Fraser that the fundamental break in the history of the Anglo-Saxons is the rise of the Puritans and the overthrow of the primeval Indo-European social order in England, to be followed eventually by other European societies. Fraser correctly notes the strong egalitarian tendencies of the Puritans. As noted elsewhere7, however, these egalitarian tendencies are far more compatible with the hunter-gatherer model of European origins than the Indo-European warrior elite model. So the question is where these strong egalitarian tendencies came from. My proposal is that these tendencies toward egalitarian individualism, which characterize the peoples of Europe, particularly northern Europe, date from the Ice Ages and existed prior to the Indo-European invasions in the fourth millennium BC. This analysis is compatible with relatively small income- and social-class differences characteristic of Scandinavian society throughout its history, including the absence of serfdom during the Middle Ages—a pattern that reflects a hunter-gatherer model far more than an aristocratic model.

Fraser is certainly aware of differences among the Anglo-Saxons—he several times cites David Hackett Fischer’s classic Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America8; but he does not see them as ethnic differences. In this regard it is noteworthy that, as Fischer notes, the elitist, hierarchical model of the West Saxons was already apparent in southwest England dating from at least the 9th century. This group had large estates with lower-middle class servi and villani— essentially slaves.

As Fraser notes, the perception of the newly liberated classes after the English Revolution was that “Old England had been steeped in slavery,” and they had no desire to return to that. It is easy to romanticize the tripartite Indo-European social form, but the problem is that the aristocratic model did result in exploitation, and “those who worked” often reasonably resented the powers and riches of “those who fought” and their oftentimes unholy alliance with “those who prayed.”

My view is that the Puritans exemplify the egalitarian-individualist trend of Western society dating from before the imposition of the Indo-European model tripartite model. As Fraser is well aware, Puritan culture does not at all fit the warrior elite model. Puritans produced “a civic culture of high literacy, town meetings, and a tradition of freedom,” distinguished from other British groups by their “comparatively large ratios of freemen and small numbers of servi and villani9—phenomena quite the opposite of the Indo-European aristocratic model. These patterns date from Anglo-Saxon prehistory.

One may deplore the passing of the aristocratic model, as Fraser does, but it’s quite clear that in any case, one must attempt to understand the dominant Puritan influence on WASP culture as a pre-condition for an analysis of contemporary WASP pathology. Briefly, my take is that this subgroup is highly intelligent (e.g., they established Harvard and other elite universities shortly after arriving in America), innovative (as Charles Murray shows10, inventors derived from the northern European peoples are responsible for a hugely disproportionate number of the important inventions that define the modern era), and capable of producing high-trust societies based on individual reputation rather than kinship relationships. Fraser deplores their materialism, their rational approach to the world, and their concern with worldly success. He is quite correct that in the absence of a strong sense of ethnic cohesion and loyalty, these traits certainly become components of ethnic suicide; but they resulted in extraordinarily successful economies that have been the envy of the world.

Whereas the aristocratic-egalitarian military group was based on the comitatus model emphasizing cohesion and loyalty as a result of fealty to a successful leader, the Puritan model for cohesion was the creation of a morally defined in-group.11 These two models are thus variants on the individualist theme. The Puritans famously imposed penalties on people who departed from the moral/ideological strictures of the society. Puritan “ordered liberty” was the freedom to act within the confines of the moral order. This might be called the “paradox of individualism”: In order to form cohesive groups, individualists have at times erected strong social controls on individual behavior in order to promote group cohesion. They were also willing to incur great costs to impose their moral/ideological version of truth: Puritans were prone to “altruistic punishment,”12 defined as punishment of people who depart from the moral-ideological consensus that costs the punisher. And for the secular-minded descendants of the Puritans in the 19th century, slavery and the aristocratic model of Southern society were anathema to the point that their destruction warranted huge sacrifices.

The logic connecting these tendencies to the individualist hunter-gather model is obvious: Like all humans in a dangerous and difficult world, hunter-gatherers need to develop cohesive, cooperative ingroups. But rather than base them on known kinship relations, the prototypical egalitarian-individualist groups of the West are based on reputation and trust. Egalitarian-individualists create moral-ideological communities in which those who violate public trust and other manifestations of the moral order are shunned, ostracized, and exposed to public humiliation—a fate that would have resulted in evolutionary death during the harsh ecological period of the Ice Age—the same fate as the derelict father who refused to provision his children.

The point here, and I am sure that Fraser would agree, is that the culture of the West as it developed in the modern era owes much more to the egalitarian individualism model of the Puritans than to the Indo-European model of aristocratic individualism.

Beyond Puritans and Cavaliers

Fraser is certainly aware of differences among different WASP groups, and thus far, the discussion has emphasized the Cavalier-descended Southern aristocratic culture and the Puritan-descended elite that became dominant, especially after the Civil War. Besides these groups, David Hackett Fischer discusses two other British groups: the Quakers, who are even more universalist and egalitarian than the Puritans, but nowhere near as culturally influential or economically dominant; and the Scots-Irish, who came from Northern England, Ulster, and the lowlands of Scotland. This group had a great deal of influence on culture of the American South and West. Fraser is surely right that the Puritan-descended WASP elite that dominated the board rooms and the elite universities have lost their religious faith, and what is left of it is little more than a mild version of cultural Marxism; they have generally succumbed to the destructive forces of the new cultural dispensation. This is not the case with the descendants of the Scots-Irish. Fischer describes their “prevailing cultural mode as profoundly conservative and xenophobic”;13 historically, they detested both the Cavalier-descended planters and the Puritan-descended abolitionists. “In the early twentieth century they would become intensely negrophobic and antisemitic. In our own time they are furiously hostile to both communists and capitalists.”

There is some indication that they were less individualistic than other groups originating in England: to an extent far greater than their Puritan co-ethnics, they were more involved in clan relationships of extended families rather than merely lineal descent.“Marriage ties were weaker than blood ties,” and there was a tendency to marry within the extended family—both markers of greater collectivism.

The Scots-Irish certainly have not lost their faith. They showed “intense hostility to organized churches and established clergy on the one hand and [an] abiding interest in religion on the other.” They rejected the Anglican Church, religious taxes, and established clergy, but for all that, they were intensely and emotionally religious. Indeed, this group is the main force behind the culture of the American Bible Belt—the religious fundamentalism that is such an important aspect of contemporary American politics. They are, indeed, socially conservative and a great many of them are involved in the angry protests of the Tea Party movement. They are the epitome of implicit Whiteness,14 flocking to White cultural events like NASCAR racing and gun shows.

The problem is that, along with the rest of White America, they are channelled by the media, federal government, legal system, and their own religious leaders to be silent on the matter of race; moreover, quite often their brand of evangelical religion is decidedly pro-Israel, which makes them avid supporters of the foreign-policy programs of the Israel lobby and the Republican Party (as defined by the Jewish dominated “neoconservatives.”) Nevertheless, this group of WASPs is likely to be a thorn in the side of the elites well into the future.

Rationality

Fraser deplores the rationalist tendencies of WASP culture because they ultimately undermined religion and ultimately the Anglo-Saxon ethno-nation.15 Thus, Fraser sees scholastic philosophy, which was heavily influenced by Aristotle, as leading to “the divorce of God from man.” Darwin’s “bleak and disenchanted vision” was simply the endpoint of a centuries-long process that displaced God from the Western mind, rendering Westerners defenseless against the onslaught of other peoples.

However, I would argue that the rationality of Anglo-Saxons is just as fundamental as the irrational, emotional and religious aspects. As Ricardo Duchesne points out, one aspect of European uniqueness originated with the Greeks, who invented scientific reasoning by offering explanations of natural events that were entirely general. Duchesne defends Max Weber’s claim that, far more than any other civilization, the West exhibited a greater level of rationalization of all aspects of life. He comments on the greater extent to which “social activities involving the calculation of alternate means to a given end were rationalized, and in the higher degree to which theoretical beliefs about the nature of the universe, life, and God were rationalized through the use of definitions, theorems, and concepts.”16

There are deep relationships between rationality and individualism: individualists are prone to seeing the world in universalist terms, objectively and without biases resulting from in-group allegiances. This accounts for the strong tendency for moral universalism in Western philosophy, and as Weber notes, this rationalistic stance predisposes the West to create rational bureaucracies “managed by specialized and trained officials in accordance with impersonal and universal statuses and regulations formulated and recorded in writing.”17

It is certainly the case that this proneness to universalism and rationalism can result in failure to defend the legitimate particularlistic ethnic interests of the West in the name of universalist ideals. That is, indeed, what we are seeing now. However, there is no question that particularist ethnic interests are defensible from a rational, scientific perspective.18

Indeed, the WASP ethnic defense of the 1920s, resulting in the Immigration Restriction Law of 1924, was energized partly by an intellectual understanding of Darwinism and race, not by a religious sensibility. The strong emphasis on rationality meant that public discourse on immigration policy in the 1920s necessarily took place in an atmosphere where scientific ideas and rational discourse had pride of place. The basic argument of the restrictionists was that all groups in the country had legitimate interests in retaining their share of the national population, including Whites (or, more accurate in the case of Madison Grant and the eugenicists, Nordics).19

Nevertheless, for Fraser, the rational basis of the WASP ethnic defense was why it ultimately failed:
Lost altogether was the primordial understanding that Anglo-Saxon identity is inseparable from the blood faith of a Christian people. Once American political theology fell under the influence of scientific modernism, racial realists lost interest in the ethnoreligious traditions of Anglo-Saxon Christendom. . . . Scientific racism . . . bore the stamp of a soulless and self-defeating materialism. Racial realism was too cold and aloof to regenerate a sense of ethnoreligious solidarity among Anglo-Saxon Protestants. It left middle-class Americans unable to decide whether they were simply whites, or one of several more exotic breeds such as the Nordics, Aryans, or Caucasians. Lacking firm roots in the historical literature and popular culture of a folk religion, in ancestral myths of heroism, chivalry, and romantic love, Anglo-Saxon racial solidarity had little purchase within the collective machinery of social control that increasingly governed industrial America.
The WASP ethnic defense doubtless had emotional roots (more apparent in the non-Puritan-descended Anglo-Saxons of the West and South), but it was justified in a scientific, rational manner. The ultimate defeat of the WASP ethnic defense occurred because of the rise of the “Culture of Critique”—particularly Boasian anthropology, the Frankfurt School, and the general academic culture of the left.
It is probable that the decline in evolutionary and biological theories of race and ethnicity facilitated the sea change in immigration policy brought about by the 1965 law. As Higham (1984) notes, by the time of the final victory in 1965, which removed national origins and racial ancestry from immigration policy and opened up immigration to all human groups, the Boasian perspective of cultural determinism and anti-biologism had become standard academic wisdom. The result was that “it became intellectually fashionable to discount the very existence of persistent ethnic differences. The whole reaction deprived popular race feelings of a powerful ideological weapon” (Higham 1984, 58-59). Jewish intellectuals were prominently involved in the movement to eradicate the racialist ideas of Grant and others.20
In other words, the failure of WASP ethnic defense occurred because the high ground in rational, scientific debate had been seized by Jews as ethnic competitors. Note also John Higham’s point that the intense emotions felt by the restrictionists eventually failed because of the failure of restrictionist science. In the absence of an intellectually legitimate grounding, the WASP ethnic defense was doomed.

This is an incredibly important object lesson for contemporary attempts to defend White interests: We must be able to seize the rational, scientific high ground because that is essential to public debate in Western societies and ultimately to the emotional commitment of Whites to a sense of having group interests as Whites—in other words, to their very survival. In my view, a well-grounded scientific understanding of White genetic interests that rationalizes the intense natural motives of ethnic affiliation is likely to be far more effective in rallying Whites, especially elite Whites, than religious feelings. As Fraser is all too well aware, the story of religious feeling in the modern age has been to either sink into irrelevance for secular Whites (who are likely to be more educated) or be diverted into causes that are suicidal for religious Whites.

Jewish influence

Fraser is quite aware of the ethnocentric aspect of Judaism and Jewish hostility toward Christianity. Indeed, I agree with his comment that “for most Jews. . . inveterate hostility toward Christianity is more important to their collective identity than ‘solidarity with Israel.’” Moreover, Fraser is not unaware of Jewish influence. He has a nice comment on Felix Adler’s universalist Ethical Culture society which promoted Anglo-Saxon cosmopolitanism and ethnic disappearance while promising that Jews would lose their ethnic coherence only after everyone else had done so. This sentiment—actually a mainstream ideology among Reform Jews of the period—would put off the sacrifice of their own ethnicity until “the arrival of a ‘post-ethnic’ utopia.” He credits them as “major players in the design and execution of the new constitutional order” underlying the New Deal. He also has a nice section of the Jewish campaign to rid the public square of any trace of Christianity.

Fraser also asks whether the abdication of the WASP has really resulted in a better society now that it is dominated by “an increasingly corrupt corporate plutocracy in which Ivy League Jews are heavily over-represented.... Worse still, Jewish elites harbor a deep-seated animus toward the Christian faith professed by most Americans.” And he notes the hypocrisy whereby “the Jewish civil religion explicitly disallows the desire of both Anglo-Saxon Protestants and ethnic Catholics to live in predominantly European Christian societies. At the same time organized Jewry loudly insists that Israel’s character as an explicitly Jewish state must be preserved and protected.” Moreover, Fraser notes that “ethnocentric Jewish elites bear a large, unacknowledged (but glaringly obvious, to those with eyes to see) share of responsibility” for militant Islam, moral decline, financial collapse and economic depression.

Nevertheless, he fails to deal with the Culture of Critique—Jewish intellectual domination, their very large influence on the media and the political process, and their role in promoting massive immigration of non-Whites which, after all, is the root of the entire problem.21 As noted above, the triumph of the Jewish intellectual elite after WWII spelled the death knell of the WASP ethnic defense that culminated in the immigration law of 1924. The organized Jewish community was also pivotal in promoting massive non-White immigration beginning with their triumph of the 1965 immigration law. WASPs indeed have their weaknesses. But in the absence of the rise of a hostile Jewish elite, there is no reason to suppose that America would now be confronted with 100,000,000 non-Whites, many harboring historical grudges against Whites, and under threat to have a non-White majority in the foreseeable future.22

Whites versus WASPs

Fraser’s appeal is to WASPs, not the “dangerously over-inclusive racial phenotype” of White. But, as he notes, “in the first ‘white man’s country,’ age-old ethnic differences between English, Scotch-Irish, Scots, Welsh, German and French Huguenot colonists literally paled into insignificance.” Fraser argues that the concept of Whiteness “always implied the inherent equality of anyone passing” for White, a logic that repelled conservatives, who were attracted to the talented members of other races and capitalists who cared more about the cost of their workers than their race. Fraser advises WASPs to shed the label of “White” in favor of “reasserting their ancestral identity as Anglo-Saxons.”

I do think that different White subgroups should continue to remain separate, particularly in Europe where it would be a very large loss to lose the different languages and cultures of the various European groups. Even in the United States, it is nice to see celebrations of Scottish, Irish, and other European cultures by their descendants.

However, it would be foolish indeed to organize politically solely on the basis of these sub-groups. The term “White” in the American political context refers to all 200 million people of European descent—a very large and politically powerful group, whereas the descendants of Anglo-Saxon Protestants are a much smaller group. The obvious strategy is to legitimize a sense of White identity and White interests in the current climate, dominated as it is by elites hostile to the traditional White peoples and White culture of America. Having an identity qua White need not compromise identifications with sub-groups of Whites. There are important differences among these groups, as emphasized in this review. However, we are all quite closely related—indeed, Europeans are the most genetically homogeneous continental group on Earth. And we should all have a sense of our common cultural heritage, spanning from the Classical Age to the Italian Renaissance to German Romanticism to the English drama.

Such a rational construction of our ethnic interests in the contemporary world is therefore not without a strong biological basis of near kinship, but also carries with it an intense emotional appreciation of the common European culture and its accomplishments. My hope is that these two strands can eventually win the day, despite the current very large threat to our people and culture.

This article was originally published in The Great Erasure: The Reconstruction of White Identity (2012).



  1. James Russell, The Germanization of Early Medieval Christianity: A Sociohistorical Approach to Religious Transformation (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
  2. Berta Surees Phillipotts, Kindred and Clan in the Middle Ages and After: A Study in the Sociology of the Teutonic Races (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1913).
  3. See K. MacDonald, Separation and Its Discontents: Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), Chapters 4 and 7.
  4. Kevin MacDonald, “The Establishment and Maintenance of Socially Imposed Monogamy in Western Europe,” Politics and the Life Sciences, vol. 14, 1995.
  5. Ricardo Duchesne, The Uniqueness of Western Civilization (Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 2011).
  6. Frank Salter, On Genetic Interests: Family, Ethny, and Humanity in an Age of Mass Migration (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2006).
  7. Kevin MacDonald, “Review of Ricardo Duchesne’s The Uniqueness of Western Civilization.” The Occidental Quarterly, Vol. 11 (3), Fall, 2011, pp. 47-74.
  8. David Hackett Fischer, Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1989).
  9. Kevin Phillips, Cousins’ Wars: Religion, Politics, Civil Warfare and the Triumph of Anglo-America (New York: Basic Books, 1999), p. 26. See also MacDonald, “Review of Ricardo Duchesne’s The Uniqueness of Western Civilization.”
  10. Charles Murray, Human Accomplishment: The Pursuit of Excellence in the Arts and Sciences, 800 B.C. to 1950 (New York: Harper Perennial, 2004).
  11. Kevin MacDonald, “American Transcendentalism: An Indigenous Culture of Critique.” The Occidental Quarterly, vol. 8, Summer 2008, pp. 91-106.
  12. E. Fehr & S. Gächter, “Altruistic Punishment in Humans,” Nature 415, 2002, pp. 137-140.
  13. Fischer, Albion’s Seed, Ibid.
  14. Kevin MacDonald, “Psychology and White Ethnocentrism.” The Occidental Quarterly, vol. 6 (4), Winter, 2006-07, pp. 7-46.
  15. See Kevin MacDonald, “Neoconservatism as a Jewish Movement,” The Occidental Quarterly, vol. 4, Summer 2004, pp. 1-18; “The Neoconservative Mind.” The Occidental Quarterly, vol. 8 (3), Fall 2008, pp. 1-18.
  16. Duchesne, The Uniqueness of Western Civilization, p. 248.
  17. Ibid., p. 249
  18. Frank Salter, On Genetic Interests.
  19. Kevin MacDonald, The Culture of Critique (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), Chapter 7.
  20. MacDonald, The Culture of Critique, pp. 252-253. The inner quotations are to: Carl Degler, In Search of Human Nature: The Decline and Revival of Darwinism in American Social Thought (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); John Higham, Send These to Me: Immigrants in Urban America, rev. ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984).
  21. MacDonald, The Culture of Critique.
  22. See my review of Eric P. Kaufmann’s The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America; The Occidental Observer, July 29, 2009: http://www. theoccidentalobserver.net/articles/MacDonald-Kaufmann.html (accessed May 1, 2012).